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The Fatherland was the home wherein God has placed us, among brothers and sisters
linked to us by the family ties of a common religion, history, and language.
–  Giuseppe Mazzini
We have […] a single, universal language. And we possess a religion which most of us
share, ways of performing our activities, and a blood which is virtually one flowing in 
our veins.
– Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid
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Abstract
This dissertation is an attempt to address the ultra-nationalism of the June 30, 2013 period from a
new and still  largely unexplored angle, that is, the function it served the businessmen who have
supported the dissemination of this discourse through their media outlets. In order to do this, this
research utilizes theories and tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to examine the
forces and interests—including economic—behind the diffusion of such discourse.  
The study uses as its sample three of the most popular talk shows which were at the forefront of
spreading this ultra-nationalist discourse. The talk shows were screened on private media channels
owned by businessmen that have started their process of wealth accumulation as a result of the 1970s
open-door policy, mostly during the Mubarak era and in close alliance with state institutions. 
Although analyzing discourse critically takes into consideration the broader context in which the
text  has  emerged,  CDA  is  sometimes  criticized  for  having  contexts  that  are  ahistorical  and
synchronic (looks only at a given moment in time). Therefore, the study broadens its context to also
include the historical dimension. Accordingly, the second half of this study explores the historical
links  of  how nationalism served economic  functions  in  Egypt  since  the  second half  of  the 19 th
century. The focus is on shifts and ruptures in official nationalist discourse, and how the past is in a
continuous process of change and restructuring based on present considerations.
This rational  adoption of nationalist  discourse based on economic considerations attempts to
offer an alternative narrative to the dominant discourse that described the June 30 ultra-nationalist
discourse as hysterical, irrational and emotionally charged. Given that key players in disseminating
such “hysteria” were rational economic men, these descriptions are therefore unsatisfactory. The
study also argues that these views are linked to the dominant notion that the rational development of
modern capitalism only influenced nationalisms in European contexts,  whereas in  non-European





Dit  proefschrift  is  een  poging  om  het  ultranationalisme  van  de  periode  rond  30  juni  2013  te
bespreken  vanuit  een  nieuw en  grotendeels  niet  onderzocht  standpunt.  Dit  wil  zeggen:  als  een
hulpmiddel  voor  zakenmensen  die  de  verspreiding  van  dit  ultranationalistische  discours
ondersteunden via hun mediakanalen. Hiervoor gebruikt dit onderzoek de theorie en de middelen
van  de  ‘Critical  Discourse  Analysis’  (CDA)  om de  machtsverhoudingen  en  belangen,  inclusief
economische, die een rol spelen in de verspreiding van zulks een discours te bestuderen. 
De studie gebruikt drie van de meest populaire praatprogramma’s die de voorhoede vormden van
dit ultranationalistische discours als voorbeeld. De drie shows werden uitgezonden op particuliere
mediakanalen die  het  eigendom zijn  van zakenlieden die  hun rijkdom begonnen te  vergaren als
gevolg van het open-deur beleid van de jaren 70, voornamelijk tijdens het Mubarak tijdperk en in
nauwe alliantie met de staatsinstellingen.
Hoewel een kritische analyse van het discours rekening houdt met de bredere context,  is de
context meestal synchroon en wordt deze op een bepaald moment bekeken. Maar deze studie neemt
ook de ruimere historische context in acht. Bijgevolg gaat de tweede helft van de studie na hoe het
nationalisme,  historisch gezien,  de economische doelstelling van Egypte diende sinds de tweede
helft van de negentiende eeuw. Daarom ligt de focus op verschuivingen en breuken in het officiële
nationalistische  discours,  en  op  hoe  het  verleden  een  voortdurend  proces  van  verandering  en
herstructurering is, gebaseerd op de huidige overwegingen.
Deze  rationele  manier  om  het  nationalistische  discours  voor  te  stellen,  gebaseerd  op
economische overwegingen, poogt een tegenwicht te bieden aan de overheersende beschrijving van
het  ultranationalistische  discours  van  de  periode  rond  30  juni  als  hysterisch,  irrationeel  en
emotioneel geladen. Aangezien de hoofdrolspelers in het verspreiden van die “hysterie” rationele
zakenmensen  zijn,  waren  deze  beschrijvingen  onvoldoende.  Deze  studie  betoogt  ook  dat  deze
denkbeelden  verbonden  zijn  aan  het  overheersende  idee  dat  de  rationele  ontwikkeling  van  het
moderne  kapitalisme  alleen  het  nationalisme  in  een  Europese  context  beïnvloedde,  terwijl  het
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Introduction
As far as historical events could be defined and contoured, June 30 was a historical event par
excellence. William Sewell (1996) defines a historical event as “a ramified sequence of occurrences
that  is  recognized as  notable by contemporaries,  and that  results  in  a  durable transformation of
structures”. For Sewell, moments of accelerated change, are usually initiated and carried forward by
historical events, and are more than just the outcome of processes that have been long underway.
Historical events tend to transform social relations in ways that could not be predicted and goes
beyond the impact of the gradual changes that may have made the events possible. 
Just like the revolution of January 2011, the June 30 moment was a historical event that sent
shockwaves so powerful that their impact helped “reshape history” in the words of Sewell, who also
emphasizes the sense of rupture created by historical events. History tends to deal with events of
such magnitude as a clear line that divides history itself into what happened before and after them.
One of the gradual changes that made June 30 possible, but at the same time led to an accelerated
transformation that goes beyond the outcome of these gradual changes had it not created a historical
event, was the slow and perhaps peculiar shift of political alliances that were built in the lead up to
and during the January 2011 revolution. 
The alliances and the counter-alliances that were established in the build-up to the January 2011
revolution and its aftermath were turned on their heads in the prelude to the June 30, 2013 events.
The enemies of yesterday were the friends of today, and some of those who were calling for the “fall
of the military regime” were now calling for its restoration. The revolutionary alliances which were
built in the lead up and during the 18-day protests in January 2011 were composed of many forces
including leftist  and left-leaning groups such as  The Revolutionary Socialists and  April  6 Youth
Movement, liberal groups such as al-Wafd party and The Democratic Front party, Nasserist groups
and political parties, broad-based alliances such as Kifaya and the National Association for Change,
and Islamist groups such as the  Muslim Brotherhood and some of their allies--not to mention the
numerous labour unions and associations, and student movements (Shehata, 2011; Masoud, 2011). 
On the other hand, the counter-revolutionary forces consisted mainly of business interests closely
associated with the Mubarak regime and its institutions, in addition to many in the culture industry
and a petty bourgeoisie that worked in or close to the hospitality industry. Members of this petty
bourgeoisie thought that the political instability caused by revolutionary politics has much more of a
negative impact on their livelihoods than the political stagnation that would have ensued had the
revolution not taken place (Ahlberg, 2017, p. 214). 
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The June 30 moment shuffled this configuration quite radically. Already after the overthrow of
Mubarak, and during the Muslim Brotherhood gradual ascent to power—first through the winning
40%  of  the  late  2011  parliamentary  elections  and  then  winning  the  presidency  with  immense
difficulty in extremely tight elections—alliances were already starting to shift.  2011 and most of
2012 were seen as a period of relative agreement and harmony between the Brotherhood and the
military, which caused a great unbridgeable gulf between the Brotherhood and its allies on the one
hand, and anti-military revolutionary groups on the other. 
This rift resulted in a new configuration composed of three major forces this time instead of the
simple pro- and counter-revolution. Now it was Brotherhood and its Islamist allies, revolutionary
groups mainly composed of secular (both leftist and liberal) groups, and the pro-Mubarak elements
popularly known as filool (lit. remnants). Moreover, Hizb al-Kanaba (lit. couch party)1 had “left its
couch” for the first time and mobilized significantly against the Muslim Brotherhood in the months
leading up to June 30 both in the streets and on social media (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday, 2017). Under
this new configuration, the military occupied a peculiar space at the nexus of all three forces trying
to appear neutral in the process. 
This configuration lasted until the June 30 moment, and it was characterized by a gradual and
cautious coalescence between revolutionary and Mubarakist forces during Mohamed Morsy’s year in
power united by their opposition to his rule. The one moment where this union was best manifested
was  during  the  constitutional  crisis  at  the  end  of  2012  when  Morsy  issued  a  constitutional
declaration  granting  himself  immense  powers,  sparking  great  protests  and  prompting  the
establishment of the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF was a broad-based alliance composed
of so-called  secular  parties  comprising  both  revolutionary  and counter-revolutionary  parties  and
politicians  with  very  little  in  common  except  for  their  opposition  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood
(Beinin, 2013). 
This  tripartite  classification—although  schematic—could  be  key  to  understanding  the  fluid
politics leading to the June 30 events and the crisis of governance that coloured the post-2011 era.
First, the antagonism between the three groups meant that any of them reaching power would have
the  two  other  forces  in  opposition  making  their  ability  to  govern  very  difficult  even  with
unconditional  support  from  their  core  group.  It  also  meant  that  in  order  to  overthrow  the
Brotherhood regime, the two other factions had to unite even if there was animosity between them.
1A term used to describe the collective of politically apathetic individuals during the height of revolutionary politics and 
during the aftermath of the 18-day protests against Hosni Mubarak in January/February 2011.
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The Brotherhood also failed despite some few and dispersed attempts to make an alliance with one
of the other two forces (revolutionary and pro-Mubarak) to alienate the third. They had no clear
conception  of  which  force  to  ally  and  share  power  with  to  be  able  to  defeat  the  third  force;
sometimes it would seem as if they were trying to warm up to the revolutionaries to alienate the
Mubarakist forces and at other times would do the exact opposite. Eventually, this strategy turned
everyone against them except their core group of supporters. 
The military successfully positioned itself as a neutral force above these divisions. It was trying
to situate itself as an arbitrator between the warring factions rather than part of the conflict; it was no
one’s closest  friend but also no one’s fiercest  enemy, so even if  it  was very few people’s most
favourite option, it was no one’s least favourable, except obviously the Brotherhood since it was the
faction that held official power.  Given this tripartite classification in which antagonism between all
three forces was too strong to make an alliance or power sharing possible once in power, each of the
forces sought to prevent the other two forces from ruling on their own, while realizing that they will
not be able to rule on their own for the same reason of lacking enough popular support. 
The way was therefore paved for a fourth and “neutral” force to emerge and claim power. The
military was the obvious option in this case; in a way the military was neither revolutionary, nor
Mubarakist, nor proponents of the Brotherhood, but in some way, it was paradoxically all of this.
The military was able to present itself as supportive of the revolution because it withdrew its support
for Mubarak in the face of growing protests in January/February 2011, but it was still perceived as
counter-revolutionary because its policies and decision in the interim period under the rule of the
Supreme  Council  of  Armed  Forces  (SCAF)  represented  a  very  reactionary  position  towards
revolutionary change. This reactionary position was appreciated by the Mubarakists for putting the
brakes on revolutionary momentum, but at the same time a regime that has stepped in to overthrow
Mubarak and yielded to pressure for prosecuting him and his entourage cannot be perceived as fully
Mubarakist either. As for Islamism, the military in Egypt--unlike in Turkey for example--does not
have a strong secular tradition and is quite religiously conservative, but at the same time had a long
history of tense relations with different Islamist factions including the Brotherhood; however, this
conservative nature helped with not alienating conservative Egyptians whose conservatism does not
necessarily translate to support for political Islam. 
In this atmosphere, a nationalist discourse was rampant because it offered to act as a unifying
force between competing groups that had little in common ideologically except for a rejection of
Islamist rule, and a vague normative conception of Egyptian identity, culture and lifestyle. Surely,
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this identity discourse was supplemented with other issues such as economic mismanagement, but
nationalism remained the main basis from which the Brotherhood was most vigorously attacked.
This nationalist  discourse was disseminated through means of mass media. As will be discussed
throughout the study, many of these media outlets have mobilized vast resources to persuade people
to join the June 30 protests. 
This  kind  of  June  30  nationalist  fervour  and  identity  politics  were  reminiscent  to  some
commentators of the rise of fascism in Europe. David Kirkpatrick, the New York Times Cairo Bureau
Chief at the time, said in an online podcast interview that this is how he imagines how Europe might
have felt during the rise of fascism. “It may be just a momentary national hysteria, but at the moment
there is a surreal-seeming enthusiasm for the military ... even by people who just a few months ago
were calling for the end of military rule," said Kirkpatrick (Fresh Air, 2013). 
Political  scientist  Ashraf  El-Sharif  also  likened the anti-Brotherhood propaganda to  hysteria.
“The government and the elite stoked a sort of hysteria towards the Brotherhood, and this took hold
among the urban middle and lower middle classes in a way I had never witnessed,” said El-Sharif
(El-Sharif, 2017). Human Rights Watch’s deputy Middle East director Joe Stork thought that this
hysteria  extended to the country’s institution after  three al-Jazeera journalists  were sentenced to
prison for  covering  the  post-June  30  protest  events.  Stork  said  that  these  sentences  show how
Egypt’s judges have been caught up in the anti-Brotherhood hysteria fostered by President al-Sisi
(Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Political  pundits  were  also  using  the  term  casually  in  describing  the  events.  Here  is  the
Guardian’s Patrick Kingsley who reported the June 30 events from Cairo in a 2015 article recalling
the events:
Sensing their  moment,  the business  elite,  which controlled the media,  launched a  full-on
decapitation  strategy.  As  June  wore  on,  their  newspapers  and  TV  cast  Morsi  and  the
Brotherhood  as  terrorists,  and  holding  them  solely  responsible  for  Egypt’s  deep-rooted
economic problems and fuel shortages. Aboul Fotouh, Morsi’s former ally, supported calls for
early elections, and for anti-Morsi protests. But he also argues that these protests were egged
on by a campaign to “smear the president, to smear the revolution, and to make people feel
that revolution didn’t bring any stability or any security.”  Which came first may never be
established, but amid an increasingly hysterical national conversation, the military also began
to move behind the scenes (Kingsley, 2015). 
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Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institute also makes an analogy between the political activity of
the time and hysteria:
The level of repression under President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi [sic] surpasses that of President
Hosni  Mubarak and even his  predecessors,  in  terms of  the  number  of  Egyptians  killed,
wounded, detained, and “disappeared” since the military coup of July 3, 2013. Meanwhile,
the nature of  repression is  more  dangerous –  and therefore  of  greater  concern  for  U.S.
policymakers – because it enjoys a significant degree of popular support, drawing on media
and  mass  hysteria,  cult  of  personality,  and  the  dehumanization  of  political  opponents
(Hamid, 2015).
Critics  of  the  June  30  developments  seem to  have  widely  adopted  the  view that  “national
hysteria” had dominated the scene; however, as someone who had closely followed the events—
including through the media—and who has some knowledge about the background of the main
supporters of the June 30 movement through my work as an economics journalist and researcher for
over  a  decade,  I  found  the  reduction  of  events  of  such  magnitude  to  “national  hysteria”  and
emotionally-charged political activity very unsatisfactory.
The source of this dissatisfaction was the fact that newspapers and television networks which
took the lead in propagating this “hysteria” were owned by veteran businessmen who had very close
ties with the Mubarak state and benefited immensely from such ties as will be explained in detail
throughout the study. These media-owning businessmen are risk averse, and would not let irrational
political action harm their interests. Even if such irrationality could be a possible explanation for the
action of an individual businessman, when treated as a collective and when the actions are clearly
coordinated, the “hysteria” discourse becomes even more unsatisfactory. 
From there,  I  grew interested  in  exploring  the  rational  and  economic  underpinnings  of  this
frontage of irrational ideological mess that appears on the screens and the pages of the media outlets
they own, and with moving beyond a view of nationalism that is only associated with the cultural
and the political domains. Since so-called economic men—whose focus is on maximizing profit for
themselves—were heavily engaged in the propagation of this “hysterical” discourse, the point of
departure of this study is trying to examine this nationalist discourse from an economic point of
view. The objective is to uncover the rational underpinnings of such irrational national fervour by
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examining the economic functions that the dissemination of this type of discourse might have served
this media-owning business elite. 
In other words, the hypothesis of this dissertation is the existence of sober and economic interests
that lie beneath this hysterical media discourse. Accordingly, these hysterical nationalist utterances
will be examined in relation to and from the lens of the economic interests of the media owners who
host and invest in their dissemination. This will happen while not treating nationalist hysteria and
sober  rationalism  as  binary  oppositions,  separate  processes  or  expressions,  but  as  possessing
elements of one other. This is reminiscent of the Rational-Choice Theory of Neurosis (RCTN) which
accounts for the development and treatment of neurosis in conscious-rational terms. It suggests that
the choice of neurotic symptom is determined by certain rational functions including functions like
cost-benefit analysis (Rofé, 2010).
The best place to start this task is the media outlets that were heavily engaged in the propagation
of this hysterical discourse, and at the same time are owned and financed by those economic men. I
aimed in this study to analyze the discourse of these media outlets and try to liken it to the economic
interests of those who fund the whole process. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seemed like the
most suitable tool to proceed with such task because—unlike other forms of textual analysis only
focusing on the  text—it  takes  the  analysis  beyond the  micro  level  of  text  analysis  (the  uttered
nationalist “hysteria” in this case) to the power behind its production, and the interests—including
economic—of its producers.
 The CDA will  focus on three prime-time shows aired on three different television channels
owned by what I describe as “infitah (open-door policy) businessmen”, who started their process of
capital accumulation as a direct result of the open-door policy of Anwar Sadat in the 1970s, and were
also Mubarak loyalists, as Mubarak’s economic policies and ruling alliance are widely perceived to
be a continuation of Sadat’s.  The reason behind selecting this  group of businessmen is  that  the
conditions which allowed them to accumulate their colossal wealth led to a landmark transformation
in the political orientation of Egypt. This transformation included the official nationalist discourse of
Egypt from a focus on pan-Arabism under the Nasserist order to an Egyptocentric focus under the
Sadat regime. 
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I comprises the Critical Discourse Analysis where
each of the CDA levels (micro, meso and macro) are assigned a chapter. Part II of the study is an
attempt to historicize the discourse presented and analyzed in Part I of the study. Chapter 1 will
present the history of the field of nationalism studies and its gaps when dealing with contemporary
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and non-European nationalism, the research problematic and question. From there it discusses the
conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches of the study and how tools such as CDA were
employed to answer the  research question.  The rationale  behind using  a  mix  of  qualitative and
quantitative methods is also discussed. 
Part I of the dissertation, which starts with Chapter 2, comprises the Critical Discourse Analysis
itself. It analyzes the nationalist discourse of the prime-time shows of three channels owned by three
of  the  biggest  infitah businessmen  who  started  investing  in  the  broadcasting  media  after  the
revolution. The purpose of this investment is to propagate a political message and promote their
political  standpoint  at  a  time  when their  privileged position  was  under  threat  due  to  sweeping
revolutionary change. 
Chapter  2  comprises  the  first  stage  of  the  CDA,  and  focuses  entirely  on  the  micro-level
dimension of analysing the text. It mainly consists of data and transcribed material that result from
watching  about  40  hours  of  the  three  prime-time  shows in  the  three  channels  owned by three
conspicuous infitah businessmen from one week before the June, 30 2013 protest until the day of the
tafweed (popular mandate) to fight terrorism at the end of July of the same year. The micro level
also incorporates some basic quantitative analysis to identify the focus of the producers,  and to
examine through relational analysis the links between concepts in a text.
Chapter 3 focuses on the meso-level analysis of the nationalist discourse of the three private
channels.  This chapter relies mostly on official  company records and available media interviews
with the owners of the broadcasting business. This chapter is the first step of what distinguishes
CDA from a normal discourse or conversation analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the
text that is the subject of study, into analyzing other texts that belong to the wider immediate context,
and the story of power relations and struggles behind producing the text. In the case at hand, it was
extremely useful to look at issues such as the ownership of the media, and the political and economic
affiliations of the owners of the media (party membership, business partnerships, etc.). This meso-
level  analysis  was  effective  for  understanding  events  through  media  discourse,  especially  that
analyzing  the  nationalist  discourse  of  the  media  rather  than  directly  analyzing  the  nationalist
discourse of the owners was due to the scarcity of relevant statements uttered directly by the owners.
The few and disparate statements by the owners is used when available to cross-examine them with
the  the micro-level discourse presented and studied in Chapter 2, and examine whether the micro-
level discourse is representative of the  producers and the owners’ positions.
Chapter 4 is the last chapter of Part I and it comprises the macro-level analysis of the nationalist
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discourse of the three private channels. The macro level builds on the findings of the micro and
meso levels, to bring the research one step closer to answering the first part of the research question
about  the  function  of  the  nationalist  discourse  articulated  by  Egypt's  business  elite  in  their
opposition against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in the period around the June 30 events.
Furthermore,  Chapter  4  discusses  how  the  macro-economic  phenomenon  of  capital
(over)accumulation both on the national, regional and international levels have played a prominent
role in influencing the nationalist discourse of the period. Special attention will be given to capital
flows from different Gulf countries before, during and after the Muslim Brotherhood time in office.
This also highlights how competition over foreign markets between different Gulf countries as a
result of excess capital in those countries might have had its impact on the unfolding of events in
Egypt.
Part  II  starts  with  Chapter  5,  which  historicizes  the  links  between  economic  interests  and
nationalist discourse by exploring the economic shapers and origins of Egyptian nationalism from
the late 19th century until the 1970s. It starts with the 1870s debt crisis that led to extreme austerity
measures mainly affecting small Egyptian landowners. This, many scholars agree, shaped a certain
national consciousness and ultimately led to the Urabi revolt which is widely marked as the "birth
moment of Egyptian nationalism" (Cole 1993; Farah 2009; Reid & Mayer 1988). The chapter then
goes on to discuss the inter-war period where a class of Egyptian capitalists, led by Talaat Harb,
Abud Pasha, and Ismail Sedky, tried to establish a class of Egyptian national industrial and financial
elite. Although they were not really in confrontation with foreign capital, and in many cases they
cooperated and partnered with it, they however benefited from and fueled a nationalist discourse that
ultimately  resulted  in  an  increasing  share  for  Egyptian-owned  capital  and  the  emergence  of  a
national industrial and financial bourgeoisie.
The chapter also analyzes the discourse of the early champions of Egyptian nationalism Mustafa
Kamil  and  Ahmed  Lotfy  al-Sayyid,  highlighting  differences  and  similarities  between  their
nationalist stances, and their focus primarily on more abstract notions of religion, kinship, etc. with
almost complete disregard to the political economy of the nationalist struggle. The purpose of this
section is to give a sense of the competing principles and foundations Egyptian nationalism was
built upon.
Finally, the chapter also discusses how the subsequent post-colonial Nasserist experiment in the
1950s and the 1960s characterized by the rise of Arab nationalism, “socialism” and third-worldism
also had its economic logic, and was necessary for the dismantling of the power of the mostly feudal
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ancient  regime.  The  chapter  then  discusses  how this  project  was  facilitated  by  the  widespread
penetration of radio, which unlike the press, allowed the Nasserist regime to reach the most remote
of areas to address both the literate and the illiterate masses in Egypt, but also in the entirety of the
Arab world.
Chapter 6 presents how the monumental socio-political  and economic transformations of the
1970s created a class of pro-state businessmen, which is referred to in the rest of the study as the
infitah (open-door policy) businessmen or business elite. The infitah policies caused this business
elite to accumulate colossal amounts of wealth with the assistance of the state, and therefore become
the mouthpieces for the new policies whether it is economic liberalization or the peace treaty with
Israel. In many cases this business elite was at the forefront off forging a new national identity that is
now based on an alliance with the West (or imperialism in Nasser’s discourse), peace with Israel, and
the consequent tension with most of the Arab world.
This chapter examines the business landscape and trends of the post-infitah era until the January
2011 revolution including the return of some business families to Egypt, such as Egypt’s wealthiest
Sawiris family, after their businesses had been nationalized during the Nasser era. This period also
witnessed  the  establishment  of  a  private  advertising  industry  in  Egypt  by  the  US-educated
businessman Tarek Nour to serve the emerging “private” sector.
The analysis also includes the increased Islamization of culture and society as the new regimes
method to preemptively counter any expected opposition to open-door policies, and how the state’s
growing Islamic character culminated during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) by encouraging
the  sending  of  the  Mujahideen to  fight  the  war  against  the  Soviet  Union.  The  chapter  finally
discusses  how the  economic  interests  and changes  of  the Mubarak era,  with a  more  aggressive
neoliberalization  project  associated  with  the  rise  of  Gamal  Mubarak,  helped  in  shaping  and
modifying the official nationalist discourse up until the 2011 revolution. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses
some closing remarks synthesising the different findings of the different stages, and linking them all




1.1 The field of nationalism studies, its history, and gaps
Perhaps one of the most contentious and contested concepts in modern social sciences is that of
nationalism and what constitutes nations. Whether nations and nationalism have pre-modern roots or
are a purely novel phenomenon, and whether the bases of nationalism are organic, illusory or a form
of voluntarist civil and political organization has been the subject of intense debate since interest
grew in this field over a century ago.
A good way to taxonomize the different approaches for studying nationalism and the competing
views in the field is to use Anthony Smith’s classification (1999). Smith divided the dissonance over
nationalism into four broad categories or paradigms; the first paradigm is the modernist approach,
which is the dominant Western scholarly paradigm to studying nationalism, according to Smith. This
approach sees nationalism as a relatively novel form of political organization and a product of a
process of modernization. According to Smith, the modernist approach is named as such because it
regards the era of the French Revolution as marking the moment when nationalism was introduced
into the movement of world history. Hence, this view identifies nations as well as nationalism as a
purely modern phenomenon without—or with very little—roots in the past.
Ernest Gellner (1996), whom Smith identifies as adopting a modernist model, argues that nations
and  nationalism are  modern  phenomena  and  a  product  of  a  modernization  process  that  eroded
traditional  societies  and  cultures,  uprooting  masses  of  people  and  proletarianizing  them  in  the
anonymous city. A shared linguistic  education,  provided by a  state-run,  standardized,  and public
education system was the sole means of communication. Gellner argues that a state-supported high
culture was built into the requirements of modernity.
There are many other scholars belonging to what Smith identifies as the modernist paradigm
who link the emergence of nationalism to modernization, industrialization and capitalism, perhaps
most notably Benedict Anderson and his key text  Imagined Communities (1991) which introduces
his theory about how linguistic and cultural standardization necessary for national identification was
first brought about by the emergence of print capitalism, and Eric Hobsbawm (1977) who also sees
nationalism as a product of "the Age of Capital".
Even 19th century scholar Ernest Renan (1990) in his famous lecture titled  What is a Nation?
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given  in  1882  argues  that  nations  are  something  fairly  new  in  history,  and  that  antiquity  was
unfamiliar with them. He asserts that old entities like Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were in no
way nations. Instead, “they were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven.” According
to his views, neither in Egypt nor China were there citizens as such.
Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and
empires, yet it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding of the term.
Athens,  Sparta,  Tyre  and  Sidon  were  small  centres  imbued  with  the  most  admirable
patriotism, but they were [simply] cities with a relatively restricted territory. Gaul, Spain and
Italy, prior to their absorption by the Roman Empire, were collections of clans, which were
often allied among themselves but had no central institutions and no dynasties. The Assyrian
Empire, the Persian Empire and the empire of Alexander the Great were not patries either.
There never were any Assyrian patriots,  and the Persian Empire was nothing but  a vast
feudal  structure.  No  nation  traces  its  origins  back  to  Alexander  the  Great’s momentous
adventure,  fertile  though  it  was  in  consequences  for  the  general  history  of  civilization
(Renan, 1990, p. 9).
Renan would go as far as claiming that the creation of a nation is a historical error that requires
collective amnesia. He argues that historical enquiry could shed light on deeds of violence that took
place at the origin of all political formations including the creation of a nation. He explains that unity
is  always  effected  by means  of  brutality. He gives  the  union of  northern  France  with the  Midi
(Southern France) as an example of a union that was the result of massacres and terror lasting for a
century (Renan, 1990, p. 9).
The historical materialistic view of the Marxists of the late 19th  and early 20th  century  quite
naturally places a lot of importance and emphasis on economic shapers of nationalism. Vladimir
Lenin (1960), for example, writes in his correspondence with  Russkoye Bogatstvo magazine, that
while one might speak of tribal life in ancient Rus, there can be no doubt that by the Middle Ages,
the era of Moscovite tsars, these tribal ties no longer existed. He argues that by this time the state was
based on associations that were not tribal at all, but local. He writes that despite this, one cannot
speak of national ties in the true sense of the term.
Lenin  argues  that  only  the  modern period  of  Russian  history  is  characterized  by  the
amalgamation  of  all  Russian  regions,  land  and  principalities  into  one  whole  (a  nation),  an
amalgamation  that  he  thinks  was  not  brought  about  by  tribal  ties  nor  their  continuation  and
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generalization, but instead was brought about by the increasing trade exchanges among the different
regions and the growing circulation of commodities—as well as the concentration of small local
markets in a single all-Russian market.  In his view, since this  process was led by the merchant
capitalists, the creation of these national ties were nothing but the creation of bourgeois ties (Lenin,
1960, p. 154-155). This closely echoes Benedict Anderson’s later theory on how capitalist interest
created by the invention of print was the foundation for the creation of the homogeneous modern
nation state.
But the Marxist view of nationalism was far from homogeneous. The Austro-Marxist thinker Otto
Bauer preoccupied himself with the issue of nationalism and dedicated one of his key monographs to
the issue (Bauer, 2000). Bauer attributes the emergence of modern capitalism to the bringing down of
tribal ties, and how even in the villages, it  dissolved differences in terms of work, custom, dress
integrating  popular  masses  into  a  community  of  culture.  Bauer  also  associates  this  cultural
integration with linguistic integration, and how the common written language is disseminated via the
school and public authority to merge with the tribal dialects breaking the barriers between them even
more.
Bauer also makes a distinction between national communities of culture in the feudal and early
capitalist era on the one hand and the modern capitalist era on the other. For him, the feudal and early
capitalist era was characterized by the integration of the ruling classes in a national community of
culture.  It  was  only  the  further  development  of  capitalism that  facilitated  the  integration  of  the
popular masses (Bauer, 2000, p17). Bauer deviated from the orthodox Marxist position that perceives
the nation as illusionary, but did not adopt the view of nationalists who see the nation as natural,
essentialized  and  primordial.  Instead,  Bauer  saw  the  nation  as  a  historical  and  social  construct
(Bauer, 2000, p. xxxv).
The nation, according to Bauer, is historical in the sense that the national character that link
members of a national community is historically modifiable. Accordingly, what links one generation
to the next is not the passing down of an immutable national spirit, but the fact that every generation
enters a social arena shaped and defined by the actions and circumstances of preceding generations.
The  so-called  national  character  in  that  sense  is  shaped  by  both  historical  and  contemporary
experience. The intersection of the historical and the contemporary is therefore the key determinant
factor in the making of the national character and in forming national identities (Bauer, 2000, p.
xxxvi).
Joseph Stalin, a Georgian who was a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social
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Democratic Labour Party, responded to Bauer in 1913 six years after he wrote his Social Democracy
and the Nationalities Question. He criticized Bauer’s view that identifies a nation with its national
character, and accuses him of divorcing the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-
contained force. The result,  for Stalin, is not a living and active nation,  but something mystical,
intangible  and  supernatural  (Stalin,  1913).  Stalin  describes  nationalism  as  a  historical  category
belonging to the epoch of rising capitalism. Just like later and contemporary modernist scholars of
nationalism, Stalin attributes the constitution of people into nations to the elimination of feudalism
and the development of capitalism. “Trade and means of communication were developing. Large
towns  were  springing  up.  The  nations  were  becoming  economically  consolidated.  [...]  The
development  of  the  press  and the  theatre  [...]  were  helping  to  strengthen ‘national  sentiments’”
(Stalin, 2013).
Isam Khafaji  (2004)  also  pays  allegiance  to  communication  and transport  technology  in  the
shaping of capital interests, and subsequently the emergence of the “nationalist moment”. Khafaji
describes the “nationalist  moment” as not  a once-and-for-all  stage whose beginning and specific
contours  can  be  clearly  defined.  Khafaji  defines  the  nationalist  moment  as  a  historical  moment
characterized by the drive of more than one social group to put the resources of the community in the
hands of indigenous elements. 
This moment, according to al-Khafaji, arrives when nationalism as a mood captures the feelings
of wide sections of a given society. He then contrasts this moment with the attempts by thirteenth
century  patricians  to  impose  their  monopoly  on  their  respective  cities  and their  hinterlands.  He
finally argues that such interests or ambitions cannot be achieved without a powerful preconditions,
that is communication and transport technology. He gives the modernist argument that without the
ability  to  link  disparate  regions  through  technological  advancement,  no  awareness  of  common
identity can rise (Khafaji, 2004, p. 224).
The role of modern capitalism and associated technologies are often brought to the forefront by
the modernist approach at the expense of the role of language, ethnicity, and religion. Hobsbawm,
for example, debunks the idea that language or linguistic unity, genetic ethnicity, religion, etc. could
form the basis for nationalism.
On language he writes that in the era before standardized general primary education—itself a
product of modernity—there was no  spoken national language except possibly for oralizing some
literary  and administrative  idioms to  function  as  a  lingua franca between  speakers  of  different
dialects or to address different audiences across dialectical boundaries (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 52).
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Hobsbawm also argues that standard national languages—both spoken and written—could have not
emerged before printing, mass literacy and schooling. He then argues for what I believe is the crux
of the modernist approach to nationalism, stating that “nations and their associated phenomena must
therefore be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions
and requirements” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10).
This clearly echoes Anderson’s (2006) assertion that linguistic standardization, and henceforth
the possibility for national communities, would not have been possible without the emergence of
technical and economic advancements that brought about the mass print industry and its associated
capitalist  interests.  By  the  same  token,  Hobsbawm goes  on  to  doubt  the  possibility  of  genetic
ethnicity  being  the  basis  for  national  sentiments.  He believes  that  the  populations  of  any large
territorial nation-states is always too heterogeneous to make any claims about common ethnicity—
let alone the impact of modern immigration on any claims regarding common descent (Hobsbawm,
1990, p. 63). Hobsbawm even argues that the more powerful the claims are about tribal ethnicity, the
more likely it would resist the imposition of a modern nation state (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 64).
Otto  Bauer  in  1907 had  already  made  a  similar  argument  that  language or  linguistic  unity,
genetic ethnicity, or consciousness could not form the basis for nationalism.
Is the nation a community of persons of common descent? Surely the Italians are descended
from  Etruscans,  Romans,  Celts,  Germanic  tribes,  Greeks,  and  Saracens,  the  present-day
French from Gauls,  Romans, Britons, and Germanic tribes,  the present-day Germans from
Germanic  tribes,  Celts,  and Slavs.  Or  is  it  the  community of  language that  unites  human
beings as a nation? Surely the English and Irish, the Danes and Norwegians, the Serbs and
Croats, although in each case both speak the same language, do not therefore constitute one
people; the Jews do not have a common language and yet they are a nation. Is it, then, the
consciousness of a common bond that unites the nation? Should the Tyrolean peasant not be
regarded as a German because he has never become conscious of his common bond with East
Prussians, Pomeranians, Thuringians, and Alsatians? And furthermore, what is the German
conscious of when he thinks of his "Germanness"? What makes him a member of the German
nation, what connects him with other Germans? (Bauer, 2005, p. 19).”
A major limitation of the modernist approach both when applied to the universal phenomenon of
nationalism, and when applied to the more specific context,  such as in the case of Egypt, is its
Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism should not be confused with focus on European history and nationalism.
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There  is  obviously  nothing  wrong  with  having  a  scholarly  focus  on  the  history  of  European
nationalisms. However, the modernist  approach due to its  focus on capitalist  development  often
looks at the development of non-European nationalisms through the narrow lens of its encounters
with  European colonialism whether  in  its  colonial  or  post-colonial  forms.  This  is  based  on the
presupposition that capitalism in the so-called non-European “periphery” is always less advanced
than in  the  European “core”,  and perhaps  is  therefore  less  of  a  powerful  force.  Some of  those
identified with the modernist  approach go as far as arguing that nationalism is a pure European
phenomenon, whereby it is implied that Europe is a closed self-contained system that influences
others but is not influenced by anything outside of it.
Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) argues that because from a European perspective the rest of the
world seemed to be lacking in modern technology and was therefore not considered modern, it was
deemed  difficult  to  apply  modern  social  sciences—such  as  economics,  sociology  and  political
science—outside of Europe. Therefore, new disciplines, namely anthropology and orientalism, were
created  to  study  non-Europeans  under  actual  or  virtual  colonial  rule.  For  Wallerstein,  so-called
primitive people had no history independent of colonial rule which, according to this view, resulted
in cultural contact and therefore cultural change (Wallerstein, 2004, p.7).
However,  colonies  that  were  perceived  as  less  “primitive”  required  something  other  than
anthropology to study it. China, India, Persia, and parts of the Arab World were described as “high
civilizations”  for  having  common  languages  and  “world”  religions.  For  Wallerstein,  such  large
languages  and religions  were  the  product  of  past  empires.  Despite  having a  history, those  vast
regions  were  however  seen  as  lagging  behind  militarily  and technologically  in  the  modern  era
compared to Europe. 
The field of orientalism therefore appeared as an attempt to decipher these great languages and
religions;  orientalism  preoccupied  itself  with  studying  why  such  “high  civilizations”  failed  to
modernize  in  the  same way as  Europe.  For  Wallerstein,  the  persistent  answer  to  this  persistent
question was the existence of “something” in the composite culture of these civilizations which have
frozen their history and has made it impossible for them to move forward without the assistance of
the European world (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 8).
Consequently, non-European nationalism could have only existed to simply mimic the model of
development set by Europe. Even if Europe modernization inspired many outside of Europe, the
modernist approach tend to largely ignore other factors and experiences of non-European historical
developments.  As will  be discussed later, some forms of early nationalism developed outside of
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Europe had taken place before any significant contact with European colonialism and before world
trade had become European led. In that sense, Eurocentrism for the purpose of this study means
overstating the European factor—which I  am in no way interested in understating either—while
largely  overlooking other  factors,  and simplistically  dividing  the  world  into  European and non-
European experiences.
Put differently, this Eurocentrism manifests itself in two manners: first, its view that nationalism
as a social and political phenomenon, that is a product of the modern capitalist era, is par excellence
a pure European phenomenon. Second, even non-European nationalisms are either modeled after
European nationalism in  a  one-way direction  of  influence,  or  was born as  a  national  liberation
movement in reaction to European colonialism and hegemonic influence in the second half of the
19th century and throughout the 20th century. 
John Chalcraft identifies in the writings of European historians—including grassroots ones—a
double standard that takes place when constructing the history of Europe compared to the history of
non-European  societies  and  gives  Hobsbawm  as  an  example.  He  sheds  light  on  Hobsbawm’s
assertion that  the makers  of  “Third World” transformations  are  elite  minorities,  which is  highly
contrasted  with  his  “history  from  below”  or  grassroots  take  on  historical  change  in  the  West
(Chalcraft, 2005, p. 3). Hobsbawm, for example, argues that for the “dependent” world, the nearest
they  come  to  producing  thought  about  nationalism  was  their  skepticism  about  its  universal
applicability, and that it was perceived mostly as an ideology of “minorities of evolues out of touch
with the mass  of  their  countrymen,  whose ideas  of  community  and political  loyalty  were  quite
different” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 158). He thinks that Europe is “the original home of nationalism”
and “ the traditional home of national causes” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 138).
Even when nationalism occurred outside of Europe as a public sentiment, and not necessarily a
sentiment  of  an  elite  of  evolues,  it  was  usually  a  reaction  to  European  colonialism  not  to  be
compared with the rational process of European nation-building.
While, as we have seen, these national liberation movements in the Third World were in theory
modelled on the nationalism of the west, in practice the states they attempted to construct were,
as we have also seen, generally the opposite of the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous
entities which came to be seen as the standard form of 'nation-state' in the west. Nevertheless,
even in this respect they were de facto more like than unlike the western nationalism of the
liberal era (Hobsbawm, p. 158).
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Benedict Anderson (2001) himself attributes the idea that there is a distinctively Asian form of
nationalism to what he describes as “the notorious insistence of a racist European imperialism that
‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’”. Anderson then proceeds to ask
whether this radical dichotomy is really justifiable, either theoretically or empirically? His answer is
no, and he states two main reasons for this: 1) oldest nationalisms in Asia are older than many of
those in Europe; 2) what people have considered to be East and West has varied substantially over
time.
I myself do not believe that the most important distinctions among nationalisms—in the past,
today, or in the near future—run along East–West lines. The oldest nationalisms in Asia—here
I am thinking of India, the Philippines and Japan—are older than many of those in Europe and
Europe Overseas—Corsica, Scotland, New Zealand, Estonia, Australia, Euskadi, and so forth.
Philippine nationalism, in its origins, looks—for obvious reasons—very similar to those in
Cuba and continental Latin America; Meiji  nationalism has obvious similarities to the late
nineteenth-century  official  nationalisms  we  find  in  Ottoman  Turkey,  Tsarist  Russia  and
Imperial Great Britain; Indian nationalism is morphologically analogous to what one finds in
Ireland and in Egypt. One should also add that what people have considered to be East and
West has varied substantially over time (Anderson, 2011).
Reducing  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  non-European  settings  to  a  reaction  against  European
colonialism fails to explain many phenomenon related to the development of Egyptian nationalism.
As will be discussed throughout the study, Egyptian nationalism in its period of formulation during
the Urabi  revolution was more about  anti-Ottomanism challenging the privileges granted to the
Turko-Circassian elite than it  was about European hegemony. The writings of Ahmed Lotfy al-
Sayyid, a few decades later, were still characterized with significant anti-Ottoman sentiments.
It could be argued that this anti-Ottomanism does not contradict, and in fact goes in line with,
the  desire  to  replace  a  pre-modern  Ottoman  order  with  the  building  of  a  European-modelled
modern nation state. This was certainly true for some thinkers including Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid
and Taha Hussein, but presenting the modern nation-state as a “purely” European discovery cannot
be dealt with separately from the hegemony of European colonialism itself and its ideas that would
quite naturally present its model of political organization as a universal model to aspire to. It is also
natural  for  some  national  intellectuals  from  the  so-called  “dependent”  countries  to  adopt  this
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hegemonic discourse. 
On the other hand, leading nationalist thinkers such as Mustafa Kamil created a movement that
still envisioned Egypt as being part of some sort of an “Islamic” unity led by the Ottoman Empire.
For  Kamil,  national  independence  only  meant  independence  of  the  British  empire,  and  most
certainly did not fit the criteria of how a modern European-modelled nation state should look like. 
In a more recent period, a Eurocentric modernist approach would fail to explain the nationalist
discourse uttered during and around the  June 30 period which was targeted against  a  national
political  Islamist  group—not  European  colonialism—without  necessarily  adopting  a  European
model to replace it. Even external influences were mostly the cause of capital over-accumulation in
the neighbouring Gulf state and not from the European countries as was the case in the 19 th century
and most  of  the 20th century. This flow of excess  capital  from the Gulf  promoted values  very
different from what would be perceived as “European values”. Finally, the Eurocentrism of the
modernist approach also fails to explain forms of rational nation-building in Egypt that might have
even preceded many European processes; in many cases, it took quicker and earlier steps than in
some European process.
One of the earliest republican experiments of the Modern era was located in upper Egypt in the
mid 18th century, which did not have much links to Europe at the time because most of its trade
partners were located in Arabia, the Ottoman Empire and East Africa within an Indian Ocean World
System. Furthermore, the first seeds of a modern nation state in Egypt were sown very shortly after
the French revolution and arguably before many European nations such as Italy and Germany who
only became nation-states in the modern sense of the meaning in the 1870s.
Zeinab Abul-Magd, in her book Imagined Empire: A History of Revolt in Egypt (2013), explains
how an independent republic based on the Indian Ocean World Economy emerged in Upper Egypt
before the French revolution,  and before the world economy system had transformed to become
European-led. The Qina province in Upper Egypt was a major port in this economic world system
and traded mostly in sugar, cotton, textile, grains, spices and coffee with East Africa and Arabia. As
the owners of sugarcane plantations and sugar refineries, the Hawwara clan of Upper Egypt rose to
prominence as the rulers of this independent republic (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 22).
The Hawwara, under the leadership of Sheikh al-Arab Hammam, have established in the mid-18th
century a “republic” independent from the Ottoman ruler governing lower Egypt, and subsequently
from the Ottoman ruler in Istanbul or any other empire. Abul-Magd explains that the registers of the
courts of the Qina province had no first-page preamble even mentioning an official affiliation with
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the Ottoman empire, and no records or decrees of the Ottoman order were published as they were
seen as irrelevant to the politics and affairs of the province (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 25).
This republic in the south of Egypt was based on a sophisticated administrative system and a
social  contract based on power sharing completely divorced from the Ottoman imperialist order.
According to Abul-Magd, the social contract between the dominant Hawwara class and the subaltern
groups was designed to appease the latter. The power sharing structure was designed to sustain
agricultural production, secure the movement of trade and ensure political stability.
Hammam's  [social]  contract  incorporated  peasants  producing  the  commercial  crops,
educated Copts managing the finances of the state, and Bedouins protecting southern trade
routes and carrying goods on their camels. Each of these groups played a vital role in
maintaining the stability of Hammam's regime (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 32).
A degree of private property relations in this mid-eighteenth century regime was also established.
The peasants had the right to sell, buy, rent and mortgage agricultural land. A justice system was
created to mitigate the exploitation of the peasantry. Moreover, Copts and Muslims enjoyed the same
rights of transacting landholdings without discrimination (Abul-Magd, 2013, pp. 24-25). This form
of non-European independent and economically rational civic form of early nationalism is rarely
discussed in European literature on Egyptian nationalism.
Some early European nationalists were even inspired by some of these models of non-European
forms of political organization. Friedrich Meinecke, the German nationalist historian, discusses in his
book Machiavellism how Traiano Boccalini regarded Turkey to be the only country during his time
with a clear  raison d’etat. He thought of it as a state that was organized entirely differently from
those of Christian Europe and that “it claimed the attention of political minds, not only because it
stood on the edge of the European horizon like a thundercloud of power politics, but even more so on
account of its wonderful inner structure.” Boccalini thought,  according to Meinecke,  that Turkey
brought  to  life  what  European  Renaissance  has  always  been  striving  for,  that  is:  “an  artificial
construction which had been consciously and purposively built up, a State mechanism which was
arranged like a cloak , and which made use of the various species and strengths and qualities of men
as its springs and wheels.” (Meinecke, 1957, p. 86).
This  Eurocentric  approach  is  not  confined  to  the  modernist  approach.  Earlier  typologies  of
nationalism also subscribe to similar—if not more blunt—Eurocentrism. Hans Kohn, who is often
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dubbed as  the  pioneer  and one of  the  most  influential  theoreticians  of  nationalism,  in  his  book
Nationalism, its meaning and history (originally published in 1955), attributes Egypt’s independence
from the British empire to England’s liberal civilization, and the reforms introduced in its colonies
which improved the level of education and economic development. He argues that England set the
example of “complete emancipation” of “dependent peoples” by giving independence to Egypt. This
view not just  completely strips the colonized people of their agency and disregards their tireless
struggle against the colonialist power, but also completely ignores and overlooks important historical
junctures when colonized Egypt revolted against and resisted British occupation, most notably in the
1919 revolution, as a reaction to Britain’s decision to exile nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul.
In this historical process England was the leading power. Her liberal civilization, which
in preceding centuries had influenced the growth of constitutional  liberty in Europe,
infused a new spirit into Asia and later into Africa. England introduced constitutional
reforms  in  her  colonies  and  increased  the  facilities  for  education  and  economic
development. She set the example of complete emancipation of dependent peoples by
giving independence to Egypt (1922, completed 1936) (Kohn, 1985: 84). 
As for the primordialist approach, it has—quite naturally—been the approach of choice for many
nationalists arguing that the nation is a stable and natural community; however, it has also been a
scholarly  stance  for  some.  Smith  divides  the  primordialist  paradigm  into  socio-biological  and
familiar  cultural.  The socio-biological approach championed by Pierre L. Van Den Berghe (1979
quoted in Smith, 1999, p. 98) argues that nations are little more than an extension of kinship units
and are built up from the same nepotistic drives of inclusive fitness you find in smaller clans and
families.  The  familiar  cultural  primordialism,  on  the  other  hand,  dismisses  the  significance  of
biological descent for the formation of nations, but gives weight to the primordial ties attributed to
congruities  of  blood,  speech,  custom,  religion,  and  territory.  This  primordialist  approach  was
pioneered by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz (Smith, 1999, p. 4).
If primordialists believe that nations and nationalism have their foundation in the natural order,
perennialists believe nations and nationalism have existed throughout at least recorded history. One
approach to perennialism stresses the continuous existence of nations,  and it  claims that at  least
particular  nations  have  existed  for  millennia,  such  as  Greece,  Egypt  and  France.  Perennialists,
however,  are  ready  to  accept  that  other  nations  are  more  modern  and  recent.  A  recurrent
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perennialism, on the other hand, is the argument that nations emerge and dissolve, and continually re-
emerge at different periods of time (Smith, 1999, p. 5).
The last  paradigm,  which  is  also  the  paradigm advocated  by  Smith  himself,  is  the  ethno-
symbolic  paradigm.  For  the  ethno-symbolist  scholars,  what  gives  nationalism  its  power  is  the
symbols of ethnic heritage and how the past can be reinterpreted and rediscovered by the modern
nationalist intelligentsia. In Smith’s view, this paradigm seeks to overcome the limitations of the
modernist approach which Smith summarizes as:
1- a failure to distinguish genuine constructs from long-term processes and structures in which
successive generations have been socialized;
2- a concentration on elite actions at the expense of popular beliefs and actions; and
3- a neglect of the powerful affective dimension of nations and nationalism (Smith, 1999, p.9).
As for approaches to Egyptian nationalism in particular, they span across the four paradigms
discussed above. Recent scholarship on early Egyptian nationalism has given a significant deal of
attention to signs of modernism in the creation of a nationalist discourse such as in the process of
building a modern army, a massive state bureaucracy, mainstream media, etc. (See Fahmy, 2002;
Isaac & Gershoni 1995; Cole 1993; Mitchell 2002; Farah, 2009). Juan Cole, a historian of Egypt in
the 19th century, devoted a whole monograph for the discussion of the “social and cultural origins of
Egypt's `Urabi Movement” (1993), but although he does not include it in the title of his book, Cole
gives considerable attention to the economic origins of Egypt's Urabi movement, and the birth of
modern Egyptian nationalism.
Israel  Gershoni  and  James  P.  Jankowski,  who  conducted  extensive  research  on  Egyptian
nationalism,  also  pay  allegiance  to  what  they  call  “the  social  context  of  thought”—which  also
includes  the  socioeconomic  context—in  the  introduction  of  their  book  on  Egyptian  nationalism
Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood (1987). Gershoni and Jankowski
stress the importance of “institutional-political, but also socioeconomic” context as a prerequisite to
comprehending the  origins  and meaning of  intellectual  constructs such  as  nationalism and their
spread. Timothy Mitchell, a historian and a specialist on Egypt in the 19 th century, is known for his
critique  of  modernity, capitalism and  technocracy. His  most  prominent  monograph  The Rule  of
Experts (2002)  explores  in-depth  questions  regarding  the  interrelatedness  of  technological
modernization, capitalism and nationalism. He makes many references to the modernist theories of
Benedict  Anderson  and  Ernest  Renan  (Mitchell,  2002,  p.  180)  when  discussing  the  wider
socioeconomic context of Egyptian nation-building in 19th and early 20th century Egypt.
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Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman also attribute the workers antagonism against British rule over
Egypt and the movement's resulting rise of nationalist sentiments to economic factors in their book
Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class (1998). For
example,  Beinin and Lockman, like Juan Cole,  argue that heavy borrowing abroad had led to a
downward spiral of indebtedness that in turn led to Egypt's bankruptcy in 1876. As a result, foreign
financial controls were imposed on Egypt which stimulated nationalist reaction (Beinin & Lockman,
2008, p. 8). Although the link between economic context and the rise of nationalism is a thread that
weaves throughout their book, many passages make the link in a very straightforward manner.
Given Egypt semi-colonial status and the form of capitalist development it had experienced, the
national question could not be easily separated from the social and economic grievances felt
and expressed by working people. For this reason the 1919 revolution also marked the first full
articulation of the special labor-nationalist relationship which had already been foreshadowed
by the Nationalist party's prewar role in labor affairs and would significantly shape the Egyptian
union movement in the following decades (Beinin & Lockman, 2008, p. 84).
Khaled Fahmy, in his book All the Pasha’s Men (2002), argues that the increased profits from an
expanded  cultivation  of  long-staple  cotton  in  the  1820s  played  an  instrumental  role  in  helping
Muhammed Ali Pasha build a modern army, navy, factories, schools, hospitals, etc, placing Egypt on
a path for modernization that rarely existed outside of Europe at the time; the existence of these
institutions would prove instrumental in the building of a nationalist imaginary in the succeeding
decades.
On  the  other  hand,  the  scholarship  and  writings  of  the  Egyptian  nationalist  intelligentsia
throughout the different eras quite expectedly fall outside the modernist paradigm, and largely into
the  ethno-symbolic,  perennial  and  primordialist  paradigms.  This  will  be  discussed  in  detail
throughout the study especially in Chapter 5 where the foundational texts of the intellectual founding
fathers  of  Egyptian  nationalism,  namely  Mustafa  Kamil  and  Ahmed  Lotfy  al-Sayyid  will  be
discussed in detail. Throughout the study, texts by other nationalist thinkers including Taha Hussein,
Jamal  Hamdan,  Mohamed  Hassanein  Haikal,  Moussa  Sabry  and  Ne’mat  Fouad  will  also  be
discussed.
As discussed above, a large body of non-nationalist historical study of Egyptian nationalism was
modernist  in  its  orientation  and  tended  to  factor  in  economic  issues,  but  recent  analyses  of
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nationalist discourses in the post-revolutionary period have mostly focused on issues of politics,
religion, culture and identity. However, limiting the contentious politics of the post-2011 era to
identity politics falls short of explaining the national fervour that captured a business elite that are
expected to act rationally and based on economic considerations.
Surely, due to the relative recency of such events, academic research on the nationalist discourse
of the June 30 and post- June 30 Egypt is still limited. However, none of the few studies that were
published have discussed nationalism in relation to the economic interests of the business elites who
have played a key role in shaping and disseminating such nationalist discourse. For example, David
H. Warren in his paper (2017) focuses on "Ali Juma's nationalist legal reasoning in support of the
2013 Egyptian coup and its bloody aftermath" emphasizing the nexuses between the religious and
nationalist spheres, and the nationalist stance of religious leaders and scholars.
Patrycja Sasnal (2014) Hania Sobhy (2015) have focused on the sphere of education and its
relation to nationalism, by examining the nationalist  content of school textbooks.  Sasnal argues,
through examining school textbooks, that very few and insignificant changes have been made in the
writing of the nationalist history since the 2011 revolution, which in her opinion, signals that the
revolution  has  not  happened  yet,  since  for  her,  changes  in  educational  textbooks  is  "the  most
accurate barometer of systemic change". Sobhy, on the other hand, examines how central Islam is to
the nationalist discourse uttered in high school textbooks, from the late Mubarak era until the time
the article was written in 2014.
There has also been several analysis of official nationalist discourse, but mostly focusing on the
micro level of discourse analysis.. Joyce van de Bildt (2015), examines the themes of nationalist
propaganda expressed by the post-Morsy military governments. However, this  discourse analysis
mostly focus on the micro-level of the text itself, and even when attempts are made to examine the
shpers  of  discourse,  it  is  usually  limited  to  the  political  sphere,  and  is  rarely  extended  to  the
economic sphere. Similar to the examples above, the focus is mostly on the action and the discourse
of  state  actors,  but  barely  any mentions  are  given to  non-state  actors  including that  of  civilian
businessmen, the private sector and private media. Mohammed El-Nawawy and Mohamad Hamas
Elmasry (2016),  employ semiotic and discourse analysis  to examine the sign system of al-Sisi's
presidential campaign posters and video. However, their focus was also on the micro "text" level
without adding the critical dimension of higher levels of discourse.
Zeinab Abul-Magd, however, succeeds in making links between nationalism and the military's
business  interest,  in  her  book  Militarizing  the  Nation  (2018),  and  her  book  chapter  Egypt's
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Adaptable Officers (2016), but she also focuses on the action of military and state actors. 
Finally, searching for the rational underpinnings is not an attempt to justify resulting violent
actions  or  ultra-nationalist  politics,  and  in  no  way  the  expression  “rationalism”  is  used  in  the
enlightenment sense with a positive connotation. When speaking of rationality, I will adopt Michel
Foucault’s  description  of  rationality  as  not  being  of  an  absolute  value.  The  task,  according  to
Foucault  is  not  measuring  “regimes  of  rationality”  against  an  absolute  value-of-reason,  but  to
analyze them according to how they form an ensemble of rules and procedures, and means to an end
(Burchell,  Gordon,  & Miller, 1991,  p.  79).  The subjects  of  this  study were clearly  involved in
forming procedures and means to some end, and the aim of this study is to analyze the workings of
their “regime of rationality” and the procedures they formed to achieve it. The goal is therefore not
to judge whether their actions were rational or not as though there is an objective, agreed-upon and
absolute definition of what constitutes a rational act.
1.2 The research problem and questions
Based on the arguments set out in the previous section, the research problem concerns the inability
of theories of passion-driven (or irrational and child-like in Edward Said's terms) national sentiments
to explain the nationalist discourse around the June 30 period. This discourse was highly backed by
billionaire businessmen and their media outlets, as well as by large regional interests. This view,
therefore,  fails  to  explain  why  such  “economic  men”  will  get  involved  and  invest  in  such
emotionally-charged  national  craze.  This  study  looks  at  whether  there  was  a  potential  profit-
maximization incentive behind the dissemination of such national discourse
The main research question of the study is therefore as follows:  what was the function ultra-
nationalist and nationalist rhetoric served in promoting the economic interests of this group of
capitalists, and what is the historical pedigree behind the articulation of a nationalist discourse by
the media  owned by Egypt's  infitah business  elite  in their  opposition against  the rule  of  the
Muslim Brotherhood in the period leading up to the ouster of Mohamed Morsy in 2013?
In order to be able to answer this main question, a list of sub-questions will need to also be
answered: 
1. What  were  the  key  messages  of  their  anti-Brotherhood nationalist  discourse,  and what
discursive techniques were used?
2. Can the action of a business elite and their national, regional and international backers be
reduced to involvement in a mass irrational national frenzy as has been described by the
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many political commentators of the June 30 events?
3. What were the economic interests of the selected businessmen that drove them to take such
positions, and how did it clash with the Brotherhood’s?
4. Did these businessmen expect to generate direct profits from investing in establishing such
media outlets; if not, what was the non-profit function of this media?
1.3 Conceptual and theoretical framework
As explained previously, this research hypothesizes that there is more to the nationalism of the June
30 media discourse than just pure ideology. Many scholars have discussed the business interest of
the media owners and rivalry between the Brotherhood and the Mubarak businessmen; however, a
close examination and detailed scrutiny about the relationship between these power and economic
struggles on the one hand and this hysterical nationalism on the other remains largely unexplored.
Most of the analysis  was either about  nationalist  discourse treated in  relative isolation from the
political and economic fields, and where links were made, they were usually linking the political
interests to the economic without bringing in the discursive element. What this study aims to achieve
in order to answer the research question is to bring down these barriers between the economic, the
political and the discursive. 
In  order  to  achieve  this  objective,  a  few  tasks  need  to  be  carried  out  including  the
conceptualization  of  links  between  “structural”  (economic  interests)  and  “superstructural”
(nationalist  discourse)  and  the  dynamics  of  their  interaction.  To  this  end,  the  study  adopts  a
conceptual framework for linking economic power and discourse, that is, the conceptual framework
of overdetermination as developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (2001). The concept of
overdetermination can  be traced back to  Freud who thought  in  the  Interpretation  of  Dreams of
overdetermination  as  a  process  in  which  one  dream  image  comes  to  represent  a  plurality  of
unconscious  concerns,  and  that  affects  which  appear  in  dreams  appear  to  be  formed  by  the
confluence of several tributaries (Lewis, 2005). Louis Althusser in turn borrowed the concept from
Freud; however, Mouffe and Laclau criticize Althusser’s adoption of overdetermination accusing
him of reproducing the same essentialism and dualism in the field of Marxist  discursiveness by
integrating the concept of “determination in the last instance” to his theory of overdetermination.
If society has a last instance which determines its laws of motion, then the relations between the
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overdetermined  instances  and  the  last  instance  must  be  conceived  in  terms  of  simple,  one-
directional  determination  by  the  latter.  We  can  deduce  from  this  that  the  field  of
overdetermination  is  extremely  limited:  it  is  the  field  of  contingent  variation  as  opposed  to
essential  determination.  And,  if  society  does  have  a  last  and  essential  determination,  the
difference  is  not  constitutive  and  the  social  is  unified  in  the  sutured  space  of  a  rationalist
paradigm. Thus, we are confronted with exactly the same dualism that we found reproduced since
the end of the nineteenth century in the field of Marxist discursiveness (Mouffe and Laclau, 2001,
p. 99).
However, Mouffe and Laclau’s rejection of an ultimate determinant of a last instance does not
mean a rejection of the centrality of economic factors. Laclau writes in his 2005 book On Populist
Reason that the economy, like anything else in society, is the locus of an overdetermination of social
logics. However, “its centrality is the result of the obvious fact that the material reproduction of
society has more repercussions for social processes than do other instances. This does not mean that
capitalist reproduction can be reduced to a single, self-defining mechanism.”
Mouffe and Laclau reject the simple determinism of a base/superstructure configuration because
they argue that if labour was merely a commodity like others, its use-value—just like a machine—
could be made immediately and automatically effective once they are purchased. Since labour-power
is purchased, according to them, the maximum possible labour has to be extracted from it; therefore,
the labour process cannot exist without a preexisting series of relations of domination (Laclau &
Mouffe, 2001, p. 78-79). Such pre-existing relations of domination—which are also prerequisites for
production—are  political,  legal,  and cultural,  which  are  all  superstructural  elements  in  classical
Marxist thought which makes relations of production themselves overdetermined. 
Other than Mouffe and Laclau, John T. Chalcraft in his study on craftsmen and guilds in Egypt
prior to World War I (2005) gives an overview of critiques of economism including from within the
Marxist tradition reaching back to Trotsky. According to Chalcraft, Trotsky has taken history, power
and culture seriously in understanding economic change (Chalcraft, 2005, p. 8). Chalcraft highlights
a few ideas that he regards as suggestive in showing how society and politics could be integral to the
changing shape of relations of production and exchange. He agrees with Raymond Williams that the
base is not a fixed economic abstraction but involves the specific activities of people with their
fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore is always in a state of flux. Chalcraft writes:
“with this concept of economy, it is easier to perceive how social,  political,  and cultural factors
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might invade, intersect with, and help produce economic outcomes” (Chalcraft, 2005, p. 8).
Even Friedrich Engels rejected the adoption of a simplistic approach to economic determinism,
and claimed that he and Marx are partly to blame for this misunderstanding common among the
young generation of his time.
Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay
more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize the main principle vis-
à-vis  our  adversaries,  who  denied  it,  and  we  had  not  always  the  time,  the  place  or  the
opportunity to give their due to the other elements involved in the interaction. But when it
came to presenting a section of history, that is,  to making a practical application, it  was a
different matter and there no error was permissible. Unfortunately, however, it happens only
too often that people think they have fully understood a new theory and can apply it without
more ado from the moment they have assimilated its  main principles,  and even those not
always correctly. And I cannot exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from this reproach,
for the most amazing rubbish has been produced in this quarter, too (Engels, 1999).
The way overdetermination provides the conceptual framework for this study is by identifying
the nationalist discourse of June 30 as an overdetermined phenomenon where the economic factors
act as a central--even if not the only or ultimate--determinant, and even if those underlying economic
factors are themselves overdetermined. 
Overdetermination is a useful conceptual framework for the purpose of this research because it
shows  inter alia  that the economic, political, discursive, cultural, religious determinants of social
phenomenon are too intertwined in a web of determinants too complex to be dealt with separately in
different academic disciplines. Applying this to the study of nationalism, overdetermination is useful
to demonstrate that while it is important to study the political, cultural, social and even religious
determinants of nationalism as a discursive phenomenon, there would always be room to examine
other factors that are overlooked especially when the determinant is as central as the economic.
Moreover,  overdetermination  helps  with  moving freely  between different  fields  and relations  of
determination to not only show how economic interests contribute to shaping nationalist discourse
but also include other forces, and at the same time look at how nationalist discourse itself shapes and
maintain other structural and superstructural fields. Finally, it  allows me to focus on one aspect
without denying the role of other aspects that may not get enough attention for being beyond the
scope of the study.
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The focus on rational and economic determinants within a framework of overdetermination also
helps  counter  an  age-old  approach  to  the  study  of  the  Middle  East  that  is  tainted  by  simple
determination that over-emphasizes cultural, mythical and religious aspects—or that “something” in
the words of Wallerstein—with relative disregard to regimes of rationality that govern or at least
influence them. Gilbert Achcar writes that a lot of people attributed the failure of democracy in the
Middle East to the fact  that there was something about the nature of Arab culture that  made it
different in a way that made it resistant to democracy (Achcar, 2016).  Overdetermination could
therefore  be  considered  a  non-reductionist  approach to  study the  role  of  underlying  regimes  of
rationality and their relations to irrational expressions in producing a social phenomenon such as
nationalism as well as being produced by it.
In  terms  of  theories  of  nationalism  that  would  honour  this  conceptual  framework  of  non-
essentialism yet acknowledges the centrality of economic factors, the most well-suited would be the
modernist approach, which according to Smith’s four paradigms of studying nationalism, is the one
that accords more weight to economic factors in the shaping of nationalist imaginings as opposed to
the other approaches of ethnosymbolism, primordialism and perennialism.  The focus on the role of
capital and technological advancement in the formation and development of European nationalisms
will be extended and applied to study the development of Egyptian nationalism, including in its most
contemporary  version.  Even  in  so-called  “backward”  societies  where  capitalism  is  not  as
“advanced”, economic considerations, the organization of economic life, the struggle over resources
and profits, and technological progress, are equally powerful factors in influencing “superstructural”
elements of culture including nationalism. Also, the modernist approach and its focus on capitalism
and  technology  in  constructing  national  imaginings  seem  to  primarily  focus  on  nationalism’s
formative  years.  This  applies  to  the  works  of  Anderson,  Hobsbawm,  and  Gellner  on  European
nationalism but  also  to  the  works  of  Cole,  Gershoni  and Jankowski,  Mitchel,  etc.  on  Egyptian
nationalism. This dissertation will expand the focus on the role of capital and technology in the
creation of nationalist discourse and imaginings in relation to contemporary developments. In other
words,  the  study  will  adopt  as  its  theoretical  framework  a  modernist  approach  to  critiquing
nationalism,  but expand the scope of this  approach beyond its  European and historical focus to
address issues of contemporary significance. 
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Figure 1 Between Theory, Method and Politics
Meyer, M. (2001). Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA. In Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis(pp. 14-31). London: SAGE Publications. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857028020.n2
The  conceptual  and  theoretical  frameworks  will  be  operationalized  through  the  adoption  of
CDA, which will  provide the general methodological  terrain for the procedures and instruments
needed to examine the links between these “structural” and “superstructural” levels because it starts
its  analysis  at  the micro-level  with discourse (superstructural)  and ends with its  macro contexts
including economic (structural), linking the text analysis to non-linguistic fields which belong to the
meso and macro levels. 
The study will roughly follow Michael Meyer’s model (see Figure 1) in which the theoretical
level is first conceptualized through the selection of theoretical concepts, relations and assumptions,
which  then  takes  the  process  to  operationalization  providing  the  instruments  of  which  the
discourse/text is selected and then interpreted (Meyer, 2001). Finally this interpretation is used to
examine assumptions and link them back to the theoretical level. This is more or less the path that
this study follows after a problematic was identified. The conceptual and theoretical framework were
selected before being operationalized into CDA. Texts were then selected and interpreted, and then
this interpretation was used to examine my assumption before being linked back to the theoretical
level.  So  far,  I  have  discussed  the  conceptual  and  theoretical  frameworks;  how  they  will  be
operationalized will be discussed in more detail in the methodology sections.
Before  we get  into  the  methodology section,  I  would  like  to  make a  last  remark  about  my
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theoretical approach. Because the study focuses on the nationalism of business elites, it is prone to
be  interpreted  as  a  top-down  view  of  history.  The  research  examines  the  nationalist  discourse
articulated  by  businessmen  as  a  social  group  with  immense  economic  power,  rather  than  as  a
hegemonic group with cultural  influence. The objective of this dissertation is not to assess their
hegemonic role  vis-a-vis the “masses”. This is of particular importance since the June 30 moment
was not a clear moment of the “masses” against an “elite” as both the proponents and opponents of
the Brotherhood had their elites and “masses”. 
Consequently, being a study of an economic elite does not make the approach of this study a top-
down one. I believe it is perfectly tenable to study a social group that is considered a political and
economic elite without being interpreted as adopting a top-down view of history. This would have
been indeed a top-down view of history if I had treated the business elite behind the media discourse
as a hegemonic group and then had neglected the reciprocal relation with the “common sense” of
everyday life of the “masses”. The focus on a business elite does not mean that the study denies that
systemic or elite ideologies are directly interwoven with everyday common sense, which shapes it
but  is  also being shaped by it.  I  explain  further  in  the dissertation  that  the focus  of  the  media
discourse on issues of identity was not invented by a handful of businessmen and media personnel
and  then imposed unidirectionally in a top-down fashion upon the “masses”; far from it. The heavy
use of identity issues was a capitalization of a sentiment that was already very widespread. What
they did was nurturing a  widespread and  already-existing fear of the impact of Islamist  rule on
people’s lifestyles and livelihoods, and was far from being an exclusively elitist sentiment.
In other words,  I  do not study business elite  in their  relation to  a certain conception of the
“masses”, but as a social group that is not necessarily a stable hegemonic group. I do not accord
more weight to the discourse of this  supposed elite as an influential  discourse. In many ways I
believe  this  discourse  is  rejected  by  wide  sections  of  the  population  including  by  people  who
participated in the June 30 protests. 
It  is  questionable  whether  economic  power  automatically  translates  to  hegemonic  power
especially  in  settings  where  the  economy  is  rent-based  and  processes  of  accumulation  happen
independently  of  labour  surplus  extraction,  and perhaps by means of  dispossession.  The  modus
operandi of processes of accumulation and its impact on nationalist discourse will be discussed in
more detail  in Chapters 3 and 4. In the Gramscian distinction between hegemonic and coercive
power where the former is the domain of institutions of civil society and the latter is the domain of
State institutions, there are significant evidence that the Mubarakist business elite has failed in its
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role as a hegemonic group and therefore became more reliant on coercive power. 
Gramsci makes this distinction in his concepts of “war of maneuver” as a direct clash against the
state  and “war of position” as a counter-hegemonic project, where the former is more suitable to an
“Eastern”  (Russian)  setting  where  capitalism is  not  as  advanced and  the  regimes  rely  more  on
coercive power. The latter is more suitable for Western European regimes where civil society and
therefore hegemony is more developed, and where no revolutionary gains could be made without
countering this hegemony. Here Gramsci himself writes:
In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there
was a  proper relation between State and civil  society, and when the State  trembled a  sturdy
structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which
there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one
State to the next, it goes without saying-but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance
of each individual country (Gramsci, 1971, pp.237-8).
1.4 The study’s multimethodical approach – a set of tools to answer the research question
As explained above, the main reason why CDA was my method of choice is because it goes beyond
analyzing the text itself into analyzing the power dynamics behind it and the immediate and broad
contexts within which the text was produced.
The origins of CDA is usually attributed to Foucault but this attribution was challenged by some
scholars. Keith Sawyer (2002) argues that the use of the term “discourse” within its current meaning
precedes  Foucault  and  that  it  was  already  developed  at  the  time  he  wrote  the  Archeology  of
Knowledge, which is the Foucaultian work where the concept of discourse is usually traced back.
Sawyer argues that the British cultural theorists in the 1970s and the early 1980s all attribute the
term to Pêcheux, Althusser or Lacan. It was only at a later stage that the term started to be attributed
to Foucault, but according to Sawyer, the cultural studies theorists that further developed the concept
in  relation  to  Foucault  did  so with  very  specific  theoretical  needs,  and interpreted  the  work  of
Foucault in the 1960s and 1970s within an already-established concept of discourse. Sawyer argues
that while the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (CCCS) were developing their
theory  of  discourse,  they  drew more  on  Foucault’s non-discursive  works  than  they  did  on  the
Archeology of  Knowledge,  especially  Discipline  and Punish  and The History  of  Sexuality.  The
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argument is that the theory of discourse had already been developed but these non-discursive works
of Foucault were not used to develop the concept, but was only seen as an analysis of the emergence
and constitution of forms of discursive subjectivity (Sawyer, 2002).
Sawyer, demonstrates  how Foucault  used the term “discourse” to clarify his  point.  Foucault
acknowledges that he has “used and abused” the term discourse in many different senses. Foucault
lists three different senses in which he used the term “discourse”. The first is the most “general” and
“vague” and denotes a group of verbal performances produced by a group of signs (Foucault, 2002,
p. 120). In the second sense, Foucault meant discourse as a group of acts of formulations, that is, a
series of sentences or propositions (Foucault, 2002, p. 120-1). The third sense, which is the one that
Foucault says he finally used at the time of writing the Archeology of Knowledge, is “constituted by
a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be
assigned particular modalities of existence”. A discourse in this last sense is therefore “a group of
statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (Foucault, 2002, p. 121).
Despite—or rather because—its fluid meaning, the concept of discourse rose to prominence out
of necessity as the terms “culture”, “ideology” and “language” were facing some serious conceptual
challenges. First, the concept of “culture” was developed in opposition to the economic determinism
of  orthodox  Marxism  (Hall,  1980,  p.23-5  quoted  in  Sawyer,  2002).  Just  like  economism,  the
centrality of culture was later criticized as overly synchronic, ahistorical and totalizing. The term
“culture” was gradually abandoned even within cultural studies, and was replaced by discourse and
took up many of the connotations culture used to previously refer to (Sawyer, 2002).
As for ideology, the concept was too tied to the base/superstructure concept of Marxism which,
according to Sawyer, implied a separation between ideas on the one hand and social reality on the
other.  This  critique  however  lacks  accuracy,  because  the  base/superstructure  argument  is  that
ideology  stems  and  is  rooted  in  economic  conditions  not  separate  from  them.  Maybe  a  more
convincing argument about what the framework of “discourse” could offer that “ideology” cannot is
how it could take into account race and gender conflicts, whereas ideology was too embedded within
a Marxist model of class conflict, and therefore became a prominent framework within feminist and
post-colonial  studies  (Sawyer,  2002).  This  makes  discourse  a  more  suitable  concept  in  the
framework of overdetermination because its dissociation from the base/superstructure configuration
means that it can better represent complex relations of determination.
In addition to culture and ideology, Sawyer argues that discourse replaced language as well after
it had suffered from several conceptual weaknesses. With the rise of post-structuralism, language
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represented an inescapable association with structuralism and was limited to semiotic symbol system
implying synchronic and mentally represented structures. On the other hand, discourse was focused
on  the  active  practice  of  language  and  included  the  connotations  of  power  and  conflict  while
language did not. This, once again, suited the theoretical needs of feminist, post-colonial, and race
theory scholars.
‘Discourse’ thus retains many connotations of 1970s Marxist and Lacanian theory, but in a
way  that  allows  the  incorporation  of  history,  culture  and  both  structuralist  and  post-
structuralist insights. It is not surprising that such an all-encompassing term is now associated
with a wide range of conflicting and confusing meanings (Sawyer, 2002).
Regardless of the theoretical concept’s origin, Fairclough is seen as the person who provided
methodological procedures and instruments to—or operationalized—what had only been a theory up
until this point (Blommaert, 2005, p. 44). According to Blommaert, Fairclough sketched a three-
dimensional  framework  for  analyzing  discourse.  The  first  dimension,  which  Blommaert  calls
discourse-as-text concerns the text itself or the “linguistic features organization of concrete instances
of  discourse.  The  second  dimension  is  called  by  Blommaert  “discourse-as-discursive-practice”,
which means that after the analysis of vocabulary, grammar, text structure, the task is now to link the
text to its wider social context. The third dimension is “discourse-as-social-practice”, that is, the
ideological and hegemonic processes in which discourse is seen to operate (Blommaert, 2005, p. 44).
These  three  dimensions  will  be  used  to  operationalize  the  study’s  conceptual  and  theoretical
frameworks by linking the micro level of nationalist discourse to the meso and macro levels of their
determinants.
Explaining why the study of discourse should not be restricted to linguists, Blommaert argues
that linguists should have no monopoly over theories of language because the linguistic bias restricts
the analysis to textually organized and linguistically encoded discourse, not to where it comes from
and goes to (Blommaert, 2005, p. 35). Instead we should be looking at how the linguistic generates
the  economic  social,  political  as  well  as  how  the  economic,  social  and  political  generate  the
linguistic (Blommaert, 2005, p. 66).
The problems I have identified with treatments of context in CDA and CA all had to do with
the centrality of text in both traditions. Despite claims voiced in both traditions about  the
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mutually  constitutive  relationship  of  discourse  and society, the  ultimate  ambition  remains
explaining  discourse,  not  explaining  society  through  the  privileged  window  of  discourse
(Blommaert, 2005, p. 66).
Other than the centrality of text in discourse analysis, Blommaert also criticizes the focus of
CDA on single societies as self-contained systems, and how it is almost always restricted to societies
he describes as “Late Modern,  and post-industrial,  densely semiotised First-World societies”. He
says that he had never encountered a reference in any CDA work to world-systems theory or the
works  on  transnational  and  global  processes  of  interconnectedness,  inequality  and  value-
differentiation of  scholars  like  Immanuel  Wallerstein,  Giovanni  Arrighi,  Samir  Amin and Andre
Gunder Frank (Blommaert, 2005, p. 36).
Therefore,  if  discourse  is  perceived  as  contextualized  language  where  the  dimension  of
contextualization is taken seriously beyond the national and temporal contours, CDA then ceases to
belong exclusively to the linguistics fields and becomes a social  science of language in society.
Blommaert’s elaborate this idea and argues that discourse analysis should be a social science that
utilizes language to answer social scientific questions. This study therefore tries to challenge the
dominant  threshold  of  contextualization  which  limits  the  context  to  single  societies  and  single
events. This, above all, is also a response to a criticism of discourse analysis which usually used a
misattribution of Derrida as saying “there is nothing outside the text” to assure that the real focus of
this dissertation is on what lies beyond—or outside—the text.
The  contexts  of  discourse  are  both  temporal  and  spatial.  As  discussed  above  in  the  theory
section,  and  as  argued  by  Blommaert  (2005),  no  CDA can  be  complete  without  studying  the
historical context of discourse, but Blommaert also argues that in the era of globalization context can
no longer be limited to a single society and “needs to include the relationships between different
societies and the effect of these relationships on repertoires of language users and their potential to
construct voice” (Blommaert, 2005, p.15). By emphasizing this intertextuality and pretextuality, the
study aims to honour this interplay of historical and global forces in the shaping of discourse.
However, global and historical contexts can naturally go without limit and therefore need to be
delimited. First, the global context would be delimited by the most key movements of capital flows
and its likely impact on the discourse at hand. For this reason, special attention will be given to the
impact of “Khaleeji capital” (capital flows from oil-rich Arab Gulf countries) in the post-2011 period
since it constituted the bulk of capital flows at the time, which was also a period characterized by the
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receding role of US capital.  As for the historical scope, the focus will  be on important ruptures
starting with the Urabi revolution that broke out in 1879 because it is seen by many scholars as the
birth moment of modern Egyptian nationalism as will be discussed further in the study. The study
will be covering other landmark rupture moments in both the flows and workings of capital and their
impact on the discourse of the nationalist bourgeoisie, such as the project to establish a national bank
in Egypt after World War I, the 1952 land reform programme, the 1961 nationalization programme
and the 1974 open-door policy. 
Although I think of this study as primarily qualitative, I will be complementing it with some
quantitative  data.  The  quantitative  approach—with  all  its  shortcomings—was  only  employed
minimally to help me select texts—upon which some meso- and macro- analysis will be built. It was
utilized to demonstrate that the selected texts are not one-off isolated utterances or a deviation from
the discourse of the programme and the channel, and to demonstrate that the texts were not selected
at the whim of the researcher to confirm a predetermined outcome. This is always a risk when doing
a  qualitative  study  of  a  relatively  small  sample;  in  this  manner,  I  believe  that  counting  the
recurrences of some themes can be useful in selecting more specific passages for deeper examination
and ensure a degree of representability. For example, it was very revealing to see that the United
States received a great deal of antagonism across the three shows and channels. In this light, it was
useful for me when running an analysis of anti-American text passages to know how recurrent of a
theme it was across the three shows and the three channels.
1.4.1. Prestage 1: Data collection and sampling
Since qualitative research determines the size and the non-random nature of the sample, I will limit
the research to three businessmen whose profiles match the definition of infitah businessmen as
outlined in the introduction of this study. Other than having accumulated their wealth as a result of
the open-door policy, these three businessmen were selected because they own some of the most
viewed media outlets, and are highly involved in media production with a high political content that
was established in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The samples will be the prime time shows of
the three most-viewed TV stations in June 2013 owned by members of the infitah businessmen
around the period of the June 30 anti-Brotherhood protests.
The three channels  will  be  Sada al-Balad (the echo of the country)  which is  owned by the
Mubarak-era business tycoon, and a member of the deposed National Democratic Party Mohamed
Abo  Elenien;  al-qahira  wal  nas (Cairo  and  the  people)  which  is  owned  by  Tarek  Nour,  an
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advertisement  tycoon  known for  his  closeness  to  the  state,  and  animosity  towards  the  Muslim
Brotherhood,  and  was  the  campaign  manager  of  Mubarak’s  2005  electoral  campaign;  Capital
Broadcasting Center (CBC) which is owned by Mohamed al-Amin, another business tycoon from
the era who has highly invested in media outlets (both TV and print) with a clear anti-Brotherhood
nationalist message. Al-Amin was relatively obscure before the establishment of CBC compared to
other Egyptian businessmen with comparable levels of wealth. This is because he spent most of his
business  career  in  Kuwait.  However,  CBC  was  very  instrumental  in  propagating  the  June  30
message  that  it  would  have  been very  difficult  to  ignore.  Al-Amin is  also  a  major  partner  and
shareholder in Amer Group, which is owned by Mansour Amer, a senior National Democratic Party
member of parliament during the Mubarak era. This connection, the opinions he holds and the kind
of business circles he belongs to qualify him to be one of the study’s infitah businessmen.
1.4.2 Stage 1: Micro level
As previously discussed, the study is carried out using CDA techniques to analyze the content of
selected TV channels. The purpose is to deconstruct and detect ideas related to the change in the
socio-political  power  structure  of  the  time,  and the  quick  revival  of  another. The  research  was
conducted using an inductive method starting with the micro level of discourse used in the subject
media, and leading to middle and macro level analysis. I will employ Fairclough's (Fairclough &
Holes, 1995) three dimensions for studying discourse: the micro level which focuses on analysing
the  text  (the  language  and  the  message  presented)  itself,  the  meso-level  which  focuses  on  the
production of the text (who funds it, for which audience and for what reason?), and finally, and most
importantly, the  macro  level,  which  involves  studying  the  broad  economic,  social  and  political
factors that affect the researched text (what domestic, regional and international economic, political
and social factors led to the employment of such discourse).
The first stage for studying discourse entirely focuses on the micro-level dimension of analyzing
the  text.  It  mainly  involved  watching  about  40  hours  of  three  prime-time  shows,  and  taking
preliminary notes and counting the frequency of certain occurrences (e.g. how many pro and anti
Brotherhood guests and phone-ins, the language used, etc.).
The CDA also incorporates qualitative analysis in the micro level (counting the frequency of
thematic concepts within the selected text) to identify the focus of the producers, and to examine
through relational analysis the links between concepts in a text. The tool used for this stage is a list
of  questions  designed  to  identify  relevant  patterns  in  the  text  and is  loosely  based  on Norman
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Fairclough’s ten questions for CDA (1989).
Fairclough distinguishes between three types of values that formal features of discourse may
have. These types of value are experiential, relational and expressive. For Fairclough, experiential
values  give  a  cue  to  how  the  text  producer’s  experience  of  the  social  and  natural  world  is
represented; it is the value that concerns knowledge and beliefs. As for relational values, they are the
formal features of discourse that have to do with social relationships; for the purpose of this study,
detecting  relational  values  in  the  discourse  will  be  mostly  employed  to  analyze  how  the  text
producers include or exclude social and political groups using grammatical features, such as the use
of the pronouns “we” and “you”. Finally, expressive values concern subjects and social identities,
and Fairclough stresses that any formal feature might simultaneously have two or three of these
values (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112).
Based on these concepts I have chosen from Fairclough's ten questions for analyzing discourse a
set of questions that are most relevant to the discourse analysis at hand2:
1) What experiential values do words have?
1.1 Are there words which are ideologically contested?
1.2 Is there rewording or overwording?
1.3 What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) are there
between words?
2) What metaphors are used?
3) What experiential values do grammatical features have? 
3.1 What types of process and participant predominate?
3.2 Is agency unclear?
3.3 Are processes what they seem?
3.4 Are sentences active or passive?
3.5 Are sentences positive or negative?
4) What relational values do grammatical features have?
4.1 Are the pronouns “we” and “you” used, and if so, how?
5) What expressive values do grammatical features have?
6) How are (simple) sentences linked together?
6.1 What logical connectors are used?
2The list of question is based on Fairclough’s 10 questions for CDA in: Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and Power. 
New York: Longman. pp. 110-139
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6.2 Are complex sentences characterized by coordination or subordination?
7) What larger-scale structure does the text have?
After a first screening of the shows and getting a sense of what kind of anti-Brotherhood discourse
was disseminated, I have generated a number of questions for the quantitative analysis to count the
frequency of different themes and detect bias in media coverage. The questions are as follows:
1) What is the topic of the discussion?
 a) The Muslim Brotherhood is the only topic of discussion. 
 b) The Muslim Brotherhood is the main topic of discussion. 
 c) The Muslim Brotherhood is a main topic of discussion. 
 d) The Muslim Brotherhood is an important topic of discussion. 
 e) The Muslim Brotherhood is a topic of discussion. 
 f)  The Muslim Brotherhood is a passing topic of discussion.
 g) There is no mention of the Muslim Brotherhood.
2) What is the general sentiment of the episode?
 a) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a very positive light.
 b) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a fairly positive light.
 c) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented fairly neutral.
 d) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a fairly negative light.
 e)  The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a very negative light.
3) What was the Brotherhood accused of (if at all)?
a) Inefficiency at running the country but with with no mention of collaborative activities or
deliberately working against the interest of Egypt (they are mere failures).
b) Does not prioritize the interests of the nation because they believe in a different kind of
nation that transcends Egypt.
c) Actively work against the interests of the nation because they work for a foreign enemy.





d) the European Union
e) The United States
f) Israel




6) What kind of nationalist/identity references (if any) are used to deligitimize the
Brotherhood rule?
 a) References made to ancient Egyptian civilization.
 b) References made to modern Egyptian culture.
 c) References made to Islamic belief and moral conduct.
 d) Reference made to principles of pan-Arabism.
7) What kind of other non-nationalistic/identity-related references are used (if any) to
delegitimize the Brotherhood rule?
a) reference made to human rights.
b) reference made to law and constitution.
c) reference made to the economy
d) reference made about violence
8) Phone-ins were made by?
 a) Proponents of the Brotherhood
 b) Neutral
 c) Opponents of the Brotherhood
 d) Irrelevant
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1.4.3 Stage 2: The Meso Level
From Stage 1 analysis, I was able to formulate questions that took me to stage 2 of my research (the
meso-level  dimension)  to  explain  the  funding  mechanisms,  the  ownership  structure,  and  the
profit/loss model of the media outlets, but also of the other non-media business activities of the
owners. Stage 2 would rely mostly on official records and media sources. This is the stage when a
CDA starts diverting from a normal discourse analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the
text,  into  analyzing  other  factors  and  discourse  that  belong  to  the  wider  context,  that  is,  the
immediate forces and determinants behind the production of the text. In the case at hand, it was
extremely useful to look at issues like the ownership of the media, and the political and economic
affiliations of its owners (party membership, business partnerships, etc.),  as an effective tool for
understanding events through media discourse.
The findings of the micro level were cross-examined in the meso level against the discourse of
the owners themselves; in some cases like that of Tarek Nour and Ibrahim Eissa, there was a conflict
of  some  views.  Such  conflict  of  views  are  just  as  worthy  of  analysis  and  examination  as  the
predominant agreement and harmony between the views of the presenters and their employers.
1.4.4 Stage 3:The Macro Level
If the meso-level dimension studies immediate forces behind producing a text, the macro level
would look into the wider and more broad forces behind the production of the text up to the
regional and the global levels, which, as highlighted by Blommaert, are very key to understanding
the economic motives behind the uttering of the researched discourse. In a global condition where
media  and  communications  becomes  increasingly  transnational,  and  more  importantly,  in  an
economic system where the flow of capital  is  facing less barriers and economic activities are
becoming increasingly transnational, it is no longer sufficient—perhaps it never was—to limit the
broader context to the national level. Therefore, my focus in the macro level was on the regional
and international interplay of forces.
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1.4.5 Historical background
CDA as  a  methodological  tool  has  been criticized  for  its  ahistoricism as  it  tends  to  ignore  the
historical conditions that influence the production of discourse and tends to examine single events of
discourse and disconnect it from previous events, but fortunately some scholars have noticed this
shortcoming and tried to overcome it. 
Jan Blommaert criticizes Critical Discourse Analysis for ignoring the historical dimension of
discourse, or what he describes as pretextuality. Blommaert’s concept of pretextuality is defined as
“contexts that influence language long before it is produced in the form of utterances and that define
the conditions under which utterances can be produced, or fail to be produced” (Blommaert, 2005, p.
77). Blommaert argues that a synchronic reading of discourse will  not suffice if the aim is to “
launch a critique of systemic features of contemporary societies and focuses on issues of power” (p.
37). Critical analysis of discourse for Blommaert should not, therefore, start as soon as people open
their mouths, but should start long before that.
An ahistorical reading of discourse therefore risks failing to spot the crucial  phenomenon of
inequality  or  mistakenly  locate  them  in  the  analysis  of  single  instance  of  communication
(Blommaert, 2005, p. 96). Accordingly, the study will be concerned with explaining this present or
recent discursive phenomenon by conducting a historical investigation of the nationalist discourse of
different business elites since the late 19th century, which scholars mark as the birth of the Egyptian
nationalist movement, and into how business and economic interests throughout this history have at
least partially contributed to shaping the nationalist discourse.
To overcome this shortcoming and to incorporate such historical analysis, the second half of the
dissertation will be a historical study of Egyptian nationalism and its intertwinement with economic
interests from the time of the Urabi revolution until the June 30 events. I will aim at highlighting
major ruptures and shifts in the nationalist discourse and the positions of the political and national
elites,  and  how  they  were  intimately  linked  to  economic  considerations  from  the  very  “birth
moment” of modern Egyptian nationalism during the second half of the 19 th century at the hands of
the Urabi movement and until I arrive at the June 30 moment. This should help with highlighting the
unstable nature of nationalist discourse and expose its susceptibility to economic and technological
changes.
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Figure 2 Research Design
Before we move onto the next chapter, I would like to make a few final methodological remarks
about my presence as a researcher in the study. This dissertation is a result of an almost five-year
long process that started with the unfolding of the June 30, 2013 events,  which led to both the
overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime after only one year in power and the establishment of
a military authoritarian order. I was a firsthand witness of the June 30 mass protests, the resulting
coup  d’etat of  July  3,  and  the  Rab’aa  massacre  a  month  and  a  half  later.  I  witnessed  these
developments not only by following their live coverage in the media, but also by taking part in some
of the protest events, first as a participant who was hoping for better governance than that provided
by the Muslim Brotherhood, and then as an observer anxious about the direction into which the
events were heading, since it quickly became clear that extreme violence, the emergence of a more
authoritarian regime, and the final “death blow” of the January 2011 revolution were imminent.
Being trained as a journalist and in policy research where it is generally unacceptable to include
the author’s subjective experience, I was trying to avoid the use of first person singular when I first
started drafting this dissertation. This normally gives the illusion of removing the researcher from
the research as if there is an objective truth that is capable of speaking for itself. Halfway through
writing up this dissertation, I abandoned this positivist approach because I came to the realization
that  not  just  it  is  inconceivable  to  remove  any  researcher  from  any  research,  but  this  topic
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particularly is one where I am (by definition and by virtue of being an Egyptian researcher) involved
emotionally, professionally, socially and politically.
This subjective view is clear when I use the term “revolution” to describe the events that led to
the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011, but I use the term “events” or “protests” to
describe the June 30 events which led to the removal of Mohamed Morsy from power. Many have
argued that the two processes were similar where mass protests led to the military’s intervention to
remove the head of state followed by a period of military rule. I have plenty of what I think are
objective reasons to make this distinction, but cannot also deny the role of subjective inclination and
personal preference.
Needless to say, this does not make the dissertation a long opinion piece; I put significant effort
into  data  collection,  verification,  ensuring  samples  are  representative,  using  cross-examination
techniques, and developing multimethodical tools to tame this subjectivity but stopping short  of
making any sweeping positivist claims.
I would also like to make a remark about linguistic matters. This being a study of discourse, it is
quite naturally heavy on exact quotations and passages. Most—if not all—of these quotations were
written or uttered in Arabic with no official translations; therefore, I had no choice but to translate
them myself. Besides being a researcher, I have worked for more than a decade as a translator and
therefore I hope that my translation will convey the meaning and the spirit of the text as much as
possible. Whenever I was faced with untranslatable expressions or words, I left them in transliterated
form with an explanation of their meaning as a footnote.
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Part I 
A three level analysis of private TV’s nationalist discourse at the time





This chapter will try to assess the nationalist discourse that was propagated in the media owned by
the infitah business elite in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood around the June 30 protest and the
subsequent military coup. As a first step towards answering the first half of the research question
about the functions this discourse might have served for its propagators, the main characteristics of
such discourse need to first be identified, and that is the objective of this chapter.
I will discuss in this chapter the micro-level of text analysis of the three prime-time shows. The
chapter will start with an overview of the TV shows and their presenters. The text will be analyzed
and divided thematically in separate sections based on the most recurrent themes that came up while
watching the shows. The selection of the themes was based on counting the frequency of similar
utterances throughout  the three shows. This resulted in  three broad nationalistic and identitarian
themes: Egyptocentrism, anti-Americanism and Islam. The micro-level text analysis is the first step
in the CDA, and will  set  the stage for the rest  of the analysis  in  the sense that the subsequent
chapters—including the historical section—will follow the same thematic structure. 
Quantitative analysis used in this chapter admittedly have their shortcomings and might offer an
over-simplistic categorization of different statement.  I  hope,  however,  that the quantitative and
qualitative  analysis  will  compensate  for  each  other’s  shortcomings  while  acknowledging  the
impossibility of reaching a full impartial and objective position while analyzing the discourse of a
highly intertwined political, social and economic phenomenon.
Before delving into the discourse of the media in 2013, I will go over some of the main thematic
concepts covered in the chapter. I will first start with a working definition for “Egyptocentrism”,
which is a term that heavily features in this study. Egyptocentrism is a nationalist ideology that
rejects all forms of pan-nationalisms, and believes that Egypt has a unique--if not superior--identity
different even from its closest neighbours. The first elaborate expression of Egyptocentrism was the
writings of Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayed in the first two decades of the 20th century. It  was further refined
and applied during the liberal era between 1923 and 1952 by thinkers like Taha Hussein, whose
writings will be described in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. After the failure of its competitor, the
pan-Arab project in 1967 and its death in 1970 with the death of its main promoter Nasser, Sadat
revived this Egyptocentric nationalism but with some modification given the specific circumstances
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and the local, regional and global struggles and conflicts of the time. This version was combined
with economic  re-liberalization in  the 1970s,  or the so-called  infitah or  open-door policy. As a
result, a new national business elite had emerged (or rather re-emerged) as a result of this policy and
ideology. The three businessmen covered in this study were the product of the switch in the state’s
general political and economic orientation in the 1970s including quite a radical switch in the state’s
official nationalist discourse.
On the other hand, the pan-Arab project championed by Nasser believed in an Arab political
union where Egypt plays a central and a leading role. Instead of a focus on Egypt-specific histories,
it focused instead on trying to manufacture a collective history of the region. It crystallized a self-
described progressive and vanguardist regime: anti-imperialist, republican and post-colonial. It was
antagonistic towards the West, namely Britain, the US and their “illegitimate child” in the region,
Israel.  It  was  a  developmental  state  that  believed  in  central  planning,  import  substitution,  self-
sufficiency and protectionism. Although Egypt officially adopted an official non-aligned position
during the Cold War under the Nasser’s pan-Arab regime, it was quite clear that in reality Egypt was
more on the side of the Eastern Bloc at the time.
2.2 The TV Shows
I have watched 16 episodes of three TV shows from three different channels in the period around
the June 30 protest. My time frame was the episodes of the week before June 30, the day that Morsy
was officially overthrown by a military decree on July 3, and the day of the mass protests on July 26
when Abdelfattah al-Sisi, the leader of the military at the time, called for Egyptians to take on the
streets to “grant him a mandate to fight terrorism” (Armbrust, 2015: 105). I was restricted to those
episodes that were available online on the official Youtube channels of the three TV stations. Despite
being daily shows, they also have two or three days off every week. Taking all these factors into
consideration, I was able to access, watch and analyze 16 full episodes from this period, with each
episode typically lasting for over two hours.
The first show is  Huna al-Aassema (This is the Capital), a prime time show presented by the
star TV host Lamis al-Hadidi. It is a political show that has a mix of live coverage of events, video
reports, while hosting guests usually towards the end of the episode. The show is broadcast on the
Capital  Broadcasting  Center  (CBC)  channel,  which  was  established  in  July  2011  after  the
revolution and quickly became one of the most viewed TV networks covering a wide range of
topics  such as  politics,  entertainment,  lifestyle,  etc.  (Dubai  Press  Club,  2012).  The network  is
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owned by Mohamed al-Amin, a business tycoon who owns a large media empire which will be
discussed in detail in the following chapter.
Al-Hadidi is a prominent TV host and journalist who joined CBC from its very inception, and
whose programme was one of the most important shows of the then newly-established TV network.
Al-Hadidy had worked for national TV under Mubarak, and for Mubarak’s 2005 election campaign
and was the managing editor of al-Alam al-Youm (the world today) financial newspaper (Sakr, 2007,
p. 30). She had—for a brief time—a programme during the month of Ramadan in 2009 in al-Qahira
wal Nas channel, which is one of the other TV channels this chapter would be looking into. She also
worked in the late 1980s as a correspondent for the New York Times in Cairo and the American TV
network NBC, and is a graduate of the American University in Cairo (Guaaybess, 2015: 169-170).
Al-Hadidi, as would be demonstrated in this chapter, held a clear oppositional stance against the
Muslim Brotherhood. I watched and analyzed six episodes with a duration of about 13 hours of her
show dated June 24, 25, 29, and 30, and July 3 and 25. In four out of the six episodes, the Muslim
Brotherhood was the only topic of discussion, and in two it was the main topic of discussion. As for
the general sentiment and how the Brotherhood was portrayed, in four episodes they were portrayed
very negatively, and in two they were portrayed fairly negatively. She made over the six episodes 11
explicit  accusations  against  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  or  showed  agreement  with  a  guest’s
accusation. The accusations against the Brotherhood are categorized as follows: a) they were five
times accused of inefficiency and failing at running the country with no mention of collaborative
activities  or  deliberately  working against  the  interest  of  Egypt.  b)  in  three  incidents  they  were
accused of collaboration and working for a foreign enemy. c) three times they were accused of not
prioritizing the interest of Egypt because they believe in another kind of nation or international
organization that transcends Egypt.
As  for  with  explicit  nationalist  references,  and  on  what  identity  bases  were  the  Muslim
Brotherhood attacked, they were dismissed five times as un-Egyptian, and four times as un-Muslim.
They were not dismissed at all as un-Arab. The significance of this will be demonstrated later in the
chapter. As for the foreign powers they were implicitly or explicitly accused of collaborating with
and their frequency, over the six episodes they were accused 11 times of collaborating with the US,
10 times of collaborating with Hamas, two times with Qatar, one time for Israel and one time for
Hezbollah.
When it comes to the frequency of references to nationalist identity to explicitly or implicitly
delegitimize  the  rule  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  30  references  were  made  of  which  eight
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references were made to ancient Egyptian civilization, five to modern Egyptian culture, and nine to
Islamic belief and moral conduct and eight to sectarianism, while no references were made to pan-
Arabism.  32  non-identity  references  were  counted  to  delegitimize  the  Brotherhood  rule.  Two
references were about disrespect to human rights, 14 were about disrespect to law and constitution,
six to economic failure and 10 to violence.
63 phone-ins were received during the six episodes, of which 57 were by opponents of the
Muslim Brotherhood, three were neutral and three were irrelevant. There was not a single phone-in
by a proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood or President Morsy. The shows hosted 10 guests over
the  six  episodes  and  they  were  all  opponents  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Reports  were  also
overwhelmingly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsy’s presidency.
The second show I have analyzed is  Huna al-Qahira (This is Cairo), a political prime time
show presented by the celebrity journalist Ibrahim Eissa. Unlike Huna al-Aassema, the show has
very little live coverage of events, filmed reports, and mostly depends on Eissa’s political analysis
and hosting and interviewing guests. The show is broadcast on the  al-Qahira wal Nas channel,
which was established before the revolution as an entertainment channel broadcasting only during
the month of Ramadan.
However,  after  the  revolution  it  expanded  to  become  an  around-the-clock  network  of  two
channels.  While  still  providing  entertainment,  the  channel  has  increasingly  started  to  include
political shows. Also, the advertising company behind the channel, Tarek Nour Communications
(TNC), worked on many political campaigns including the 2005 election campaign for president
Mubarak, and the election campaign of presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik (Bohn, 2014) in 2012
in addition to many other governmental campaigns during the Mubarak year. Established in 1978 a
few years after the open-door policy, TNC was the first private advertising agency to be established
in Egypt under the name Americana, and has grown to become one of the largest advertising houses
in Egypt and the Middle East (TNA Website). The company and its owners will be discussed in
more detail in chapter 3 on the meso-level of Critical Discourse Analysis.
As for Eissa, he is a veteran journalist who established one of the first private newspapers in the
mid-1990s  called  al-Dostour.  Al-Dostour  was  highly  critical  of  the  regime  and  was  sometimes
critical of Mubarak himself which was not entirely usual at the time. He was sentenced to prison in
2006 for having doubted Mubarak’s health condition, but was shortly released after he received a
pardon from Mubarak himself. He was initially supportive of the January 2011 revolution, but grew
very critical of the Muslim Brotherhood regime and was a staunch supporter of the June 30 protests,
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and started distancing himself from January 25 revolution. However, after June 30 he changed the
name of his  programme to 25/30 paying allegiance to  both the January 25 and June 30 events.
Throughout  his  career,  he  had a  multitude  of  media  projects  including  several  newspapers  and
political shows in different networks. The Facebook page for the Huna al-Qahira programme dates
back to September 2012, just a few months before the June 30 events (Official Facebook Page for
Huna al-Qahira Programme, 2012).
The same as Al-Hadidi, Eissa held a clear oppositional stance against the Muslim Brotherhood. I
watched and analyzed five episodes with a total duration of about eight hours of his show that were
aired on June 24, 25, 26, and July 3 and 26. In all of the five episodes, the Muslim Brotherhood was
the only topic of discussion. As for the general sentiment and how the Brotherhood was portrayed, in
four episodes they were portrayed very negatively, and in one episode they were portrayed fairly
negatively. In the five episodes,  he made 11 explicit  accusations or expressed agreement with a
guest’s  accusation.  The  accusations  are  categorized  as  follows:  a)  they  were  accused  once  of
inefficiency without a mention of collaborative activities or deliberately working against the interest
of Egypt; b) five times they were accused of not prioritizing the interest  of Egypt because they
believe in another kind of nation or international organization that transcends Egypt; c) five times
they were accused of actively working against the interest of the nation for a foreign enemy.
As for explicit nationalist references, and on what identity bases the Muslim Brotherhood were
attacked, they were dismissed seven times as un-Egyptian, and four times as un-Muslim. Just like
with al-Hadidi, there was no mention at all of Arabism. Over the five episodes they were accused
11 times of collaborating with the United States, one time of collaborating with Hamas, two times
with Qatar, and seven times for Israel
When it comes to the frequency of references to nationalist identity employed to explicitly or
implicitly delegitimize the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, 21 references were made of which two
were made in relation to ancient Egyptian civilization, two to modern Egyptian culture, eight to
Islamic belief and conduct, only one for pan-Arabism and eight to sectarianism. 38 non-identity
references  were  counted  to  delegitimize  the  Brotherhood  rule.  No  references  were  made  for
disrespect of human rights, six references were made about the disrespect to law and constitution, six
reference were linked to economic failure and 14 to violence. 10 phone-ins were received during the
six episodes, and all of them were by opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. The same applies to the
three guests who were all opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood as well.
The third and final show is al-Balad al-Youm (The Country Today) on Sada al-Balad’s channel
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presented by Rola Kharsa. The channel started broadcasting on November 28, 2011 just before the
first round of the first parliamentary elections after the January 25 revolution (Sada al-Balad official
Website, n.d.). The channel is owned by business tycoon Mohamed Abou El Enein, the owner of
Cleopatra Group, which is the biggest producer of ceramic in Egypt, and exports its products to over
a 100 countries, and has 17 plants and employs over 25000 workers (Ceramica Cleopatra Official
Website, n.d.). He was also member of parliament from 1995 until until the 2011 revolution, and a
member of Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (Atef, 2015).
Rola Kharsa has started her career in the media as a presenter in the European programme on the
Egyptian radio in 1989. She then moved to London to work for the BBC in 1992. In 1994, she
became the London correspondent for the Egyptian state-owned TV. In 1999, she returned to Cairo
and started a programme on state-owned TV called Akhbar al-Nas (news of the people), and then
one year later started another programme called fil ‘omq (in-depth) (Moheb, n.d.). Although Kharsa
is not as much of a celebrity TV personality as Eissa or al-Hadidi, Sada al-Balad’s beginnings were
quite  modest  in  comparison  to  CBC and  al-Qahira  wal  Nas,  and  did  not  attract  as  many  TV
celebrities as the two other networks. Taken that into consideration, Kharsa was Sada al-Balad’s star
who took up prime time slots and covered key events at key moments.
Kharsa was also the wife of Abdel Latif El Menawy, the head of the news sector in the Egyptian
Radio and Television Union (ERTU) at the time of the revolution. El Menawy was known for his
pro-Mubarak coverage during the 18 days of the revolution to the extent that workers within the
ERTU protested for his removal until he was sacked by the interim military government shortly after
the overthrow of Mubarak (Reuters, 2011). El Menawy was personally close to the Mubarak family.
He wrote in his book Tahrir: the last 18 days of Mubarak about how he accompanied the Mubarak
family on their last day in power as they were about to board a helicopter that would transfer them
from the presidential palace to their private residency in the Sharm al-Sheikh resort (Abdel Latif El
Menawy, 2012).
I watched about 11 hours of her show split over five episodes dated 24, 25, 26 and 30 June and 3
July. Like the previous two shows, Kharsa’s show was overwhelmingly anti-Brotherhood, where all
five episodes presented the Brotherhood in a fairly negative light. The Brotherhood was the only
topic of discussion in four out of five episodes, and a main topic of discussion in the remaining one.
They were twice accused of not prioritizing the interests of Egypt because they were loyal to another
kind of nation or international organization. They were dismissed as un-Egyptian three times and un-
Muslim only once. They were not dismissed as un-Arab at any point during those 11 hours.
61
In terms of countries the Brotherhood was accused of collaborating with, once again the US tops
the list with four mentions, Qatar and Hamas with three mentions each, Israel with two mentions and
Hezbollah with one mention. In the five episodes there were no references made to ancient Egyptian
civilization or modern Egyptian culture as a method of delegitimizing the Brotherhood rule. Only
one reference  was  made to  Islamic  belief  and moral  conduct,  and  one  reference  made to  pan-
Arabism. Three references were made to sectarianism.
As for  non-identity  references  to  delegitimize the  Brotherhood,  no references  were made to
human rights, two references were made to the law and constitution, three to economic failure, one
to general administrative failure and seven to violence. In terms of guest and phone-ins, Kharsa’s
show was more balanced relative to Eissa’s and Lamis’s but was still clearly imbalanced against the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Out of 47 phone calls, 32 were from opponents of the Brotherhood, 11 were neutral, two were
from Brotherhood proponents, and two were on irrelevant topics. As for studio guests, 13 out of 16
were opponents of the Brotherhood, two were neutral and only one was a proponent. Out of 9
reports, 4 were neutral, three had an anti-Brotherhood tone, and two were irrelevant.
2.3 Egyptocentrism without anti-Arabism
What is remarkable from the quantitative analysis as portrayed in the previous section, that even if
Egyptocentrism was quite dominant as a nationalist sentiment, it is clearly distinguishable from the
Egyptocentrism of the late Sadat era in that it was not anti-Arabist. This approach might have started
with  Mubarak’s  conciliatory  approach  with  the  other  Arab  states,  but  also  unlike  the  1970s
transformation whose main supporter was the US, the sponsors of the June 30 transformation—as I
will discuss in Chapter 4—were the oil-rich Gulf states namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Sadat used to employ a double offensive on Arabism, the first was on the Nasserist version of
pan-Arabism, which was in line with and sponsored by the Gulf’s policy towards Nasserism and
pan-Arabism as an ideology that imposed an existential threat to their rule. However, the second
element of Sadat’s anti-Arabism was against Arabs in general with the aim of humiliating them and
asserting Egypt’s cultural and historical superiority after it has been isolated and expelled from the
Arab League. These two forms of anti-Arabism constituted in the late 1970s a key component of
the official Egyptocentric national discourse of the time. This second form of anti-Arabism was
almost completely absent from the discourse of the studied media around the June 30 events, which
could safely be attributed to the increased financial and political dependence on support from Arab
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oil-rich countries.
As clear from the quantitative analysis, there was an excessive nationalistic and identity-related
discourse used to dismiss the Muslim Brotherhood as un-Egyptian across the three shows. Ahmed
Said, one of al-Hadidi’s guests who was at the time the leader of the liberal Free Egyptians party,
established  and  funded  by  business  tycoon  Naguib  Sawiris,  described  the  protests  against  the
Muslim Brotherhood as a move to defend the “true identity of Egypt”.
Said: The Egyptian people are taking to the streets today to defend the Egyptian culture and
not to attack the minister of culture, whom we don’t care about.3
Al-Hadidi (interruptedly): the true identity of Egypt.
Said: The true identity of Egypt. The Egyptian people are taking to the streets so that Egypt is
not divided into two. The Egyptian people are going down to defend the literature of Naguib
Mahfouz, the heritage of Taha Hussein, the heritage of Om Kolthoum, the theatre of Naguib
al-Rihani, and the cinema of Youssef Chahine. The Egyptian people are not taking to the street
because of the hatred,  sectarianism, killing or violence that  they talk about.  The Egyptian
people are taking to the street for freedom of opinion and freedom of belief, not to lynch the
shia’a folks, or to threaten the Christians, or deem the opposition kafirs. The Egyptian people
are taking to the streets for Egypt, and not against Morsy (Ahmed Said on Huna al-Aassema
24/6/2013).
By using the totality of the “Egyptian people” several times to describe opponents of Morsy
and the Muslim Brotherhood, Said is de-Egyptianizing anyone who will not be joining the protest
because they support the presidency of Morsy. What is at stake here, according to Said, is not
issues of politics or the economy, but issues of identity and culture; what is under aggression and
threat here is nothing but Egypt itself, a clear affirmation that the opponents are un-Egyptian. The
overwording of “Egypt” and “Egyptian people”, and the rewording of the different elements of
culture  that  are  under  attack  stresses  further  the  attempts  of  de-Egyptianizing  the  Muslim
Brotherhood.
3A group of Egyptian artists had occupied the Ministry of Culture headquarters in June 2013 to protest the removal of 
cultural leaders by the then newly-appointed minister Alaa Abdel Aziz. Abdel Aziz was seen by the protesters as being 
planted to destroy the cultural life of Egypt to serve a Muslim Brotherhood agenda.
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The antonymy between expressions like “freedom of opinion”, “freedom of belief”, “theatre”,
“heritage”,  “literature”  as  values  associated  with  the  “Egyptian  people”  on  the  one  hand  and
“lynch”, “kafir”, “sectarianism”, “hatred”, “killing”, “violence” and “division” as characteristics of
the non-Egyptian Other is designed to show the incompatibility of the first set of terms with the
rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy was used to dichotomize the unfolding political
crisis, and divide the nation into “us” and “them”.
Al-Hadidi also makes primordialist  and perennialist  references reminiscent to the writings of
early nationalist thinkers that will be described in Chapter 5 to Egypt as an ancient entity that was
united by King Menes, which is, according to her, a unity that stood the test of time and is protected
by God and cannot be divided by Morsy.
We will not accept division, because the country that was united by Menes, is not going to be
divided by Morsy; it will not be divided by Khairat4 and will not be divided by Badie5. This
country will stay unified because God protects it. Because this is the country of prophets. It is
the country of Moses, Jesus, and Mohamed (Huna al-Aassema, 30/6/2013).
Here al-Hadidi is using the antonymy “united” and “divided” to create contrast and polarization
between the Muslim Brotherhood rule and the primordial unity that is divinely protected by God.
Three days after the first mention of Menes as a uniter of Egypt, which has remained united since,
al-Hadidi made another remark about the indivisible nature of Egypt.
We are not Syria, we are not factions. We are a country that was united by Menes. When
Menes  united  it,  Morsy  cannot  break  us.  Morsy  cannot  divide  us  (Huna  al-Aassema,
30/6/2013). 
Al-Hadidi  in  this  passage  uses  an inclusive “we”,  which  Fairclough (1989) described as  a
relational value of grammatical features, in saying “we will not accept division”, which includes
both herself and the audience and any truly Egyptian citizen, which again de-Egyptianizes any
supporter of Morsy’s presidency.
The dichotomization of the political  crises was more bluntly and explicitly laid bare by al-
4Khairat al-Shater is a Muslim Brotherhood leader and businessman who was widely believed to be the most powerful 
member of the Islamist organization.
5Mohamed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of June 30.
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Hadidi’s guest Mahmoud Badr, the coordinator of Tamarud, the campaign that worked on collecting
signatures for the overthrow of Morsy, and which decided the June 30 date for the anti-Morsy mass
protests.
Tamarud has succeeded where Mohamed Morsy has failed, in that it divided the Egyptian people
into  two  groups  only:  Egyptians  and  Muslim Brotherhood.  You  are  either  with  the  Egyptian
people, and with the great Egyptian state with a 7000-year history, which will not die or end and
no one including Morsy and Badie will be able to alter its identity, or you are with those who
frankly will take the country a million years back. But in the end, I have great confidence in the
Egyptian  people,  and  I  am optimistic  and  we know that  Egypt  will  not  become Afghanistan,
Somalia or Omar al-Bashir or any of that kind of stuff (Huna al-Aassema, 24/6/2013).
Other  than  very  clear  dichotomization,  this  passage  also  stresses  the  perennial  nature  and
continuity of the Egyptian state not just in relation to the past but also the future, when he says “the
great Egyptian state with a 7000-year history, which will not die or end”. Furthermore, Egypt is
portrayed here not just as having a stable identity, but also an identity that is immutable and eternal.
This immutability of the Egyptian identity was expressed by al-Hadidi herself on several occasions
such as in the following passage from the day Morsy was overthrown:
This is a civilian state. This is a civilian state. This is a civilian state. 6 It won’t ever remove its
skin. It  won’t wear an Iranian costume. It  won’t wear a Pakistani costume. It  won’t wear
anything but the Egyptian costume. We will walk wearing our own headscarves. If we want to
wear  gilbabs,  we  will  wear  our  own—the  fellahi jellabiya;  the  sa’eedi  (upper  Egyptian)
jellabiya. […] No one will alter our soil. No one will change us and tell us you are a different
people, and you have a different anthem. We will keep singing the national anthem only (Huna
al-Aassema 3/7/2013).
This passage is a continuation of the de-Egyptianization process by associating the overthrow of
the  Muslim  Brotherhood  with  the  preservation  of  the  Egyptian  identity.  It  also  continues  to
demonstrate an identity of Egypt that is stable, primordial, pure, immutable and uncontaminatable.
The usage of the words “soil” and “skin” which denote stability, rootedness and insusceptibility to
change, and associating the concepts of “altering the soil” and “removing the skin” to issues that are
6“Civilian” or madaniya is often used in Egypt to mean “non-religious” rather than “non-military” because it is more generally 
acceptable than the Arabic term for “secular” which many Egyptians associate with being anti-religion.
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more susceptible to change like dress and costumes, gives the message that replacing the Egyptian
traditional  costume with  something else  is  as  difficult  a  process  as  removing the  skin that  lies
underneath this costume.
However, on the same episode and only a few minutes later, al-Hadidi admits that she lost faith
in the immutability of the Egyptian identity after Morsy’s election and spoke about how she felt that
Egypt was losing her identity after being captured by those whose Egyptianism is questionable.
Exactly a year ago, we were in this studio. I didn’t vote for Morsy but I accepted the result. It
was a difficult day for me. It was a difficult day. Maybe this is the first time I tell this story. It
really was a difficult day, not because Shafik lost. It was a difficult day because I felt my
country was stolen. I felt like my life was stolen. I felt that my son would not live here  […] I
felt that I too might not be able to live here. I felt that we will be forced to leave. I felt that I
will not be able to help in building this country. I felt that the country was going to be a
different place, and its identity will change, and will be stolen for the sake of other people.
People I read a lot about. They are Egyptian, but they were brainwashed; a lot of their ideas
were disfigured. They are Egyptian, but they think of Egypt as part of a caliphate. Not a
home. A part of a big organization that is not ours. We learnt to say biladi biladi7, we didn’t
learn to say nashid al-jihad, or any other nashid8 (Huna al-Aassema 3/7/2013). 
Eissa also engages quite bluntly in a process of de-Egyptianization by distinguishing between
being Egyptian and belonging to the Ikhwan9 (Brotherhood). After Morsy’s last speech to the nation
four days before the June 30 protests and a week before his overthrow, Eissa wondered whether this
speech could “touch the hearts of Egyptians”. “Is it possible that this speech can touch something in
the heart of Egyptians? Of course the hearts of the Ikhwan is a different matter” (Huna al-Qahira,
26/6/2013).
Eissa does not just stop there. He goes on to proclaim that the Brotherhood are not Egyptian and
therefore it does not count if they were touched by the speech. Eissa while predicting the content of
Morsy’s last speech, compared the Muslim Brotherhood to the  Kharijites, an early Muslim group
who are believed to have assassinated the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib for agreeing to arbitration
in his power struggle with Muwaiyah I.  The word “kharijites” is  derived from the Arabic word
kharaja meaning “to leave” or “to exit” denoting that  they have left  their  community and have
7 The title of Egypt’s national anthem meaning “my homeland, my homeland”.
8 Islamic hymn but could also mean a national anthem. 
9 Arabic for “brothers”, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood.
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become alien to it. The group is highly vilified by most Muslim scholars and the contemporary use
of term denotes a group that has left and betrayed its community and declared war against it.
Eissa also ruled out the possibility of a civil war breaking out also by means of de-Egyptianizing
the Muslim Brotherhood. He argues that a civil  war only happens between equals,  and when a
nation is evenly divided. He described the mass June 30 protests as “the entire Egyptian people
against you (the Brotherhood)”.
Didn’t Mubarak say “it’s either me or chaos?”. Tomorrow, Mohamed Morsy will tell us: “it’s
either me or the civil war. Me or the civil war!” You ask yourself, what civil war? [...] You’re
a bunch of terrorists. Are terrorists capable of making a civil war? Civil war happens when a
nation is divided, when factions are divided, when there is a defected army. When you have
things like that  […] When you have different  races and ethnicities.  But  this  is  the entire
Egyptian people, against you (Huna al-Qahira, 25/6/2013).
In the previous passage, Eissa uses the word “entire” instead of “most” to denote that any and
every Egyptian can only be opposing the Brotherhood, and therefore the Brotherhood cannot be part
of the “Egyptian people”. He refuses to think of the political conflict as a nation divided, because
that would be implying that the Brotherhood are a significant part of the Egyptian nation, and that
conflict with its opposition would be considered division of the nation. Eissa goes on in the same
episode to make his point even more clear:
We are the Egyptians and you are the proponents of the international caliphate. We are the
proponents of Wataniya10. The conflict by the way is a conflict of thought more than it is a
conflict about anything else. For some people it is “Egypt, first, second, third and fourth”, and
for some people “the caliphate and the world” comes first (Huna al-Qahira 25/6/2013).
Kharsa also emphasized this difference in size stressing the fact that the Brotherhood and their
supporters are a minority, and therefore deviant and do not represent the true spirit of the nation.
The people of Raba’a al-Adawiya, with of course all respect to their opinions and their support
of Dr. Morsy, went on the stages to say that they are four times the number of those in Tahrir. It
10A term used to denote Egyptian nationalism as opposed to Arab-nationalism or other forms of pan-nationalisms which 
uses the term “qawmiya”.
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seems that they did not see all the governorates of Egypt, that they did not go to Itihadiya. 11 The
did not see in the other governorates and all of Egypt’s squares the numbers there (Studio al-
Balad, 30/6/2013). 
In the following passage,  Kharsa gives her instruction to protesters urging them to put their
differences aside and just express their love for Egypt.
When you are in the protest, don’t say what your affiliation is, don’t say which movement
you belong to, just say that you love Egypt, and that you will make a sacrifice for Egypt.
You will stand by anyone, and walk next to anyone who loves Egypt. Don’t ask the person
next to you: “who are you?”; don’t look to what they’re wearing; don’t try to know whether
they  are  kanaba12,  or  filool17,  or  revolutionaries,  or  Tahrir13.  Don’t  try  to  know  their
affiliations. Ask him simply: “do you love Egypt?”, and God willing, Egypt will return to
the Egyptians (al-Balad al-Youm, 24/6/2013).
 A recurrent theme that serves the same goal of de-Egyptianizing the Muslim Brotherhood as a
political group is to portray them using different discourse techniques in a manner akin to colonizers
or occupiers.
No one can assault you, Egypt. Not the French, nor the English, nor the Hyksos; not any
invasion; not the Israelis; not anyone; and not the Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood are
our brothers, and will remain our brothers. No one can assault you Egypt, no one can rape
you, ya bahiya14 (Huna al-Aassema, 3/7/2013).
Here it is clear that al-Hadidi is trying to liken the rule of the Brotherhood to colonization
before she retracts by calling the Brotherhood “our brothers”.
We will  not  be  enslaved  after  today.  We will  not  be  ruled  by  a  group  and   an
international  organization.  This is  the Egyptian people saying their  word (Huna al-
11 The presidential palace area where large anti-Morsy protests took place)
12Hizb al-kanaba (couch party): a derogatory term popularized after the January 2011 revolution referring to those who 
have not participated in any revolutionary events, and preferred instead watching them from the comfort of their couch. 
13Meaning someone who is supportive of the revolution
14A nickname for Egypt, which is also a woman’s name meaning “glorious” or “illuminated”
68
Aassema, 3/7/2013).
The expression, “we will not be enslaved after today” is a famous quote purportedly said by
Urabi to Khedive Tawfiq during his revolt against European and Ottoman privileges in Egypt. The
fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is an international organization was often stressed to prove that
their  loyalty  cannot  be  to  Egypt  because  the  way  they  function  as  an  international  group  is
inherently transnational.
On the day of  the  overthrow of  Morsy on July 3,  2013,  Kharsa also  makes the  colonizer’s
analogy. Known for her animosity towards the January 25 revolution, she explains that June 30 is a
continuation of the 1919 revolution against British occupation. She also uses the theme of national
unity in defiance against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The June revolution is a continuation of 1919 revolution. The revolution of the crescent and
the  cross.  The  revolution  of  the  youth  and  the  elderly.  A revolution  that  was  against  a
colonizer, even if they spoke in the name of religion. A revolution where the army accepted
the challenge and have outdone themselves. It challenged Mr Obama and the White House’s
plan to destroy Egypt. Who did this were the heroes of the Egyptian army (Studio al-Balad,
3/7/2013).
Back then, there was still a strong debate whether the overthrow of Morsy should be described
as a military coup or a revolution. Proponents of the overthrow tended to defend the idea that this
was a revolution, whereas the opponents were keen on describing it as a coup d’etat (Fisher, 2013).
The overwording of “revolution” where it is uttered five times in this short passage shows the need
to stress and emphasize the fact that it was not a coup d’etat, despite in the end paying homage to
the role of the armed forces.
2.4 Anti-Americanism
The same way the June 30 Egyptocentric discourse differed from the 1970s Egyptocentric discourse
in the fact that it was void of anti-Arab references, the June 30 discourse was notably anti-American,
unlike the 1970s discourse which was pro-American and very anti-Soviet in the spirit of the bipolar
world order of the time; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, where the anti-Soviet
Sadatist discourse will be discussed and analyzed. The US received the lion’s share of attacks by the
media presenters as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. This antagonism towards the US might
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be likened to the receding role of the US in favour of the Gulf Arab states as more important key
political and economic players, whose interventions can prove more decisive. It is worth noting that
this antagonism was also particular to the Obama administration which was seen as sympathetic to
the Muslim Brotherhood, and during the term of US ambassador to Cairo Anne Paterson, who was
also seen as an ardent supporter of the Brotherhood.
The following passage for example was voiced on the episode of 24/6/2013 on the day a group
of Shi’a Muslim were publicly killed in a village in the outskirts of Giza in a mob attack by the
Sunni Muslim resident of the Zawiyat Abu Musallam village. Lamis al-Hadidi blamed the incident
on the  sectarian  rhetoric  of  the  Muslim Brotherhood,  and  blamed  President  Morsy  himself  for
sponsoring such hate speech. She accused the Brotherhood of only denouncing the violent attack
after receiving orders from Paterson, whom she calls “the American High Commissioner”, making
an analogy to the British High Commissioner who was the effective ruler of Egypt when it was
under British occupation.
Today Anne Paterson released a statement denouncing the killing of the Shi’as. You know the
ambassador, is the British high commissioner, or the American high commissioner, whom this
regime bows to, and uses it to protect itself. The high commissioner said—the lady said, “that this
is foul play you children”, “it is inappropriate” and “shameful” (Huna al-Aassema, 24/6/2013).
Al-Hadidi used a tone as if Paterson was addressing children who had misbehaved. The message
she was trying to relay by using this metaphor is the level of intimacy the US ambassador has with
the Muslim Brotherhood regime, but the language of this motherly rebuking of a child, and the use
of Arabic terms of the words “shameful” and “inappropriate” while changing her tone to imitate a
mother rebuking her children, is used to show that there is a very high degree of intimacy but not an
equal one, and that there is a clear authority mixed with love like that between a mother and her
children.
In a separate incident on her show six days later on June 30, al-Hadidi made another mother
metaphor, but this time the mother was not Anne Paterson but was Egypt itself,  as Egypt has
traditionally been portrayed as a woman and a mother (Baron, 2007). In Al-Hadidi’s metaphor
Egypt was a mother under attack and therefore afraid, but Al-Hadidi was reassuring her because
her children in the demonstration are out to defend her. In the previous passage the mother of the
Muslim Brotherhood was American and the Brotherhood were portrayed as misbehaving children
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who were rebuked by their American mother, whereas the mother of the opponents of the Muslim
Brotherhood is Egypt itself and the opposition are portrayed as loyal courageous children.
Don’t be afraid, Egypt, as long as your children are there in the streets. Don’t be afraid, Egypt,
as long as there are men and women covering your back, and women, and women who are
worth a million man. The louder voice today in Tahrir was the voice of women, singing all the
nationalistic songs that we all know by heart and were brought up listening to. Do you know
why? Because “the women of these country are men”15; they don’t hide at homes; no one can
hide them behind curtains, or a khimar, a hijab, or behind anything. Veiled women take to the
streets;  face-veiled women take to the streets;  non-veiled women take to  the  streets.  Your
women, are like men, Egypt. Those are the ones who stood in the lines, and those are the ones
who took to the streets. Why are you afraid? Don’t you be afraid as long as those are in the
streets; as long as they have faith in you; as long as they still memorize your poems, the poems
of al-Abnudi16; as long as they are still singing the songs of Mounir17, and as long as they recite
all the art and culture that we grow up with. Why are you afraid? Don’t you be afraid? (Huna
al-Aassema, 30/6/2013).
In Kharsa’s show, the term “American High Commissioner” was also used to make the analogy
between  American  influence  and  British  colonization  when  interviewing  Hossam  Khairallah,  a
former military and intelligence officer, on the same evening al-Hadidi made the analogy less than a
week before the planned protests. 
Khairallah: It is not acceptable that the United States, the American High Commissioner here,
imposes a condition on us. We are the decision makers. We will make our decision and after
that they will have to agree with us; we are rational […] our politics is moderate. We take into
consideration the interests of the great powers (Studio al-Balad, 24/6/2013).
Role  Kharsa  then  went  on  to  ask  Hossam Khairallah  why does  Anne Patterson support  the
Muslim Brotherhood like she did in Pakistan and Afghanistan18 and everywhere she goes. To this
question, Khairallah responded:
This shows that  she does not  understand the Egyptian people.  We are very different from
15A misogynistic Egyptian expression describing courageous women by equating them to men.
16A popular nationalist Egyptian poet from the south of Egypt.
17A popular Egyptian singer from Nubia.
18 She was the US ambassador to Pakistan before Egypt.
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Pakistan […] Even within the Pakistani intelligence there is an extremist current and they were
the ones supporting Taliban, and there is a part of Taliban inside Pakistan. As for us, neither
the nature of the people, nor its culture or civiliziation is similar to that. We are very different.
So unfortunately, she brought  a very wrong measuring tool  which shows that  she doesn’t
understand the Egyptian people (Studio al-Balad, 24/6/2013). 
Abdel-Halim Kandil, the prominent Nasserist journalist, also mentioned Paterson, while he was
hosted  by  Eissa  on  June  26  right  after  Morsy’s  last  public  speech  as  president,  accusing  the
Brotherhood of making the same policy choices as Mubarak’s regime including warming up to the
United States. 
The choices of the Mubarak clan is the same as the Brotherhood’s, which are: loyalty to the
Americans; protecting the security of Israel; crony capitalism […] Here, notice that the speech
lacks any mention of the United States or Israel; they are not conspiring against the revolution
as if this is the White House and Anne Paterson’s revolution (Huna al-Qahira 26/6/2017).
Eissa also oscillates from accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of prioritizing pan-Islamism over
Egyptianism, to accusing them of being American agents. Eissa enthusiastically argued that the June
30 events  and their  repercussions were not  just  a  victory over the Muslim Brotherhood,  but  he
described them as an “independence day” and a victory over America itself, making use again of the
colonizer’s analogy.
Today is the day of independence. We didn’t just triumph over extremism and bigotry. We
didn’t just triumph over snobbery, exclusion,  arrogance, stubbornness, blindness, dullness
and tediousness. No, we triumphed over America. Today is a victory over America (Huna al-
Qahira 27/7/2013).
2.5 Heavy use of Islam
Over a quarter of all identity references across the three shows used to deligitimize the Brotherhood
were references to Islamic belief and moral conduct. Other than questioning the Egyptianism of the
Islamist  group as discussed earlier  in the chapter,  their  understanding of “true Islam” was also
questioned. It was clear at times that the hosts and their guests wanted to demonstrate that their
rejection of the Brotherhood rule does not equal a wholesale rejection of Islam. For example,  Al-
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Hadidi was keen to say that even if the media she works for is against the Brotherhood, that does not
mean it is  against Islam.
This is the time of construction, and not destruction. Please understand us. This media is not
against religion. This media is not against Islam. On the contrary, the banner of Islam rises
with an advanced country, a modern country, a civilized country. This is how to raise the
banner of Islam (Huna al-Assema, 1/7/2013).
Eissa heavily used Islam as an entry point to Egyptian nationalism, making a rough distinction
between an Egyptian civilized version of Islam and between a Bedouin backward Islam supported
by Islamist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood. This version of Islam, in Eissa’s opinion is
imported, outlandish and foreign to Egyptian culture, and he argues instead that the Egyptian—but
also the correct—version of Islam is more civilized and tolerant.
Today also Islam has triumphed. Islam has triumphed, and Christianity has triumphed against
extremism  and  bigotry.  Today  was  a  victory  for  the  real  understanding  of  Islam:  the
enlightened, the open-minded, and the tolerant over coarseness, boorishness, and grimness
and excess.  Today, the believers won against the tedious.  Today, the Egyptian Islam won
against the foreign imported image from the desert and the fiqh (jurisprudence) of nomadism
(Huna al-Qahira, 3/7/2013).
This expression is also a clear process of uneven dichotomization, dividing Egyptians into true
Egyptians who are pious yet tolerant, open-minded and enlightened, and who according to Eissa set
the norm. The other group is deviant because it is “foreign”, “imported”, “deviant”, “extreme” and
“bigoted”. Excessively using the war metaphor of “triumph” and “victory” is designed to imply that
the other is not only different or foreign, but is also an enemy. Moreover, the concept of dullness that
was expressed using several near-synonyms such as “coarseness”, “boorishness”, “grimness”, and
“tedious”  could  be  an indicator  of  what  qualities  he  wants  to  attribute  to  the  other  side  of  the
equation. This set of words also corresponds with an opposite set of words such as “enlightened”,
“open-minded” and “tolerant”  in  an act  of  antonymy to entrench this  dichotomy and express  a
certain irreconcilability of these “opposites”.
We need our  understanding  of  religion  to  be  corrected.  We need our  Egyptian  Islam to
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prevail, that is, the Egyptian understanding of Islam. The understanding of the great Egyptian
Imam, al-layth ibn saad. The understanding of al-Imam al-Shafei, who when arrived to Egypt,
changed his  fiqh  completely. The understanding of al-imam Muhammed Abduh of Islam.
Even the Qur’an and its recitation, the Egyptian recitation (Huna al-Qahira 3/7/2013).
Here Eissa stresses the primacy of Egyptianism over Islam. However, he does not reject Islam,
but emphasizes the importance of having it Egyptianized. He also thinks the Egyptianization of
Islam is an old phenomenon going back to al-Imam al-Shafei, the founder of one of the four main
schools of  fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and one of four great imams who lived in the 8th century
AD. According to Eissa, al-Shafei changed his fiqh when he arrived to Egypt and made it more
enlightened. He also refers to the 19th century Egyptian reformist Muhammed Abduh who believed
that the values of enlightenment and modernity are compatible with Islam.
Eissa contrasts this primacy of Egyptianism over Islam, or a unique Egyptian Islam being a key
component of Egyptianism, with the Brotherhood’s pan-Islamic project in which Egypt ismerely a
component of a large entity, that is the wider Islamic world.
Do you know that  when Hassan al-Banna thought  of establishing this  group [the Muslim
Brotherhood],  he  was  thinking  of  one  of  two  countries:  Egypt  or  Yemen.  The  topic  of
nationalism and Egyptianism is not at all of their concern (Huna al-Qahira 27/7/2013).
It is important to note here that Al-Qahira wal Nas took it upon itself to advocate for a liberal
reading of Islam through several shows including that of Ibrahim Eissa. Ibrahim Eissa was a huge
critic of Wahhabism and what he coins “the fiqh of nomadism” even if he would not mention Saudi
Arabia  by  name in  most  cases.  He  likened  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  interpretation  of  Islam to
Wahhabism and what he described as the fiqh of desert and nomadism. Moreover, in 2016, during
the process of the transfer of the two strategic red sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt to Saudi
Arabia, which many regarded as the Sisi regime selling the islands to Saudi Arabia in exchange for
economic and political favours, Eissa was a fierce critic of such transfer. This has put Eissa and his
channel  under  immense pressure and many believe that  it  led to the suspension of  his  show in
December 2016 on the day he was supposed to host prominent opposition lawyer Khaled Ali, who
led a legal battle against the transfer of the islands and won it to the vexation of both the Egyptian
and the Saudi governments (Mada Masr, 2017).
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In  an  interview with  the  daily  al-Masry  al-Youm in  January  2017,  Eissa  was  asked by  the
interviewer about his view on what has been said about his continuous attack on Saudi Arabia and its
positions in the Arab region and his criticism of the transfer of the two Red Sea islands as the reason
behind the suspension of his show. Eissa responded by saying that many parties are requesting the
“blood of his thinking”. As for Saudi Arabia, he said he was committed to being against Wahhabism,
and that the politics of Riyadh is  a catastrophe for the Arabs and for Islam in general and that
“[Saudi Arabia] is fully responsible for the blood of millions killed in civil wars across the Arab
world now” (Ramzi, 2017).
In a separate interview in May 2017 in al-Masry al-Youm, Tarek Nour admitted that Eissa had
gone overboard and that he was subject to pressure.
I felt that they were “upset”, but not from me but from Ibrahim Eissa, although Ibrahim Eissa
is certain that President Abdelfattah al-Sisi is one of the most pure, honourable and noble
men of Egypt, and that no rational Egyptian who has not been polluted with the ideologies of
backwardness, terrorist alliances, objecting everything and ignorance will ever doubt these
characteristics. I think he agrees with the goal, but he objects to the method. Ibrahim Eissa
saw  that  it  is  better  to  leave  because  he  harmed  [al-Qahira  wal  Nas],  and  harmed  me
personally because an overdose of  criticism might  kill  the  patient,  and Egypt  after  what
happened to it and after what we’ve done to it is in the ICU now (Badawi, 2017).
Another fierce critic of Wahhabism appearing on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas was Islam al-
Behery who also advocates for a liberal  reading of Islam away from the strict  teachings of Ibn
Taimiyyah and Muahmmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Word was also circulating that Saudi Arabia was
disquieted by al-Behery's show. The programme was first suspended in April 2015, and al-Behery
then  cited  “disagreements  with  the  channel”  without  giving  details  about  the  nature  of  such
disagreements (Al-Masry al-Youm, 2015). Al-Behery was later sentenced to one year in prison on
charges of contempt of religion before being pardoned by a presidential  decree short  before his
sentence was over (El-Sheikh, 2016). In a press interview after the suspension of his programme and
before he was jailed in June 2015, al-Behery said that the disagreement with Nour began when his
show started being censored without his knowledge. When he spoke with Nour about this, Nour had
told him to just deliver the episodes, and then Nour “will then see what do with them”. Al-Behery
then said that these omissions were due to pressure from security agencies (Ramzi, 2015).
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2.6 Non-identity assaults: Economic failings and business rivalry
The Muslim Brotherhood was also dismissed in the studio of Huna al-Aassema on grounds that are
not only and always identitarian. When this was the case, most non-identity references were linked
to economic failings or business rivalry. This is of particular significance given the dominance of
nonmarket and state-sponsored models of accumulation as will be detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Al-
Hadidi thinks the rivalry between different classes of businessmen is behind this economic crisis.
There is about a 1 percent increase in unemployed people during his [Morsy’s] year [as
president]. This 1 percent is millions of Egyptians who became unemployed. And why is
that? Because a lot of factories have closed down for the lack of fuel, land; and because of
shaken hands, and threatening the industries because there is a new class of businessmen
replacing another class of businessmen (Huna al-Aassema, 25/6/2013).
Al-Hadidi in this passage refers to the businessmen of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “new class
of businessmen” that is trying to push aside a more established class of businessmen and take its
place. She speaks about factories closing down in the passive without stating a clear agent, but it
clearly implies—given the context—that this was more of a Brotherhood strategy to weaken the
established business elite in order to be able to take its place.
Al-Hadidi was also not shying away from mentioning the owner of the channel Mohamed al-
Amin  on  a  few  occasions  and  even  receiving  phone  calls  from him.  Mohamed  al-Amin  was
mentioned by name in Morsy’s last  speech addressing the nation four days before the June 30
planned protests. Morsy then implied that al-Amin is waging a media war against him because of
tax issues, a case which will be covered in Chapter 3. Al-Hadidi responded to this allegation a few
days later by accusing Morsy of delusion to think that the masses who took on the streets are the
workings of a Mubarakist businessmen conspiracy.
Those19 are not 37 thousand20. Those are not a conspiracy. CBC is not a conspiracy. Mohamed
al-Amin is not a conspirator. I am not a conspirator (Huna al-Aassema, 30/6/2013). 
This is not the only incident where Al-Hadidi directly mention the owner of the network and
19Referring to the June 30 protesters.




Thank you Nasser Amin who called on the residents of Helwan21 to take on the streets to
defend Helwan after what he described as a barbaric attack from the pro-Morsy forces and
he said that these are crimes against humanity. But you must stand your ground. This is not
going to intimidate us, folks. This is what they want. This is their way. This is the path they
choose. You are not going to intimidate us. Put my home address, what can I do? What can I
do now? What will Mohamed al-Amin do? We are not doing anything. We are just doing our
work and duty (Huna al-Aassema, 2/7/2013).
It is worth noting the use of the pronoun “we” in “We are not doing anything. We are just doing
our work and duty” for grouping herself with al-Amin. This passage is what Fairclough (1989) calls
an exclusive “we” as it includes the speaker/writer and another person but excludes the audience, as
opposed  to  an  inclusive  “we”  which  includes  the  speaker/writer  and  the  audience.  Here  she  is
excluding everyone except herself and al-Amin in what she perceives as an act of defiance. This
comes in great contrast to the earlier use of “us” and “folks” in the inclusive “they are not going to
intimidate  us”.  This  use of  the  pronouns aims at  creating a  dichotomy of  us  against  them, and
presenting the “us” as a large group and “they” as a deviant minority group. The use of “you” in
“you must stand your ground” serves the same purpose of this uneven dichotomization, assuming
that anyone who is listening or watching is more likely to be in opposition to the Brotherhood, rather
than supporting  them or  even being neutral  or  indifferent.  Here,  al-Amin himself  speaks  to  al-
Hadidi:
Mrs.  Lamis22,  I  would like  to  tell  you something.  No matter  what  they do,  they will  not
intimidate us. They want to burn our houses, let them do it. They want to kill us, let them do
it. Our blood will never be more valuable than the blood of any young man around. Mohamed
Morsy’s gang, Mrs. Lamis […] I tell him, if the blood that runs in your veins is Egyptian
blood, have mercy on the Egyptian people for the love of God (x3) All what they do, Mrs.
Lamis is not going to intimidate anyone. Whatever they do, the gang around him will end up,
and I  will  remind you,  in  prison for  the  crimes they are  committing now. I  want  in  this
occasion to send some very important messages. An important message to the great people of
21A neighbourhood in South Cairo.
22“Mrs.” here is a translation of the Egyptian title “ustaza” which is similar to the use of “Mrs.” or “Madam” in 
English; it is commonplace in Egypt to use a title such as Mr. or Mrs. with a first name
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Egypt, to the youth of Egypt, to the heroes of Egypt, to the girls of Egypt, and when I say
youth and girls of Egypt, I mean every Egyptian citizen regardless of their religion, regardless
of their political affiliation, stand your ground. You are right, and God almighty will make
what is right prevail. We need you for a few more days. The issue is not over  ya shabab23.
Continue with your defiance. Be on the ground. I am talking to you, Mrs. Lamis while being
among the young people on the ground. I am not afraid of Mohamed Morsy or his gang. […]
The second message is to the brave Armed Forces soldiers, who are loyal to their homeland.
Those are the soldiers of Ahmed Urabi; those are the soldiers of Abdel Nasser; those are the
soldiers who liberated Sinai; those are the soldiers of Anwar al-Sadat (Mohamed al-Amin on
Huna al-Aassema, 2/7/2013).
This passage spoken by Mohamed al-Amin uses a techniques of inclusion. Al-Amin directs his
speech to “the young men and girls regardless of their religion, political affiliation”, and he talks
about “every Egyptian citizen” needing to stand their ground against “Mohamed Morsy’s gang”
who he clearly does not consider as part of the Egyptian citizenry. It is also crucial to notice his
mentioning of both Nasser and al-Sadat as a method of inclusion and consensus-building, and to
keep with his emphasis on not wanting to alienate any Egyptian citizen. Most importantly, this
phone call demonstrates that al-Amin endorses the views and opinions of the show and its host,
especially that he spent a long time praising al-Hadidi and describing here as a heroine.
2.7 Findings and conclusion
As we have seen throughout the chapter, there was a very heavy use of identity discourse across the
three programmes in the build up to and straight after the June 30 protests and the overthrow of
Morsy on July 3 to delegitimize the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Out of the times the Brotherhood was dismissed on a nationalist basis across the three shows, in
72.2 percent of them they were dismissed as un-Egyptian, in 27.8 percent they were dismissed as un-
Muslim, and not a single time they were dismissed as un-Arab. In terms of countries or organizations
the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of  collaborating with or being supported by, the US was
named 43.1 percent of the times, and Hamas comes as a distant second with 21.57 percent of all
mentions. Israel came close after Hamas with 19.61 percent, Qatar with 13.7 percent and Hezbollah
with nearly 2 percent.
23An expression  literally  meaning  “youths”,  but  is  mostly  used  informally  to  mean  something  similar  to  “folks”
especially to a young group of people.
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Topping  identity  related  references  that  were  used  to  delegitimize  the  Brotherhood  was
sectarianism at about 34.2 percent. Part of the reason this topped the list was also the coverage of the
Shia  massacre  that  took  place  just  a  week  before  the  June  30  protests.  However,  perhaps  less
expected was the use of Islamic belief and moral conduct to delegitimize the Brotherhood rule at
26.3 percent. Following Islam in the third place with about 18 percent of all mentions, was mentions
of ancient Egyptian civilization, and in the fourth place was mentions of modern Egyptian culture at
15.8 percent. If we combine the two as Egyptocentric indicators, then they would top the list as the
most employed identity discourse aiming at attacking the Brotherhood. References of pan-Arabism
bottoms the list with only 5.26 percent. This trend is somehow similar to the indicator on which
nationalist basis was the Brotherhood dismissed, where in about three quarters of the cases they were
dismissed for being un-Egyptian.
This chapter showed how the US was the foreign power that was most consistently attacked
throughout the three shows. This anti-Americanism and portraying the US as colonizers with the
Muslim Brotherhood  as  their  local  agents  contradicts  the  Sadatist  open-policy  discourse,  which
worked on aligning Egypt  with the Western world and directed all  its  antagonism in the 1970s
towards communism, socialism and the Eastern Bloc as  will  be discussed in  Chapter  6.  Eissa’s
employer Tarek Nour named his first advertising agency—which was established as a first private
advertising agency in the late 1970s as a result of the open-door policy— Americana, and Nour
himself had studied and started his career in the US, as I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4.
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the adoption of an aggressive Egyptocentric discourse was
the result of the collective Arab boycott against Egypt as a result of a US-brokered peace with
Israel. After liberalizing its economy and expelling the Soviet experts, the regime also wanted to
distance itself as much as possible from Nasserist Arab nationalism. This happened by allowing a
greater role of religion in politics to fight socialist ideas, and allying with the West and the US.
When all the Arab states turned its back on Egypt, the US emerged as the regime’s major and
indispensable ally.
Furthermore, the complete absence of anti-Arabist Sadatist sentiments is also a major diversion
that could at least be partially explained by the increased dependence of the infitah businessmen on
support from the Arab Gulf countries. Despite these diversions from a Sadatist discourse, some
similarities remain, including the heavy use of Islam which goes in line with the Islamization of
society initiated by Sadat. Moreover, the Egyptocentrism—even if less anti-Arab compared to the
Sadatist version—was still very present and perhaps the dominant sentiment. This inward-looking
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approach to nationalism was very much in line with the policy of oil-rich Gulf monarchies who
were anxious about a pan-Arabism that was driving Egypt to take a more outward-looking approach
to its nationalism by trying to influence change in its surrounding countries. The Gulf monarchies
finally had the double convenience of having this inward-looking Egypt but without positioning
itself against Arabic culture, but on the contrary, a position that is full of praise of the Gulf Arab
states with a hint of conservative and reactionary Arabism.
Positioning themselves against a religious organization and political groups, two of our three
critics heavily used Islam in perhaps attempt of beating the Brotherhood at their own game. Most of
these incidents revolved around the Brotherhood adopting a wrong version/understanding of Islam,
and using Islam only for their own political benefits. Even when Egyptianism was employed, Islam
was still heavily used to make a distinction between an Egyptian form of Islam and other forms.
The specifications of this Egyptian form of Islam was mostly vague except from some ideas
about dress and a vague conception of moderation and tolerance. Even when Islam was used, it
was used to dismiss the Brotherhood as un-Egyptian more than to dismiss them as un-Muslim.
The fault of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political religious group that support
them, according to Eissa, is that they were trying to Islamize Egypt rather than Egyptianize Islam.
This is particularly a defining characteristic of Egyptian nationalism that has mostly been friendly to
Islam but still rejects the transnational political Islam project and defines it as akin to colonialism.
When it comes to Arabism, across the three programmes there was almost no mention at all of
pan-Arabist values, of ideals of Arab nationalism. In both al-Hadidi and Kharsa’s programmes, there
was no mention of ideals of Arab nationalism, but there was also no criticism of Arabism and often
there was a positive acknowledgment of the role of other Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia and the
UAE,  in  supporting  the  anti-Brotherhood  movement.  Only  Eissa  has  shown  some  antagonism
towards  an  Arabian  version  of  Islam that  he  describes  as  backward,  desertic,  anti-modern  and
extreme.
The Egyptianism of the Brotherhood was aggressively and consistently contested and denied
throughout the three shows. They were mostly portrayed as colonizers, cultural aliens, and deviant.
What is interesting is that this exclusion and production of the Other was not based on a pure and
rigid idea of the self, but rather on a degree of appreciation of diversity: a diversity that stops short
of including the Brotherhood. Al-Hadidi and Kharsa were especially emphasizing—and to a certain
degree celebrating—the diverse nature of the opposition, who were united in their rejection of the
Brotherhood rule. 
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It was always emphasized that Egyptians are eager to join the protest movement regardless of
their age, political affiliation, geographical areas, region, gender, religion, social class, etc. This is
also clear with giving platforms to guests from different backgrounds, including Nasserists and
socialists. This was particularly true in Ibrahim Eissa’s show where he hosted the leader of the
leftist Socialist Alliance party Aboulezz al-Hariri, the general secretary of the centre-left Egyptian
Social Democratic Party Ahmed Fawzy, and the Arab nationalist journalist and writer Abdel Halim
Qandil. Aboulezz al-Hariri even spoke critically of the open-door policies adopted by Sadat.
The general nationalistic sentiments expressed across the three shows generally go in line with a
territorial Egyptianism that was championed by Sadat. However, due to the dwindling role of Egypt
as a regional leader and the immense support that the Brotherhood opposition received from the
increasingly powerful oil-rich Gulf states, this strong Egyptocentric and ultra-nationalist wave did
not  position  itself  vis-a-vis the  Arab  states  as  was  the  case  in  the  late  1970s  or  against
European/Ottoman influence in the last part of the 19 th century and the first half of the 20th century.
Instead,  it  adopted a very delicate position stressing Egyptianism against an Islamist  group but
without upsetting its Arab supporters that also embrace Islamic rule, especially Saudi Arabia.
Other than Egyptocentrism, the use of Islamic moral codes across the three programmes was
reminiscent  of  the  widespread  use  of  Islamic  morality  that  was  prevalent  during  the  1970s
transition from Arab nationalism to Egyptocentrism to discredit the political left as disbelievers
and enemies of Islam, when Sadat coined himself  alra’ees almo’men (the believer president) as
will be explained in chapter 6. 
Hamas also got its fair share of accusations of collaborating with the Brotherhood to destabilize
Egypt by carrying out works of vandalism and helping the Brotherhood leaders, including Morsy,
escape jail during the January 25 by breaking into the prison complex in which they were detained.
A general  anti-Palestinian,  and  a  particular  anti-Hamas  sentiment,  is  typical  of  an  Egyptianist
discourse since the Palestinian cause has always acted as the single most important rallying cause of
Arab nationalism, and also due to Sadat’s description as a traitor by pro-Palestinians for single-
handedly signing a peace treaty with Israel. A vast majority of the Hamas criticism came from al-
Hadidy’s  show.  However,  the  other  two  programmes  did  also  mention  Hamas  negatively  and
associated them with the Brotherhood’s project. Israel, the usual suspect, was not far behind Hamas
as an entity that was attacked as associated with the Muslim Brotherhood project. However, most of
the mentions of Israel were uttered by Eissa and the least by al-Hadidi, the fiercest critic of Hamas.
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Chapter 3
The meso-level analysis of the nationalist discourse of three private channels
owned by infitah businessmen
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 comprises level two of the CDA and focuses on the level of discourse production. The
chapter looks at the general landscape of broadcast media ownership, and the political and economic
affiliations of those who dominate the media scene (party membership, business partnerships, etc.),
their  business interests.  This focus  distinguishes  CDA from a normal  discourse or conversation
analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the text that is the subject of study, into analyzing
other  texts  that  belong to the immediate  wider  context  concerned with producing the text.  The
findings of this chapter will act as a prerequisite for understanding the general events and processes
through which the nationalist media discourse that is the subject of the study came into being.
The chapter then focuses on the ownership of each of the three channels that were presented in
Chapter 2, and describes the business interests and political affiliations of their owners. Whenever
possible, an analysis of the owners’ own discourse will be conducted in a similar fashion to the
micro-level analysis of Chapter 2. This is however conditioned to the availability of such discourse,
and whether the owners of the channels have given public interviews or written articles on topics
relevant to that of the study. 
This  chapter  brings  the  research  one  step closer  to  answering  the  first  part  of  the  research
question  about  the  function  ultra-nationalist  and  nationalist  rhetoric  served  in  promoting  the
economic interests of the propagators of such discourse; it does so by explaining how their model of
accumulation was rent-based and state-dependent which made it easy to keep most of the economic
privileges to this small group of select businessmen, and how this model of accumulation might
have contributed to the adoption of the discourse discussed in the previous chapter.
3.2 The private broadcasting landscape in Egypt before and after the 2011 revolution
In  Egypt,  broadcasting  was  for  very  long  almost  exclusively  state-owned.  Until  the  year  2000,
broadcasting was under the control of the state monopoly Egyptian Radio and Television Union
(ERTU) (Sakr, 2007, p. 22). The ERTU, according to the Media Broadcasting law of 1997, is the
agency in charge of managing all the broadcasting affairs of Egypt (Mohammed & Gunter, 2013, p.
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99).  After  opening  up  for  privately-owned  broadcasters  to  operate  in  the  television  industry
alongside state-owned broadcasters, business leaders, especially those close to the political regime
were the main beneficiaries of this opening. This was mostly due to the excessive—but also complex
and  unclear— regulations,  difficult  licensing  procedure  and the  high  cost  of  establishing  a  TV
channel or network.
This opening has “coincided” with the rise of businessmen influence which culminated when six
businessmen held ministerial positions corresponding with the fields of their business activity in the
2004 cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif which was also popularly known as the “businessmen
cabinet” (Sakr, 2017, p. 28). For example, Ahmed Maghrabi, the Minister of Housing in this cabinet
was a major shareholder in one of the largest real estate development companies in Egypt.  The
Minister of Trade and Industry Rashid Mohamed Rashid, was also one of the main industrialists in
Egypt owning one the biggest food manufacturing companies in the Middle East (Diab, 2015).
The first businessmen to take advantage of this limited opening of the broadcasting market was
Ahmed Bahgat when he established Dream TV in 2001. Bahgat is a businessman with investments
that span a large number of sectors including real estate, electronics, household appliances, and now
media.  Hassan  Rateb,  a  business  tycoon  and  one  of  the  funders  of  Mubarak’s  2005  election
campaign, shortly followed to established al-Mehwar TV in 2001 (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 55). Despite
this limited opening, the government still maintained a tight control over news broadcasting, did not
provide licenses for news channels and retained an effective monopoly over news broadcasting (El-
Issawi, 2014, p. 76). Some talk shows circumvented this monopoly by providing a round up of news
that they give names like “the pulse of the street” or “the headlines of the country” as is the case in
Rola  Kharsa’s  al-Balad  al-Youm  (The  Country  Today)  programme  presented  in  Chapter  2.  In
addition to the fact that private broadcasters are not allowed to broadcast news and to the excessive
levels of governmental control, they can only distribute their signals via the Nile Sat satellite, which
is largely controlled by the government (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 23).
The early days of private TV also saw licenses mainly extended to providers of non-political
content such as music channels modeled after MTV but for Arabic music. One of the early players
of private TV in Egypt was the grandson of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Gamal Marwan, who established a
music channel  called  Melody, which  led to  a  subsequent  proliferation  of  music video channels
which exceeded 50 channels in the Arab world by 2006. Melody’s main rival, Mazzika, was also
indirectly owned in part  by EFG-Hermes (Sakr, 2007, p. 122), which was found after the 2011
revolution to have strong links to the Mubarak sons Gamal and Alaa (Diab, 2016). 
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“Having nothing to do with politics, religion or news” was a precondition for getting a license
for Good News Group to establish the first two private radio stations, as described by Amr Adib, a
prominent  TV  personnel  and  the  brother  of  the  founder  and  president  of  Good  News  Group
(Sakr,2007,  p.  30).  Back to  television,  the governmental ERTU had a stake in the early private
channels  Dream and Mehwar. The ERTU also had a stake in  the companies running the Media
Production City. Furthermore, the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) also has the power of
suspending TV licenses, which is a power it exercised many times including for political reasons.
This  emerging private  broadcasting  industry  was also  subject  to  the  general  restrictive  laws  on
freedom of  expression  and even the more  general  restrictions  of  political  freedoms which  were
employed to add another measure—in addition to restrictive licensing—to keep the new private TV
in check (Sakr, 2007, p. 30).
The government sustained centralized control by employing the above-mentioned methods, but
also through legally obliging satellite broadcasters to operate from Egypt’s only Media Production
City (EMPC) in the outskirts of Egypt’s capital Cairo. The EMPC, according to Egypt’s investment
law,  is  placed  under  the  supervision  of  the  GAFI.  The  governmental  ERTU’s dominance  was
maintained to a significant degree by owning a 50 percent stake in the overall EMPC project; parts
of the remaining stake were owned by state-owned banks and investment companies (Sakr, 2007, p.
195-196). Even when some political talk shows seemed to be mildly critical of the government, this
excessive amount or regulations makes it difficult to believe that this was not within a margin of
“freedom” allowed for by the government.
Another milestone in the development of the private broadcasting industry was when business
tycoon Naguib Sawiris, then Egypt’s richest man, entered the private TV industry in early 2007. He
founded OTV, a channel which he describes as a service "for young people, without religious or loud
content" (Tryhorn, 2010). Sawiris was keen to present himself as an independent businessman by not
accepting membership in the ruling National Democratic Party or any governmental position. A large
portion  of  his  business  empire  by  this  time was  already outside  of  Egypt  in  a  dozen countries
including Iraq, Algeria, and the US, making him relatively immune to government pressure. In the
press, Sawiris funded newspapers with a relatively independent and even at times oppositional tone
such as the daily  al-Masry al-Youm, but his TV investment in OTV remained largely non-political
and focused almost exclusively on entertainment.
Al-Sayed al-Badawy, the president of al-Wafd party, also established al-Hayat TV network in
2003 (El-Issawi 2014, p. 56). Despite being the president of an “opposition” party, al-Wafd after its
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re-establishment in the late 1970s has not posed any meaningful political challenge to the successive
regimes, and was a symbol of the co-opted opposition under Mubarak, or what used to be referred to
as  ‘ahzab kartoniya (cardboard  parties)  by  their  critics  to  describe  their  impotency and  staged
nature.
3.2.1 After the Revolution
The broadcasting landscape changed both in quality and quantity  after  the 2011 revolution in  a
myriad of ways; first, the already-existing channels have become more politically oriented with an
explosion  of  political  talk  shows  covering—as  well  as  trying  to  shape—the  rapidly  unfolding
political developments of the post-revolutionary era (El-Issawi, 2012). Secondly, many new channels
were established after the revolution including the three channels that are the subject of this research
—CBC, al-Qahira wal Nas and Sada al-Balad—and which will be discussed in more detail later in
the chapter. Other channels that were established after the revolution include  al-Nahar, which is
owned  by  advertising  businessman  Alaa  al-Kahki,  and  the  pro-revolution  low-budget  al-Tahrir
channel which was partially owned by some of the journalists working in it including Ibrahim Eissa
(Daily News Egypt, 2011).
A similar mechanism happened to the Islamic channels, which existed before the revolution in
the form of televangelism by Salafist  celebrity  preachers,  but  most  of  them stayed away from
politics up until the revolutionary period. In the aftermath of the revolution, the existing ones have
become  increasingly  occupied  with  the  unfolding  political  developments,  and  new  ones  were
established as a result of the revolution (Dorpmueller, 2012). Examples of such Salafist channels
that  were  established before  2011 but  only  got  involved  with  politics  after  are  al-Rahma  (the
mercy) (est.  2007),  al-Nas  (the  people) and  al-Hekma (the  widom) (both  established in  2006)
(Shehata, 2012). This goes in harmony with the establishment of the first Salafist political party, al-
Nour party, after  the  revolution  by Salafist  groups,  namely  al-Da’waa al-Salafiya  (the Salafist
Call),  who were keen on remaining apolitical  during the Mubarak years. Besides being able to
establish their own political party, the Muslim Brotherhood was also able after the revolution to
have its own media outlets including the TV channel Misr 25.
3.3 Capital Broadcasting Center and Mohamed al-Amin
Established in 2011, Cairo Broadcasting Center (CBC) has grown rapidly to become one of the most
important private TV channels in Egypt hosting a range of celebrity TV personalities and popular
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political talk shows, including the ultra-popular satirical show of the “Jon Stewart of Egypt” Bassem
Youssef, which broke TV viewership records in Egypt at the time. CBC has decidedly taken a very
oppositional  anti-Brotherhood  stance  during  most  of  the  year  Mohamed  Morsy  was  in  power
between late June 2012 and early July 2013, but this oppositional tone has intensified during the
later days of Morsy’s rule in the buildup to the June 30, 2013 protests (Douai & Moussa, 2016, p.
149).
The owner of CBC, Mohamed al-Amin, is also the president of the Media Industry Chamber,
which part of the Egyptian Federation of Industries—a body that acts as a union for businessmen in
various industries. Al-Amin in a 2014 interview with Ibrahim Eissa said that his strength derived
from the fact that he had all his career as a businessman outside of Egypt, so no one could find—
despite the many attempts—any wrongdoing committed by him like the other businessmen who
were involved in corruption cases. Compared to other businessmen and media owners, Mohamed al-
Amin was relatively unknown compared to other business tycoons like Naguib Sawiris,  Ahmed
Bahgat and Tarek Nour. 
According to Al-Amin himself, he has built his wealth and business in Kuwait—where he lived
for over three decades—in the infrastructure business before moving back to Egypt. Al-Amin said
that profit seeking was never the goal of establishing CBC, and that it operates like a non-profit
organization.  He says that no TV channel  makes  profits  in its  early years and that it  would be
considered an achievement if a TV channel just breaks even after five years. He added that even if
CBC starts  making profits,  it  will  be donated  to  charities,  according to  his  agreement  with the
channel’s other minority shareholders (OnTV, 2014). Al-Amin said:
From our own experience, anyone who claims that private channels could make a quick profit
after a year or two, or even three, is delusional. If it breaks even after five years, it will be a
wonderful thing […] It was never the goal to be profitable because from the start, this group
had a charity subsidiary, and the agreement was that even if profits are generated by the group
(which owns the channel), it will be redirected to the charity.24
The goal of establishing CBC was political; al-Amin asserts that he wanted to establish a channel
that  will  counter  the  discourse  propagated  by  the  Qatari  pro-Brotherhood  al-Jazeera  channel,  a
discourse that he described as serving the “American plan to completely redraw the map of the
24 Mohamed al-Amin on 25/30 show dated 20/8/2014 presented by Ibrahim Eissa.
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Middle East”. The objective of this plan, according to al-Amin, is to serve American interests and
consequently “remove the extremist and terrorist groups from the US and Europe, and place them in
conflicts in the Middle East region.” (OnTV, 2014). This explains the heavy anti-American and anti-
Qatari views that was presented in Chapter 2, especially that al-Amin asserted in the interview that
there is no such thing as an objective channel, and that the presenters must be chosen according to
the channel’s orientation.
Al-Amin asserted that this is not to suggest that the presenter has no agency in the process of
media production, and that they simply follow the instructions of the media owners. He said that the
media owner would not put themselves in a position where they need to regularly intervene by
picking and selecting TV hosts with a shared view and political orientation. Al-Amin’s strategy is for
owners to decide the framework of the channel and then have a hands-off approach with no direct
editorial intervention (OnTV, 2014).
Al-Amin is also the main owner of al-Watan daily newspaper, but he believes that TV is a much
more effective medium for  influence  and awareness  raising  because it  is  watched by millions
whereas even the most widely circulated newspaper is only read by tens of thousands.
3.3.1 Economic clash with the Muslim Brotherhood
It is difficult to determine whether the economic war that emerged between the Brotherhood regime
and al-Amin was the result or the cause of the political and ideological battle. In either case, it is
clear that both were interlinked and used to serve each other. The Morsy regime seemed to try and
harm the business interests of their critics in several ways including starting tax investigations of
their business interests. This happened with one of the Sawiris family members, when he was asked
in 2013 by the tax authorities to pay EGP 7 billion (about $1 billion at the time’s exchange rate) for
making a profit on selling a cement factory in 2007 (Saleh, 2013).
There are many businessmen in Egypt who are very good, but some are determined to make a
comeback. What is Mohamed al-Amin doing? [Applause] He has taxes to pay; he is a tax
evader. Pay them (the taxes). You’re afraid? Pay. But instead he unleashes on us his channel.
Ahmed Bahgat [Dream TV owner] owes money to the banks, more than EGP 3 billion. Pay or
settle them. But instead he unleashes his channel on us. (Morsy’s speech on 26/06/2013 –
misr25channel)
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These tax investigations were triggered by Talaat Abdallah, the public prosecutor appointed by
Morsy to replace the Mubarak era public prosecutor Abdelmeguid Mahmoud. The appointment of
Abdallah  by  Morsy, which  allowed for  this  kind  of  tax  cases  to  gather  steam,  was  seen as  an
encroachment from the executive authority over the judicial authority and granting the president
dictatorial powers (Kirkpatrick & El-Sheikh, 2012). It triggered mass protests against Morsy, and
ushered the country into a political crisis that led to the formation of the National Salvation Front
(NSF),  a  broad-based  political  coalition  that  played  a  key  role  in  overthrowing  the  Muslim
Brotherhood regime.
Only a few days before the June 30 protests amidst the heightened tensions between the Muslim
Brotherhood regime and the opposition,  al-Amin and his business partner Mansour Amer were
accused of evading the payment of $60 million in taxes and banned from travel (Daily News Egypt,
2013). On July 9, less than two weeks after the tax charge and the travel ban, the newly restored
Mubarak-era General Prosecutor Abdel-meguid Mahmoud dropped the charges and bans against
both Amer and al-Amin.
In his 2014 interview with Eissa, al-Amin said that some of the harm that happened to Amer
Group was because of CBC’s position during the rule of Mohamed Morsi (OnTV, 2014). Al-Amin
did not specify in what manner exactly was Amer Group harmed by the CBC activity other than the
travel ban and the tax evasion accusation that was brought against him and Amer. However, looking
at the financial statements of Amer Group, it shows clearly that the company’s revenues in 2012 and
2013, the calendar years corresponding with Morsy’s year in power (June 2012-June 2013), were
much less than the following years from 2014 until 2016 (see Table 1).
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Table 1 Amer Group’s net profits, revenues and total assets between 2012 and 2015




Total assets (EGP 
million)
2012 155.6 1152.5 4955.2
2013 32 877.7 6241.4
2014 246 2168.2 7510.9
2015 167 1,846 N/A
2016 184 2,443 N/A
Source: Amer Group Financial Statements
3.4 Tarek Nour and al-Qahira wal Nas
In Ramadan 2009, advertising mogul Tarek Nour made his first entry into the broadcasting business
by starting al-Qahira wal Nas channel to broadcast entertainment shows and soap operas only in the
month of Ramadan, which is the high season for TV drama and entertainment in Egypt.  In the
summer of 2012, the same summer Morsy took office, the channel started broadcasting year-round,
and in the spirit of the time, it started introducing political talk shows including Ibrahim Eissa’s
show. Being established by an advertising agency, the channel was able to cover its costs. In an
interview with Egypt Independent, the Chief Executive Officer of the channel Yasmin Abdullah said
that all the channel’s income comes from commercials and that they have never failed to cover the
costs  of  any  of  the  channel’s  shows  (Halawa,  2012).  Media  experts  in  the  field  say  that  the
advertising packages Tarek Nour Communications offers to their client include airtime in al-Qahira
wal  Nas  channel  guaranteeing  a  flow of  advertisement  that  is  possibly  not  available  for  other
channels.
Nour  does  not  make regular  public  appearances  despite  having behind him four  decades  of
working closely with the media first as a radio host in the public radio in the 1970s, then as the
founder and head of Egypt’s major advertising company in the 1980s and the 1990s, and finally as
the founder and owner of one of the biggest private TV stations in Egypt. He only gave a handful of
interviews in the past years, and these interviews will  be used to cross-examine the findings of
Chapter 2.
Despite claiming in all his interviews that he is a “professional” advertiser, and that his approach
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to  designing  governmental  and  electoral  campaigns  during  the  Mubarak  era  is  a  professional
approach, Nour does not refrain from giving his strong political opinions about both current and
historical events and people. In 2005, Tarek Nour was the media designer of Mubarak’s presidential
elections  campaign,  and he  also  ran  the  media  operations  for  the  presidential  campaign of  the
Mubarak-era minister Ahmed Shafik in the 2012 presidential election (Fadel, 2012).
When asked in a 2009 television interview about whether he would accept to make a campaign
for the Muslim Brotherhood to help them revamp their image, he said that he cannot do it because
he  disagrees  ideologically  with  them  (shbarakat,  2010a).  This  implies  that  he  must  agree
ideologically with the political campaigns he accepts, or at least not fundamentally disagree with
them. In the same interview he expressed contempt towards Nasserist policies of land reform and
nationalization, and called Sadat a “great man” for his economic reform and said that things would
have been very different had he lived for only five more years (shbarakat, 2010b).
Nour would, however, criticize the government for having excessive regulation and red tape and
failing to market itself properly. He saw the 2004 “businessmen cabinet” as a positive change and
was full of praise to them. He dismissed the question by the presenter that it presents a conflict of
interest  for  businessmen to hold  ministerial  positions.  His  argument  was that  they  had enough
money and were already wealthy and therefore less prone to be corrupt, and that their track record
as successful businessmen means that they have superior management and administrative skills that
is  lacking  in  traditional  bureaucratic  governance  in  Egypt.  He  also  praised  the  cabinet  for
understanding the importance of marketing (shbarakat, 2010c).
It is obvious then why Nour would not be a supporter of the January 2011 revolution, which not
only overthrew Mubarak, but also stripped the businessmen cabinet out of their power, put many of
them in prison and pushed others to flee Egypt. To celebrate the second anniversary of one of the al-
Qahira wal Nas shows titled Cairo 360, the host of the show Ossama Kamal reversed his role as a
presenter and took on the seat of the guest and Nour took on the role of the presenter. Nour, in his
temporary role as a host, asked Kamal about his position regarding both the “revolutions” of January
25  and  June  30.  After  giving  a  diplomatic  answer  saying  that  he  considers  both  legitimate
revolutions even if they differ in their motives, Kamal returned the question to Nour, to which he
responded by saying: “I can tell you that the result of the [January] 25 revolution was the Muslim
Brotherhood. What was the outcome of June 30 ? It was Abdelfattah al-Sisi. I think the question
does not need a response as to which one I support. Of course I am with the second [June 30]
revolution” (Cairo 360, 2015).
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Al-Qahira wal Nas’s move from a Ramadan-only entertainment channel to a year-round political
channel was a conscious move made by Nour. He said in a short interview that at the time of the
revolution, they needed to have nationalist Egyptian channels, and that he believes that it made a
difference during the build up to the June 30 “revolution” (Itfarrag Live, 2015). Just like al-Amin,
Nour is concerned with countering the narrative of al-Jazeera; he also implied during the interview
with Kamal that al-Jazeera acts like a fifth column in Egypt (Cairo 360, 2015).
Iًn our three case studies, it seems that the largest gap between the micro- and the meso-level is
the case of Ibrahim Eissa and Tarek Nour. When the position of Nour is compared with that of
Ibrahim Eissa, whom he hosted in his channel, it is clear that they agree when it comes to the general
opposition  to  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  Qatar  and  Islamism.  However,  Nour  is  clearly  more
antagonistic to the January 25 revolution compared to Eissa, who thinks that January 25 had pure
motives but was hijacked by the Islamists, and that June 30 came to “correct its path”. Eissa was also
opposing the Mubarak regime and the the tawreeth25 plan, whereas Nour was closely linked to the
so-called reformists close to Gamal Mubarak. Nour was also heavily involved in the image revamp
of the National Democratic Party and the political campaigning of the Nazif neoliberal businessmen
cabinet.
Other than Mubarak, another important difference is over Sadat, the political hero of Tarek
Nour. Eissa is more of a mild Nasserist and a fierce critic of Sadat. Among the three presenters
who are the subject of this research, Eissa was the one who was more open to hosting guests from
Nasserist  and socialist  backgrounds,  which clearly contradicts  the views of Eissa’s employer,
Tarek Nour.
The reason behind this might be to manufacture an image of unity among opponents of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and not to alienate Nasserists, socialists, anti-Mubarakists who are also anti-
Brotherhood. This unity was proven to be short-lived; when Eissa started becoming mildly critical
of the government and of Saudi Arabia, he was dismissed from al-Qahira wal Nas. The shelf-life of
this unity was linked to how strong the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood is. The more the threat
fades,  it  seemed  that  the  unity  was  becoming  weaker,  and  the  fundamental  differences  and
disagreements were re-emerged to the surface.
For example, when Eissa started being more vocal in his criticism of the new regime after June
30, his relationship with al-Qahira wal Nas became extremely erratic. Despite being a fierce critic of
25Arabic for hereditary succession referring to the the plan of grooming Gamal Mubarak to be his father’s successor
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the Muslim Brotherhood and one of only two journalists to interview Abdelfattah al-Sisi during his
presidential campaign in 2014, Eissa—as discussed in the previous chapter—was a very vocal critic
of the handing over by the Egyptian regime of two strategic Red Sea islands from Egypt to Saudi
Arabia  in  early  2015  (Dawoud,  2017).  The  government  adopted  a  zero-tolerance  policy  over
criticisms regarding the transfer  of  the two islands  and have rounded up and arrested scores of
protesters who rejected the transfer (Walsh, 2016).
A probable explanation of this zero-tolerance approach is the increasing influence Saudi Arabia
is having in Egypt as will be discussed in Chapter 4, especially as Eissa is well-known for his
criticism  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  its  “backward”  version  of  Islam.  Saudi  Arabia’s  anger  was
manifested when the Saudi  Arabian TV network the Middle East  Broadcasting Center  (MBC)
suspended  the  airing  of  a  show  hosted  by  Eissa.  The  official  reason  reported  by  the  MBC
administration was that the show does not meet the production standards of the of MBC and that
the content is not suitable for its audience (al-Masry al-Youm, 2015). However, it is widely thought
that the MBC took this step due to Eissa’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s policy in Yemen and Syria,
and its promotion of extremism and Wahhabism.
The  tension  between  Eissa  and  al-Qahira  wal  Nas  on  the  one  hand  and  the  government
(including the overwhelmingly pro-government parliament) on the other hand has intensified to an
extent that the continuation of Eissa’s appearance on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas has become an
impossibility. A large furniture convention organized by Tarek Nour was suspended by a decision of
the Ministry of Interior in 2016 citing security concerns without further explanations (Mada Masr,
2017). The cost Tarek Nour had to bear for the suspension of the fair was EGP 60 million (about
$3.4 million by that time’s exchange rate).
However, for a furniture convention that has been taking place annually for about 35 years, the
indirect cost  due to the harm to its  reputation would be much higher  than this  immediate cost,
especially  that  it  was  estimated  that  the  exhibitors  who work all  year  round to showcase  their
products at the convention lost around EGP 300 million ($17 million) due to the suspension (Mecky,
2016). It is widely believed that the suspension was due to the government’s anger at Eissa, although
both the channel and the government have never officially stated so. Only a few days after the
suspension of the convention, al-Qahira wal Nas announced officially that Ibrahim Eissa resigned
from the channel (Mada Masr, 2017).
This uneasy relationship between Eissa, al-Qahira wal Nas and the political regime in the post-
2013 should not give the false impression regarding the existence of a free media where TV hosts
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are free to express views against the wish of both the owners of the media outlet and the political
regime. Eissa stated clearly that his resignation was due to pressures after the parliament had filed a
report  against  him  and  demanded  that  the  General  Authority  of  Investment  (GAFI)  close  the
channel. This is a clear indication that if one show in a channel crosses some red line, the whole
channel could risk suspension even if it is otherwise overwhelmingly supportive of the regime and
had helped in bringing it to power. This also testifies to the fact that despite the officially private
status  of some media outlets,  they are still  subject  to  heavy government  regulation and control
through the various means discussed earlier in this chapter.
Eissa, is therefore a case where the micro-level of discourse might not perfectly match the views
and the beliefs of the producers, but what is important here is the nexus where their ideologies link,
which is antagonism towards the Muslim Brotherhood and advocating a more liberal reading of
Islam. Moreover, building an anti-Brotherhood consensus needs by definition people from different
ideological backgrounds, otherwise it cannot be argued to be a “consensus”. Eissa, therefore, served
this  appearance  of  “consensus”  very  well.  As  was  discussed  in  chapter  2,  this  appearance  of
consensus was a recurring theme across the three shows including that of Eissa.
3.5 Sada al-Balad and Abou El Enein
Sada al-Balad was established on November 28, 2011, and is owned by Cleopatra Group (Sada al-
Balad, 2014). It operates, like all the other private TV stations, out of the Media Production City and
is broadcast on the Nilesat. Out of the three infitah businessmen, its owner Mohamed Abou El Enein
is  perhaps the most political  figure and the one with the strongest direct links to the Mubarak
regime.  Abou  El  Enein  was  appointed  by  Mubarak  in  the  1995  People’s Assembly  (the  lower
chamber of the Egyptian parliament). He was then elected for three consecutive terms in 2000, 2005
and 2010. In the parliament he was the head of the Housing Committee from 2000 to 2005, and then
head of the Industry and Energy committee from 2005 and until the parliament was dissolved in the
aftermath of 2011 revolution (Mohammed M. Abou El Enein Official Website, n.d.).
In 2010, Abou El Enein also chaired the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, an inter-
parliamentarian  organization  consisting  of  parliamentarians  from  37  Mediterranean  and  near-
Mediterranean countries. He also chaired a few committees in the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Union for the Mediterranean for two terms. He played many roles in many business associations and
councils  in Egypt such as being the President of the so-called Egyptian-European Council  since
2007, and a member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (Mohammed M. Abou El
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Enein Official Website, n.d.).
As for  his  economic activity, Abou El  Enein  started  a  trading business  in  the 1970s before
establishing his ceramics factory in 1983 in the then newly established 10 th of Ramadan industrial
city, which was founded in 1977 by Sadat to promote private investment in industry. The company
now, according to its own website, owns 17 factories in two locations in the North West Gulf of Suez
and the 10th of Ramadan City and employs 25,000 workers and exports its products to 108 countries
(Mohammed M. Abou El Enein Official Website, n.d.).
Since then,  Cleopatra  has widely expanded not just  in  terms of  ceramic production but  also
penetrated  different  sectors  including  real  estate,  tourism  and  media.  Abou  El  Enein  has  been
allocated vast areas of lands by direct order. It is not possible to have an exhaustive list of the lands
he was granted by direct order due to the unavailability of such data, but some official documents
and media reports can give a glimpse of the scale and how the process would take place. An over
300-page report  by the Central  Auditing Agency (CAA) was leaked in 2015 listing the different
financial violations and embezzlement of public assets in the different sectors including in that of
land and real estate. The report sheds light on a piece of land in October city in the outskirts of Cairo
given to Abou El Enein between 1999 and 2004 in violation of the laws regulating the selling of
public land.
According to the report,  the constitution in article 95 prohibits members of parliament from
buying any state-owned assets. The constitutional article stipulates that: “no member of the People’s
Assembly shall, during his term, purchase or rent any state property or sell or lease to the state or
barter with it regarding any part of his property, or conclude a contract with the State in his capacity
as entrepreneur, importer or contractor.” Disputes over the legality of the land continued from right
after the revolution until in 2014 when it was settled by a ministerial decree allowing Cleopatra
Group to build an upscale residential compound selling luxury units on the land.
Additionally,  Abou  El  Enein,  along  with  Naguib  Sawiris  and  senior  NDP  member  and
businessman Ahmed Ezz, were granted in 1998 vast areas of land in the North West of the Gulf of
Suez, according to another leaked official correspondence between the director of the CAA and the
minister of investment Mahmoud Mohey Eldin in 2007. Abou El Enein was given about 22 million
square metres in this area for the meagre price of EGP 5/square meter, where he established his
second Ceramica Cleopatra industrial complex. He is believed to have sold the rest of the land for up
to EGP 200/square meter (Abdelmeguid, 2009). These lands, divided among four companies, are, in
the words of David Sims, “truly enormous”. They are larger than all industrial land of all of Egypt’s
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new industrial towns (Sims, 2015, p. 223).
In 2007, Abou El Enein was also allocated a 15 million square metres of land in the pristine and
touristic red sea resort of Marsa Alam. Abou El Enein had to only pay $1/square meter for half the
area, and the other half was rented for $1/100 square metres per year (Soliman, 2011). According to
the Cleopatra Group website, a luxury resort is to be open soon in Marsa Alam to be added to the
Cleopatra portfolio of resorts in Sharm al-Sheikh, Marsa Matruh and Hurghada (Cleopatra Luxury
Hotels & Resorts Website). In a similar vein, Abou El Enein has grabbed vast areas of other desert,
coastal and agricultural public lands in a variety of areas around Egypt throughout the years.
It was not just his lands that were threatened and its legality questioned as a result of the 2011
revolution. Since the breakout of the revolution in 2011, Abou El Enein had also been perpetually
struggling to manage his industrial empire. In the revolutionary spirit of the time, one strike used to
break out after the other in his factories both in Suez and 10 th of Ramadan industrial zones. Some of
these strikes would continue for a few months.
The workers’ action has come to a peak in July 2012, only a few days after Morsy took over
office, when the workers were close to taking full control of the factory operations. The workers
called on the newly-elected Morsy to intervene in their favour, possibly also encouraged in their
action by his election. Morsy probably had vested interest in breaking the power of former members
of  the  Mubarak  regime  like  Abou  El  Enein.  However,  mass  strikes  and  mass  protests  were
something that started to alarm the Brotherhood regime now that they were in power because they
wanted the kind of calm that would enable them to stabilize the economy. Therefore, Morsy chose to
“mediate” between the workers and the owner of the factory (Adly, 2017).
However, Abou El Enein had another story to tell; in an interview on his own channel Sada al-
Balad in 2014 on the day Sisi was officially elected president, Abou El Enein claimed that he was
facing pressure from the Brotherhood to sell the factory, and that he had received advice to sell it
from people associated with the Brotherhood that he chose not to name. Abou El Enein claimed
that this pressure made him more stubborn and keen to keep the factory; he added that his factories
are like his children, and that he will never sell his children. Abou El Enein also implied that the
striking workers belonged to and were pushed to action by the Muslim Brotherhood (Sada al-Balad
Official Youtube Channel, 2014).
However, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the former NDP businessmen was not
always tense. It seemed for a brief moment that the newly-elected Muslim Brotherhood and former
Mubarakist businessmen are on their way to finding a coalition or a method of working together. It is
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worth mentioning that many of the former NDP businessmen such as Mohamed Farid Khamis, a
billionaire  industrialist  and  the  founder  of  Oriental  Weavers,  were  part  of  Morsy’s  business
delegation  during  his  trip  to  China.  On  this  trip,  Morsy  was  accompanied  by a  large  business
delegation comprised of 80 businessmen of which many were associated with the former Mubarak
regime (Hussein, 2012). 
The delegation was, nevertheless, led by Hassan Malek, a Muslim Brotherhood businessman
who saw that  the investments of business  heavyweights  is  vital  for  the restoration of  economic
performance.  Malek  was  the  architect  of  the  new  regime’s  business  landscape  trying  to  bring
together the businessmen of both the former regime and the Brotherhood’s regime under the banner
of a business association that he founded and called the Egyptian Business Development Association
(EBDA).
Despite this “conciliatory” approach, it was clear that the businessmen who had direct links with
the Mubarak regime can only be accepted as a second tier  and in a subordinate position to the
businessmen of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was clear in the leadership of the EBDA, which was
chaired by Malek and its other leaders were mostly comprised of businessmen with strong links to
the Brotherhood such as Samir al-Najjar, Abdel Moneim Seoudi and Safwan Thabet (Adly, 2016).
This strategy did not go unnoticed by Mubarak-era businessmen and their associate media personnel,
as was demonstrated in Chapter 2 when al-Hadidi spoke of the Brotherhood’s plan to replace one
group of businessmen with another.
However, Abou El Enein even before Morsy became a president seemed to have been a fierce
opponent and not on the Muslim Brotherhood’s map of former Mubarak businessmen to reconcile
with. Morsy, during a presidential campaign tour in May 2012 in Suez, said that Abou El Enein “has
a black history”. He stressed that the Ceramica Cleopatra crisis must be resolved, and he encouraged
the workers to “demand their right, but without disrupting production”. According to al-Masry al-
Youm newspaper,  more  than  3,000 workers  from the  Ceramica  Cleopatra  factory  have  attended
Morsy’s presidential election rally to demand his support against Abou El Enein’s refusal to address
their demands (Abadi, 2012). It is unclear why Morsy was so fierce in his attack against Abou El
Enein during his presidential campaign, and not other Mubarak-era businessmen. One explanation
could  be  that  he  simply  wanted  to  win  the  votes  of  thousand  of  striking  workers  in  Suez  by
promising to support them if he was elected. Another probable explanation was the support that
Abou El Enein’s channel Sada al-Balad gave to presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik, Morsy’s rival
in the second round of the presidential elections.
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3.6 Findings and conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to focus on the forces and struggles behind the production of the media
discourse that was presented in chapter 2, that is, the immediate broader context of producing such
discourse. This broader context does not include the historical context which will be presented in
Part II of this study, and instead focused on trying to maintain a temporal unity with the micro-level
of the CDA while slightly oscillating to cover events that took place right before and after the June
30 events.
In a country that is not very rich in extractable natural resources, and with a growing population
and a growing tourism industry, land becomes a crucially important natural resource with values that
are constantly on the rise. The rapid expansion in the last decades of urban centres like Cairo and
Alexandria, and the expansion of tourist areas around the northern Mediterranean and eastern Red
Sea coasts created a very high demand for lands and property in these areas.
The vast majority of these lands were privatized by direct order and handed for meagre prices
to businessmen close to the regime and government officials. Given this model of accumulation, it
is  not  just  vital  to  be  close  or  be  part  of  the  political  regime that  distributes  such land,  it  is
inconceivable  to  be  able  to  reach  such  levels  of  accumulation  without  such  relationship.  The
January 25 has shaken the property rights over these new lands, and the new successive regimes
along with the courts have started looking into tens, if not hundreds, of these land privatization
contracts. Within weeks of the overthrow of Mubarak, 27 businessmen were reported by state-
owned al-Ahram newspaper to have been prosecuted for involvement in illegal land deals (Sims,
2015, p. 276).
Many businessmen have settled the disputes by paying an amount of money that would close
the  gap between the  original  nominal  price  they  paid  to  the  governmental  authorities  and the
market price for such lands. Some had their land re-nationalized, and some managed to maintain its
ownership. The companies of both Abou El Enein and Amer and his partner al-Amin were among
the tens of companies and individuals who were involved in such land privatization schemes.
This explains the contempt toward the January 25 revolution that has put the property rights
that resulted from such dealings into question, and challenged them both in the streets, courtrooms
and in the media. Moreover, given that land is by definition in limited supply, the rise of a new
business class associated with the Islamist movement would bring an unwelcome competition and
threaten the accumulated wealth of the established business class.
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For long, Islamist businessmen were barred from such processes of accumulation and many have
either  made their  wealth outside of Egypt  or through underground trade in foreign currency, or
investing people’s money in ponzi and pyramid schemes. Some were allowed to run retail businesses
in food, clothing and electronics keeping them confined to modes of accumulation that is  more
subject to market forces away from state-granted privileges (Joya, 2016). This was surely prone to
change after the Muslim Brotherhood had reached power. This is why it was a matter of survival for
some of these businessmen to wage a double media war against both the January 25 revolution and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Given the cultural fear of many in Egypt and globally from the Islamists, it
was the easy and convenient choice to base the media war on issues of identity, sectarianism and
violence,  while  trying  to  represent  a  brand  of  nationalism  that  stands  in  contrast  to  such
characteristics associated with the country’s new Islamist rulers.
However,  this  process  of  accumulation  does  not  apply  prima  facie to  Tarek  Nour,  whose
investments are mostly limited to media and entertainment. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood
probably posed as much of an existential threat to his business given that the type of entertainment
he produces is usually sensational and its humor is often sexually explicit in a way that might not be
accepted by an Islamist government. Programmes that discuss religion on al-Qahira wal Nas are
known to be controversially unorthodox as well. However, even under the military government and
in the post-June 30 era, al-Qahira wal Nas host Islam al-Behiery was accused of blasphemy and
served a year in prison for opinions he expressed on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas.
Therefore, a prolonged Islamist rule would have had a potentially destructive impact on the show
business,  which  drove  many  of  the  players  in  the  industry  to  take  some  of  the  most  staunch
oppositional positions against the Brotherhood. Lastly, since Nour is in the advertising industry, his
own  process  of  accumulation  depends  largely  on  the  accumulation  of  others,  especially  that
excessive spending on advertising is usually the product of excess capital and possibly a crisis of
overaccumulation (Odih, 2007, p. 207). Finally, this close-knit small community of state-dependent
political/business  elite,  positioned  Nour  to  be  the  agency  of  choice  for  many  of  the  infitah
businessmen. The emergence of Nour’s political rivals to power would in this case be nothing less
than an existential threat to his business empire.
98
Chapter 4
The macro level analysis of the nationalist discourse of three private channels
owned by infitah businessmen
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the broader context for Chapter 3—which discussed the business interests and
position of the owner of the subject media outlets in order to situate the text in its immediate context
(the meso level). 
The  first  section  of  the  chapter  will  discuss  the  national  trends  of  “accumulation  by
dispossession”  that  characterized  post-infitah  Egypt  in  which  the  three  businessmen  found
themselves but also helped create, especially at later stages, and how this contributed to the positions
they  had  around  the  June  30  events.  The  following  section  explains  the  regional  forces  that
contributed to shaping the events in Egypt with a focus on the role of Qatar and Turkey in supporting
the Morsy regime, and then the role of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (the UAE) in
supporting the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood new order. Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave
almost unconditional support to the ruling alliance that took over power after July 3, 2013 formed by
the  so-called  jihat  siyadiya (lit.  sovereign  entities)  that  constitute  the  military,  the  police,  the
diplomacy, and the judiciary, along with some veteran Mubarak-era businessmen and journalists, as
well as some new fresh faces.
The final section of this chapter will cover the global context which contributed to the emergence
of  the  June  30  nationalist  discourse,  although  it  argues  that  unlike  many  previous  eras,  the
international context had minimal impact at least compared to developments on the national and
regional levels. As a working definition for this chapter, “national” will generally be used to denote
developments  that  happen  between  Egyptian  parties,  whereas  “regional”  is  used  to  describe
developments where Egypt engages with other parties from the region, that is, the Middle East and
North  Africa  (MENA)  including  Turkey.  Lastly,  “international”  will  be  used  to  mean  any
developments where Egypt engages with the world outside of the MENA region.
The chapter also discusses how the anti-Americanism, lack of anti-Arabism and the use of Islam
that  were presented in Chapter  2 are  linked to  economic interests,  workings  and movements of
capital going a step further in answering the first part of the research question about the function this
nationalist discourse served in promoting the economic interests of its dissemenators.
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4.2 A national economy characterized by “accumulation by dispossession”
Despite the professed support of market forces as a result of the infitah policies and subsequent
waves  of  neoliberalization,  methods  of  accumulation  in  post-infitah  Egypt  remained  largely
dominated by nonmarket mechanisms, and was characterized by a process of “accumulation by
dispossession”. The process of commodification and privatization of land and its enclosure in the
Marxist tradition contrasts with market-based accumulation, which motivates the pursuit of profit
through market forces rather than the direct and violent expropriation of natural resources including
land enclosure. This mode of accumulation, according to the Marxist tradition, characterized the
pre-Capitalist feudal stage and imperialism, and was set as a precondition for a capitalist mode of
production and accumulation. Being a precondition for a capitalist mode of production does not
deny its continuity as necessary for market-based accumulation, yet external to it (Roberts, 2017).
Harvey  thought  it  is  peculiar  to  keep  using  the  Marxist  terms  of  “original”  or  “primitive”
accumulation to describe an ongoing process and a process that was intensified under an emerging
neoliberal order. Since it is inapt to use the term “primitive” for something that still continues to
occur at our present time, Harvey therefore adopted the term “accumulation by dispossession”.
In Egypt, since the infitah, accumulation could at best be described as a mix of both primitive
and market-based accumulation, given the amount of public land that was enclosed and privatized
by ‘amr mubasher (direct order) significantly below its market price and in many cases even for
free. Other methods of accumulation by dispossession took place in Egypt since the infitah, such
aggressive privatization of public companies, stock manipulation, pervasiveness of investment in
public debt, national debt monetization, etc. However, the focus of this chapter will be exclusively
on land as a more direct and forthright mechanism of accumulation by dispossession.
Angela Joya (2016) argues that although the neoliberal reforms introduced some restructuring to
the  bureaucratic  state,  privatization  remained  controlled  by  the  state  and  official  policy.  Joya
describes  the  free  market  as  a  “guise”  to  privatize  public  resources.  Koen Bogaert  argues  that
privatization “served a new source of patronage to reinforce and extend links between the political
and economic elites”.  Bogaert  argues that privatization remained a  state-led and state-controlled
affair (Bogaert, 2013, p. 223).
Since the start of the open-door policy, many forms of accumulation by dispossession have been
taking place in Egypt through privatization of public sector assets, the market liberalization of the
agricultural sector and arable land that took place in the 1980s and culminated with law 96 for 1992
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(Bush, 2007), and also the privatization and allocation of desert and coastal areas. Many scholars
(see Bush, 2007 and Bogaert, 2013) have studied the revocation of land reform policies passed in the
1950s and the 1960s by Nasser’s developmental state. This academic focus on arable land was not
matched by a similar  focus on accumulation by dispossession that took place as a  result  of the
privatization of desert and coastal land despite its magnitude.
This under-researched topic might be due to the fact that it is more of a recent phenomenon, or
that such lands were for the most part unpopulated and therefore no physical, violent and direct
process of “dispossession” took place. However, this section will primarily focus on desert and
coastal lands for a few reasons: first,  in an economy whose growth is becoming less reliant on
agriculture because the capacity of growing crops is limited by Egypt’s water share, and due to its
low profit rates, and as the population is growing at a very fast rate, most of the growth potential
existed in the real estate and construction sectors. The share of agriculture as a percentage of GDP
has gone down from about 30 percent in the mid-1970s to less than 12 percent at the moment. This
is evident by the huge urban encroachment on agricultural land where it has become much more
profitable to build residential housing than to grow crops. Therefore, desert and coastal land has
become the public natural resource of choice in the last three decades.
Second, agricultural land has been in private hands for long, and even if land reform heavily
regulated it and put a limit on ownership, it was still relatively subject to some degree of market
mechanisms. On the other hand, market forces were completely absent in the vast majority of the
cases of privatizing desert  and coastal  lands, and there was no bidding process or any form of
competition to bring the price close to its “fair market price” which demonstrate how nothing less
than full  control over the state is a prerequisite for enabling such nonmarket and non-capitalist
mode of  accumulation.  Third,  at  least  two of  our  three  infitah businessmen have accumulated
colossal  wealth  by  means  of  dispossessing  the  public  of  desert  and  coastal  lands.  Finally, the
regional players covered in this study have also been heavily investing in desert and coastal land-
related economic activities namely real estate and construction.
In 1974, when Egypt embarked on its open-door policy, the population was 38 million, and at
2016 it stood at 95.6 million (World Bank Data). This increase of nearly 60 million people in 32
years has led to a massive and accelerated process of urban expansion. This increase simply meant
that 15 million households needing 15 million homes were introduced to the market in only three
decades, not to mention the need for commercial property, holiday homes, second and third vacant
properties,  etc.  This  means  that  500,000—as  a  very  conservative  estimate—new  properties  on
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average were needed every year. The tourism arrivals to Egypt have also increased exponentially in
the two decades preceding the revolution driving the industry of real estate and construction to
expand. The number of tourists arriving in Egypt has increased from 2.8 million in 1995 to a record
14 million in 2010 (World Bank Data, n.d.).
There are a few government agencies who own the entire desert and coastal land on behalf of the
state, and they are mandated in a lot of cases to sell the land in the same manner as a private owner
would in a form of a contract signed between the authority and the purchaser at  a price that is
negotiated between the two parties alone with almost no oversight.  The first  authority, the New
Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) is the government authority in charge of owning land in new
cities in the desert usually in the outskirt of big urban centres like Cairo and Alexandria. Established
by Sadat in 1979, the NUCA’s establishment law states that its capital is formed, among other things,
by the lands chosen for the establishment of new urban communities. Most critically, article 31 of
law number 59 for 1979 states that the assets (including land) are considered the private property of
the state,  rather than public  assets.  The legal implications of this  seemingly subtle difference is
significant because it means that the state can deal with these assets as it pleases or at least with less
rules than if it was considered public assets.
According the NUCA’s website, the total built areas of all new urban communities is 500,000
feddans, with a total area of 1.14 million feddans. Since the NUCA is the authority in charge of
owning and selling all land in new urban communities, this means that since its establishment in the
late 1979s, it has “sold” more than half a million feddan to private investors.
How the land is allocated is under the state’s full control. Before a land can be available for
allocation, it has to be “let” by several state entities. First, the Minister of Defense has the right to
declare an area as a military zone or of “strategic importance”. Second, the Supreme Council of
Antiquities  is  allowed  to  declare  lands  to  have  a  special  archaeological  importance.  Lastly, the
Ministry of Petroleum can claim lands for extractive activities (Sims, 2015, p. 263). All land that is
not claimed by these entities become subject for allocation. Before being allocated to the investor,
they are normally allocated to the relevant land authority first, which would in turn allocate it to a
selected investor.
Sims, based on his research, has classified land in Egypt into four broad categories; public lands
are divided into two categories, which are public-domain land which cannot be disposed of due to
infrastructure or security reasons,  or state  private-domain land which can be sold,  transferred or
allocated  under  several  executive  laws.  The  third  category  is  private  land  which  can  be  traded
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through market mechanisms and transferred freely. Finally, there are the Awqaf lands which are lands
held in religious trusts as endowments. According to Sims, it is the state private-domain land—such
as the land controlled by the NUCA—that account for the majority of public land and almost all
desert land (Sims, 2015, p. 263).
The relevant authorities are as follows: the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation which
manages desert land planned for reclamation into arable land; the NUCA which manages land that
will be used to construct new urban communities (desert towns); the Tourist Development Authority
(TDA) which manages land including coastal land for tourist  projects;  the General Authority for
Industrial Development which manages land for industrial use; the Egyptian Environmental Affairs
Agency which is in charge of conservation and protected areas.
As many of the cases revealed by media reports and court documents, the profitability that results
from such land allocation policy happens at  rates that cannot be achieved by any other form of
economic activity, and the disparity between the “buying” and the selling price sometimes reaches a
factor of one hundred. Sims writes: “such pricing means that getting a foot in the door and inside the
relevant authority, either through influence or personal connections or by interference from above, is
extremely important to secure such cheap lands before they are offered in anything approaching a
public arena” (Sims, 2015, p. 267).
Even the World Bank took notice and expressed concern over this  nonmarket mechanism
when it comes to land management, or rather mismanagement, in Egypt. In a report published in
2006, titled “Egypt Public Land Management Strategy” the World Bank sheds light on what it
calls “the limited reliance on market-based allocation mechanisms”.
Most public land outside of the Zimam26 is allocated using administrative, non-market-based
channels at State-determined prices that are often unrelated to the opportunity cost of land or
even to recovery of service delivery costs. The typical method is direct allocation administered
by the competent land controlling authority to individual or corporate investors in response to
advertisements or submitting unsolicited requests for land (World Bank, 2006).
Two of  the  three  businessmen  that  are  the  subject  of  this  research  are  involved in  tourism
development (i.e. building resorts and hotels on under-priced coastal land) and housing construction
26Zimam: Boundaries of cultivated and uncultivated agricultural lands that have been historically surveyed by the 
Egyptian Survey Authority and is included in the Real Estate Tax Department and property tax registry. Based on World 
Bank definition
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in new urban communities. The two have benefited immensely from this mismanagement of land
distribution  as  described  by  Sims  above.  The  lands  have  been  clearly  given  to  investors  and
businessmen associated  with  the  regime.  This  seems to  have  been the  one  and most  important
criteria, as the relevant state authorities had almost complete discretion as to who they “sell” the land
to.
Not only have billions  upon billions  of  dollars  been wasted,  but  even more colossal
amounts of potential revenues have been lost. And those who have benefited from the
wholesale disposal over the last fifty years of what should be considered held in trust for
the Egyptian people are mainly a few individuals who are either in key positions or who
wield particular influence, and some of these, both inside and outside government, have
benefited spectacularly” (Sims, 2015, p. 261).
An example of this conspicuous profiteering is when real-estate tycoon Ahmed al-Maghraby was
appointed Minister of Housing in the Nazif cabinet (2004-2011), and more crucially the head of the
NUCA. In his capacity as the director of the NUCA, he granted vast areas of strategic land to his
own real estate development company at a fraction of its price. In 2006, Al-Maghraby was able to
allocate to his own company, Palm Hills Development, by direct order a million square meter piece
of land in a strategic location in New Cairo for EGP 241 million, or EGP 241 per square meter
(Diab, 2015). According to a judicial report by the Egyptian State Council, the market price of the
square meter in this area at  the time of the allocation reached EGP 4000. The difference of the
market price and allocation price was therefore about EGP 3.6 billion ($620 million at that time
exchange  rates)  (El-Badrawy,  2013).  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  Alaa  Mubarak,  the  former
president’s older son, owned  over three percent of Maghraby’s company (Diab, 2015).
This capture of key state agencies, and establishing a legal framework that would enable that sort
of land grab meant  two things;  first,  methods of  aggressive and rapid accumulation away from
market-based accumulation was a common method of enrichment that made reliance on state capture
indispensable;  second,  this  meant  that  losing  state  power  would  not  just  mean  losing  new
opportunities, but having previous gains expropriated by the new order which was already starting to
be the case after the revolution. Furthermore, many of those cronies faced prison and jail sentences
as  a  result  of  revolutionary  change.  The  dominance  of  a  state-sponsored  “accumulation  by
dispossession” model has made control over the state indispensable for economic success (Zemni et
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al., 2012).
Those who worked in the culture and entertainment industry, including our third businessman
Tarek  Nour,  might  have  followed  a  different  model,  and  the  theory  of  “accumulation  by
dispossession” might be inadequate to explain the motives of an owner of an entertainment and
advertising  company  to  fight  the  June  30  battle.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  process  of
accumulation by dispossession does not happen in a vacuum and in many cases feeds other forms of
economic activities including those dependent on market-based accumulation.
Therefore,  the two domains  should not  be  treated separately, as  they have  several  points  of
intersection and interdependence, most clearly manifested in the reliance of the culture industry on
advertisement  and funding from businesspeople who made there  money elsewhere.  This  is  also
manifested in how Nour—as presented in Chapter 3—seems to be the only one out of the three
businessmen who treats his channel as a for-profit enterprise, because he regards the show business
as his domain of profit unlike the other two businessmen who regard it as a domain of influence.
Rosa Luxemburg (2003) argues that the two modes of accumulation are organically linked and that
‘the historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together’.
Thus capitalist accumulation as a whole, as an actual historical process, has two different aspects.
One concerns the commodity market and the place where surplus value is produced – the factory,
the mine, the agricultural estate. Regarded in this light, accumulation is a purely economic process,
with its most important phase a transaction between the capitalist and wage labourer. In both its
phases, however, it is confined to the exchange of equivalents and remains within the  limits of
commodity exchange. Here, in form at any rate, peace, property and equality prevail, and the
keen dialectics  of  scientific  analysis  were  required  to  reveal  how the  right  of  ownership
changes in  the  course  of  accumulation into appropriation of  other  people’s property, how
commodity exchange turns into exploitation and equality becomes class-rule.
The other aspect of the accumulation of capital concerns the relations between capitalism and
the  non-capitalist  modes  of  production  which  start  making  their  appearance  on  the
international stage. Its predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system –
a policy of spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed
without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of
political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process.
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Bourgeois liberal  theory takes into account only the former aspect:  the realm of ‘peaceful
competition’, the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it strictly
from the other aspect: the realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as more or
less  incidental  to  foreign policy and quite  independent  of  the  economic sphere  of  capital.
(Luxemburg, 2003, p 432).
4.3 The growing regional “new imperialism”
In December 2013, five months after the overthrow of Morsy, the then-new Egyptian government
organized a conference titled the Egypt GCC27 Investment forum to promote GCC investments in
Egypt in areas of energy, housing and real estate, agriculture and food, infrastructure, tourism, etc.
(Joya, 2017). 
Also, a year after the overthrow of Morsy in June 2014 at a time when the economy of Egypt
was struggling from the lack of investments, then-Saudi King Abdullah called for Egypt’s friends
and brothers “to attend a donors’ conference to help Egypt overcome its economic difficulties". This
call materialized in March 2015 as the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) in Sharm
al-Sheikh  which  aimed  at  marketing  Egypt  as  an  attractive  FDI  destination  where  Gulf  states
pledged $12 billion to Egypt in the form of FDI, loans and assistance (Georgy & Kalin, 2015 &
Başkan, 2016, p. 125). This pledge, according to Angela Joya, is “both a reflection of the GCC ruling
elites’ economic interests, as well as a desire for political stability facilitated through investments in
the Egyptian market” (Joya, 2016).
Joya  continues  to  argue  that  in  order  to  improve  the  investment  opportunities  for  Gulf
capitalists in Egypt, the GCC pressured Egypt to implement investment reforms, and that Saudi
Arabia, using the leverage it gained in the revolutionary period, has used this influence to shape the
investment and economic policy framework of Egypt ensuring new investment opportunities for
Egypt (Joya, 2016).
It was reported that during the Egypt-GCC conference, Saudi Arabia had “suggested” to the
interim president  Adly  Mansour  some amendments  to  the  Egyptian  investment  law that  would
ensure that no criminal procedure against an investor would take place without the approval of the
Minister  of  Investment,  alongside  other  measure  that  would  protect  investors  from  any  legal
proceedings (Alarabiya.net, 2014). This move was aimed at protecting Saudi investment interest
27Stands for Gulf Cooperation Council: a regional political and economic union consisting of all the Arab states of the ؛ 
Persian (Arabian) Gulf except Iraq.
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against  legal  action that  proliferated in  the aftermath of  the revolution,  including against  Saudi
Arabian investors,. It is worth noting that all these suggestions have been put into effect through
multiple changes to the investment law.
According to Joya, other forms of pressure were also exerted on Egypt to “reform” its investment
policy. In early 2011, the Saudi Arabian government warned Egypt that it would cancel work visas
for  a  million  Egyptian  workers  residing  in  Saudi  Arabia  that  are  considered  a  major  source  of
remittances and foreign currency for Egypt, if the privatization deals in which Saudi companies are
involved were revisited. The Egyptian government at the time responded by forming an extrajudicial
committee to resolve 20 investment disputes. Among the disputes were prominent cases involving
Saudi  Arabia  and  UAE  multinationals,  such  as  Saudi’s  Kingdom  Agricultural  Development
Company, the UAE-owned construction company DAMAC and Saudi Arabia’s Anwal group (Joya,
2016).
For the Gulf countries, between the period of 2002 and 2006, $510 billion of extra liquidity
were generated (Hanieh,  2011, p.  106). In 2011, the Gulf region recorded the highest account
surplus in the world which was estimated at $300 billion, meaning that the region’s exports and
earnings on investment abroad were $300 billion more than its imports and the earnings of foreign
investors  in  the  GCC countries.  Total  combined  value  of  foreign  assets  owned  by  the  GCC
countries  by  2011  were  $1.7  trillion,  of  which  half  were  owned  by  sovereign  wealth  funds
(Augustine, 2011).
Moreover,  Gross  Domestic  Savings  (GDS),  which  measures  the  combined  savings  of  the
government, the household sector and the corporate sector was 33.6% and 52.8% of GDP in Saudi
Arabia and the UAE respectively. The highest the percentage of GDS means the more the funds
that are available for investment and these two rates are among the highest in the world. The GDS
rate in Egypt, on the other hand, was 3.1% of GDP (World Bank Data, n.d.).  
This massive increase in surplus wealth which resulted from the rise of oil prices in the first half
of the 2000s, had a remarkable impact on capital flows to other Middle Eastern countries. In 2008,
36 percent of total foreign investments in the region came from the GCC countries, which exceeds
the amount of investments arriving from North America which stood at 31 percent, Europe at 25
percent and Asia at  4 percent (Hanieh,  2011, p.  150).  In Iraq,  for example,  the GCC countries
benefited tremendously from the removal of the restrictions previously imposed on foreign capital
entering Iraq as a result of the US invasion. The ruling Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led
by Paul Bremer in the immediate aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, had passed 100 laws to
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allow unlimited foreign ownership of companies, while ushering in the privatization of 200 state-
owned companies and setting a low flat tax rate of 15 percent (Hanieh, 2015, p. 149).
Contrary  to  what  was  expected,  investments  coming  from the  GCC quickly  surpassed  that
coming from the US itself, especially after the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004. By 2009, more
than half of all foreign investment in Iraq came from GCC countries (Hanieh, 2015, p. 150). This
overaccumulation and the resulting export of capital  from the Gulf countries has intensified the
competition among them over external markets especially given the very small  populations, and
hence markets, in most of the GCC countries with the sole exception of Saudi Arabia. Sending this
excess capital abroad in the form of FDI, portfolio investments, loans and aid has also served a
double purpose of winning political allies regionally and internationally to help save their absolutist
models  of  government  against  external  threats,  namely  that  of  Iran  and  of  the  post-2011
revolutionary wave.
During the year of Morsy in power, two new countries, Qatar and Turkey, remarkably increased
their  investments  in  Egypt  .  Before Morsy’s ascendancy to power, the  contributions  of  the two
countries were minimal. Qatar’s FDI contribution to Egypt increased more than tenfold from about
$35 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011/2012 to about $375 million in FY 2012/2013 which corresponds
exactly  to  Morsy’s year  in  power. As  for  Turkey, its  FDI  increased  from $12.5  million  in  FY
2011/2012  to  $169  million  during  the  year  of  Morsy’s  presidency.  For  both  countries,  their
investments of this year in Egypt were the highest ever including until the end of 2017 (see Table 2).
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Table 2 Foreign Direct Investment to Egypt from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Turkey and Qatar (2001-2017) (in USD million).
Saudi Arabia United Arab 
Emirates
Turkey Qatar
2001-2002 0.9 0.1 0 0
2002-2003 3.7 0.2 0 0
2003-2004 4 3.3 0 1.4
2004-2005 32.4 40.6 0.2 2
2005-2006 99 63 0.8 6.4
2006-2007 204 3049 8.6 2.5
2007-2008 365.4 726.2 14.3 184.8
2008-2009 514.1 1037.4 69 53
2009-2010 323.4 303.5 25.4 70.4
2010-2011 206.3 410.8 27.2 191.5
2011 Revolution
2011-2012 240.4 559.8 12.5 34.9
Mohamed Morsy’s year in power
2012-2013 191.7 480.6 169.2 375.6
June 30, 2013 events
2013-2014 284.4 401.2 31 109.1
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2014-2015 649.1 1382.5 44.3 94.4
2015-2016 313 1328.7 77.5 194.8
2016-2017 343.7 836.9 35.5 169.4





1590.2 3949.3 188.3 567.7





397.55 987.325 47.075 141.925
Source: Data collected from different Monthly Statistical Bulletins published by the Central
Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author
Qatar and Turkey were two of the most important allies for the Muslim Brotherhood regime.
Before the election of Morsy to office, Qatar announced that it would invest $10 billion in Egypt
over a period of five years. In September 2012, three months after Morsy’s election, Qatar’s prime
minister announced a new higher number of $18 billion to be invested by Qatar in tourism and
industry projects in Egypt (Başkan, 2016, p. 99). The same month of September 2012, the Egyptian
government signed a deal with Turkey in which the latter  would provide $2 billion in financial
assistance to Egypt constituting of a $1 billion loan, and the other $1 billion would be used as credit
to finance imports from Turkey (Başkan, 2016, p.100).
Qatar and Turkey continued to back Morsy even as opposition increased against him. A new $2.5
billion of financial assistance package to Egypt was announced by Qatar, of which $2 billion were in
the form of a central bank deposit, and $500 in the form of a grant. Soon after, Qatar offered another
$3 billion making total Qatar financial assistance to Egypt reach $8 billion, making it the largest
donor and lender, and hence supporter, to Egypt during Morsy’s presidency (Başkan, 2016, p. 103).
Even after the overthrow of Morsy, Doha and Istanbul were major safe destinations for members of
the Muslim Brotherhood who were forced to flee Egypt (Trager, 2017; Başkan, 2016, p. 126).
As for the regional opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and at the same time the supporters of
the military regime that took over power from Morsy, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have slightly cut
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down  their  FDI  flows  into  Egypt  during  the  year  of  Morsy’s  presidency.  Saudi  Arabia’s  FDI
decreased to $191 million in FY 2012/2013 from $240 million in 2011/2012. As for the UAE, its
FDI inflows went down to $480 million in FY 2012/2013 from $560 in FY 2011/2012 (Central Bank
of Egypt).
The four years after the coup saw a remarkable slump in FDI flows from Qatar and Turkey,
which averaged about  $142 million a  year  for  Qatar  compared to $375 million during Morsy’s
tenure, and $47 million for Turkey compared to $169 during the year of Morsy presidency (Central
Bank of Egypt).
Conversely, the FDI of regional supporters of the regime of Abdelfattah al-Sisi invested annually
on average double what they did during the year of Morsy. Saudi Arabia’s average annual FDI flows
during the four years after the military coup stood at about $397 million compared to only $191
million during Morsy’s year in presidency, and the UAE for the four years sent $987 million as an
annual average compared to $480 million during Morsy’s presidency (Central Bank of Egypt).
As  for  indirect  portfolio  investments,  or  investments  in  debt  bonds  and equity  (stocks),  the
pattern is less clear than that of FDI (see Table 3). For example, Saudi Arabia’s portfolio investments
throughout all the successive governments and regimes since late 2011 and until the spring of 2017
were quite stable. The UAE’s portfolio investments seem to have had a slump compared to the time
of Morsy. For the supporters of the brotherhood Turkey and Qatar, the trend was very clear and
similar to that of the FDI. 
Turkey, for example, in December 2012 halfway through Morsy’s one-year tenure, had a total of
portfolio investments in Egypt at $105.4 million and it kept going down gradually until it hit an
extreme low at the end of March 2017 reaching $1 million. As for Qatar, at the end of December
2012, portfolio investments amounted for $110.8 million and ended up reducing until it hit a low of
$29 million at the end of March 2017, with an exception of a post-revolutionary peak at June 2014
when its portfolio investments reached $126 million (Central Bank of Egypt).
The reason behind the less clear pattern in indirect portfolio investments compared to FDI may
be  that  the  assets  in  the  case  of  portfolio  investment  are  traded  in  an  open  market,  and  it  is
technically up for anyone who has the money to trade in securities, whereas FDI normally depend on
getting through a lot of red tape, licenses, and complicated laws, and having access to factors of
production like land; companies are in many cases state-owned and are privatized by direct order
allowing for a great deal of favouritism, especially that a significant portion of both the UAE and
Saudi Arabia’s FDI were in the real estate and construction sectors, a sector where favouritism is
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crucial as discussed above and in the previous section.
Table 3 Breakdown of portfolio investment assets by country





337.6 N/A 70.7 73.2
End of 
December 2012
339.2 123.6 105.4 110.8
End of 
December 2013
326.9 71.9 14.2 83.8
End of June 
2014
348.5 122.0 17.0 126.0
End of June 
2015
392.4 50.5 6.9 102.5
End of June 
2016
316.0 20.6 5.2 80.8
End of March 
2017
364.9 38.8 1.0 29.5
Source: figures collected from different External Position Quarterly Reports published by 
the Central Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author
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Table 4 Outstanding stock by creditor country
Saudi Arabia United Arab 
Emirates
Turkey Qatar
2011 40.64 25.42 0 0
2012 1000+68.74 21.43 0 4000
2013 500+95.71 21.80 1000 4500
2014 500+102.12 19.09 1000 500
2015 500+106.03 40.83 1000 500
2016 500+121.55 590.78 800 48.14
2017 500+439.54 632.71 400 34.67
Source: Figures collected from different External Position Quarterly Reports published by 
the Central Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author
The choice of investment and the allocation of capital is therefore clearly more than just a choice
driven by private sector profit motives that are detached from the political considerations of the
involved states. Any non-political and purely economic explanation of the post-June 30 upsurge of
Saudi  Arabian  and  UAE  investments,  such  as  improvements  in  the  business  climate,  better
investment incentives, better returns, etc. would fail to explain the concurrent slump in Qatar and
Turkey’s investments at  the time when Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s were increasing.  If  these
movements were just a matter of neutral non-selective economic opportunity, it should apply more
or less equally to investments of all relevant states, or at least with a less clear pattern than the one at
hand. The profit-driven argument holds stronger for portfolio investments in the open securities
market, but for FDI—given the nature of both the sending and receiving ends of the investment—it
is very clearly linked to the political considerations of the involved states.
Accumulated capital  in the Gulf is either directly state-owned or closely linked to the state
through a “private” sector that is overwhelmingly controlled and owned by member of the ruling
family  in  the  different  Gulf  monarchies;  it  is,  therefore,  not  akin  to  market  economies  where
corporations would get involved in these accumulation structures in a private capacity (Hanieh,
2015, p. 147). However, as an additional way to cross-examine the claims that is made based on the
FDI statistics, I will also look into other forms of financial flows into Egypt from our four countries.
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Other than FDI, billion of dollars of financial assistance from Gulf countries have also been
closely linked to the quick political developments witnessed in Egypt in the post-revolutionary era.
Since the January 2011 revolution, Egypt received about $31 billion in financial assistance in the
form of aid and deposits from all countries, of which $13 billion came from Saudi Arabia and the
UAE after the overthrow of Morsy in July 2013 and until August 2016. Turkey and Qatar gave no
financial  assistance to  Egypt  at  that  period despite  having previously given $8.5 billion during
Morsy’s tenure, of which $7.5 billion came from Qatar and $1 billion came from Turkey (see Table
4).
This form of financial assistance is completely government-to-government and therefore does
not have the reservations of the FDI mentioned above. Looking at our three indicators: financial
assistance, FDI and portfolio investments, it becomes clear that the more governments are involved
on both the sending and the receiving end, the more the sensitivity to the political developments is
clear. We see this trend the clearest when it comes to the fully-state managed financial assistance,
and it  is  clear  but  to  a  lesser  degree  when it  concerns  FDI  which  is  highly  influenced by the
receiving  and  sending  states  but  just  stopping  short  of  having  full  control.  As  for  portfolio
investment where governments have the least control over both receiving and sending, the clear
pattern becomes a lot more blurred.
These kinds of financial flows have a double purpose; first, they provide for more channels to
invest all the excess capital that was described in the introduction to this section. Egypt, a very large
consumer market but still suffering a shortage of capital seems like a suitable avenue for this kind of
activity. Second, these financial flows also extend the influence of the concerned countries and win
them political allies especially at a time when protests and demands for change and democratization
are sweeping the region. However, the two points might not be as separate because placing political
allies in power in a country like Egypt where investment opportunities and access to markets are
tightly controlled by the government, is key to having access to such markets, and it is therefore
crucial to have a “friendly” government in power. 
In other words, winning political allies acts as a guarantor of access to markets and lucrative
business opportunities, but the ability to access such markets and send FDI and financial assistance
help these regimes in installing friendly governments in power. The same way, the Mubarak-era
businessmen might have been anxious about being replaced by another class of businessmen as will
be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the GCC heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the
UAE who have been investors of privilege in Egypt, might have been slowly faced with increasing
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competition from both Qatar and Turkey with the help of their Brotherhood allies in power.
The very generous support to the anti-Brotherhood ruling alliance by the two biggest Gulf
economic  powers,  of  which  at  least  one  is  a  conservative  religious  monarchy  who has  been
investing for decades to spread its own ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam in Egypt, might
have contributed to limiting the adoption of too much of a secular nationalist discourse against the
Brotherhood, and could give a probable explanation of the heavy use of Islamic arguments against
the Brotherhood in the June 30 period as was demonstrated in Chapter 2. This support could also
provide a partial explanation about how the anti-Brotherhood discourse of the media owned by the
infitah  businessmen  differed  from  a  purely  late  Sadatist  discourse  in  its  eschewal  from
disseminating an anti-Arab discourse.
Given that the United States was a major supporter of the regime that saw the enrichment of the
infitah business elite, and a promoter of a transition that gave them increasing economic power, the
growing  anti-Americanism discourse  that  was  one  of  the  key characteristics  of  the  micro-level
discourse (see Chapter 2) is a phenomenon worthy of careful studying. Egypt is the second largest
recipient of US aid after Israel with an average of military and economic aid of $1.3 billion a year
that has been steadily flowing from 1978 until the present time. However, although the aid has been
more or less stable in absolute amounts or even declining at times, its weight relative to the size of
the Egyptian economy is significantly decreasing with time.
In 1979, the year where the US aid started flowing to Egypt, the GDP of the country was 18
billion dollars (World Bank Data). According to this year’s GDP the US aid constituted about 6.6
percent of Egypt’s GDP. In 1991, the US aid constituted about 5 percent of the GDP, and it kept
descending to only 0.6 percent in 2013. The Decode company for economic and financial consulting
argued that economically, cutting or canceling the aid is not expected to increase or pose serious
fiscal pressure due to the bilateral aid coming from Gulf Arab countries (DECODED, 2017).
Decode has put the US aid in context by comparing it to key foreign currency inflows of Egypt
in 2012-2013. By this measure, exports in the same year brought about $26 billion, in addition to
about $18.4 billion from remittances which mostly comes from Gulf countries namely Saudi Arabia,
$9.7 billion from tourism, $5 billion from Suez Canal and $3 billion from FDI totaling about $62.1
billion against $1.3 billion of US aid (DECODED, 2017). This measure does not include loans,
grants and portfolio investments.
This sense of the increasing insignificance of the US aid to Egypt has been expressed by many
people including Abou El Enein himself. Abou El Enein said in a press conference in September
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2017 that Egypt must refrain from seeking aid or assistance and that it should shift from the culture
of aid to building strong partnerships and achieving common interests (al-Houti, 2017). Moreover,
Egyptian diplomat Gamal Bayoumi said in August 2017 that the US aid does not mean anything to
Egypt if compared to the figures of Egyptian imports from the US, adding that the US and Europe
benefit  much  more  from what  Egypt  imports  from them compared  to  the  aid  they  give  Egypt
(Moawad et al, 2017).
This increasing sense of dispensability of US aid, coupled with a general sense of distrust in the
US foreign policy after the 2011 revolutions, has fueled anti-American discourse from some of the
US most traditional allies in the region. From the perspective of the status-quo proponents in the
region (whether the military regime in Egypt and its civilian business allies, or the regional actors
especially  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  UAE)  there  has  been  a  general  lack  of  trust  in  the  Obama
administration, and a sense of disappointment that the US has not supported and backed its longtime
allies in the regime—especially Mubarak—until the end,. For example, Dhahi Khalfan, the head of
the Dubai police known for his anti-Brotherhood sentiments, in January 2012, accused the USA of
working to export the revolutions and claimed that after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the Gulf would be
next in line. Khalfan also accused the US of allying with the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve this
goal, and as the Brotherhood was getting more powerful with the US support, it became more of a
security threat to the Gulf countries. The UAE authorities in 2012 waged a wave of arrests against
tens Muslim Brotherhood member in the UAE. They were charged with “seeking to oppose the basic
principles of the UAE system of governance and to seize power” (Başkan, 2016, p. 111).
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter described two forms of dependence in the economic field in which the infitah business
elite is situated. The first form is the dependence of the business elite itself on the state as an entity in
control  of  distributing  the  country’s  natural  resources,  namely  land,  independent  from  market
mechanisms in a process more akin to that of “accumulation by dispossession” than market-based
accumulation. This sort of dependence on the state as a primary method of extreme enrichment and
accumulation, while the market mechanism only comes as secondary mechanism typically predicated
by accumulation by dispossession, makes the continuation of direct control and capture of the state
more decisive than in an often hypothetical setting where the market dominates as a method of
accumulation.
Therefore,  the  rise  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  its  increasing  control  over  the  state
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apparatuses  and  the  increasing  role  its  regional  allies  namely  Turkey  and  Qatar  played  in  the
Egyptian market, posed a threat not only to the infitah business elite who formerly held privileged
position on the receiving end of the distributive policy of the state, but also to the more traditional
and established regional investors, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the interests of the
infitah business elite on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other hand coalesced
around the time of the June 30 protests. The mission was clear, to dispose of the Brotherhood regime,
and stop the increasing economic role of the Brotherhood’s regional allies, namely Qatar and Turkey.
This competition over opening up markets for excess capital was also coupled and intertwined
with a more imminent existential political threat during a time of revolutionary fervour sweeping the
region. Qatar and Turkey were more embracive of these changes especially when they resulted in
bringing  groups  associated  with  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  to  power.  King  Abdullah  of  Jordan
described this rise of groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey and then Tunisia and
Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood crescent (Başkan, 2016, p. 3). The embracing of these changes,
especially by Qatar, was best manifested through the coverage of al-Jazeera. During the revolution,
al-Jazeera  was  the  network  with  the  most  extensive  around-the-clock  coverage  of  the  Egyptian
revolution. However, unlike other networks, al-Jazeera did not concern itself much with hiding its
vehement support to the political developments taking place in Egypt (Başkan, 2016, p. 86). Al-
Jazeera also endorsed the subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, supported them during their
time in power, and was unapologetically and bluntly critical of the military regime for overthrowing
the Muslim Brotherhood regime and ruthlessly cracking down on the entire movement.
This position was a major motivation behind Nour and al-Amin establishing TV networks to
counter this narrative of al-Jazeera, as I discussed in Chapter 3. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also
invested significantly in establishing TV networks to counter the narrative of al-Jazeera. In June
2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut all diplomatic relations with
Qatar and imposed a siege by restricting trade and closing air space in front of Qatari airplanes,
among other measures (Nasseri, 2017). Among the key demands of the “siege countries” was to shut
down al-Jazeera television completely (Maclean et al, 2017).
This chapter argued that the economic and political competition and rivalry should not be treated
separately,  especially  under  a  model  of  accumulation  characterized  by  “accumulation  by
dispossession”. In order to adequately separate the economic from the political, accumulation should
therefore happen completely independent of state power. This is far from being the case in most
settings,  but  especially  in  post-infitah  Egypt,  which  witnessed  the  rise  of  “accumulation  by
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dispossession” and also witnessed the rise of oil-rich Gulf countries leading to a process of immense
overaccumulation in the early 2000s, which made Egypt a theater for both political and economic
competition between the GCC countries. The post-revolutionary period has intensified this process
due to the political anxiety that characterized all regional players.
 Tying back together the political and the economic is of crucial importance because orientalist
and neo-orientalist  approaches and theories of Middle Eastern exceptionalism often perceive the
authoritarian state in the Middle East as the major obstacle against democratization, as if the state
was  functioning  independently  of  society, and  as  if   politics  was  functioning  independently  of
economics (including the workings of global capitalism) (Zemni, 2017).
This introduces us to the second form of dependence, which is that of the Egyptian economy as a
whole. The Egyptian economy has since the infitah been mostly dependent on external assistance
and support in the form of aid, loans, remittances, etc. due to its economic structural and chronic
crisis,  characterized by long-term budget  and trade deficits,  and shortage of  capital  and foreign
currency inflows. This has made the post-infitah Egypt increasingly reliant on aid, loans, and foreign
investments. As discussed throughout the chapter, the early providers of aid, loans, tourism inflows
and foreign investments in the post-infitah era were the US and European countries. With time and
with an accelerated process of accumulation in the Gulf, the relative weight of the GCC countries
has increased. 
This  has  perhaps  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  a  new  Egyptocentric  discourse  whose
characteristics  were  identified  in  Chapter  2,  where Egyptocentrism was no longer  positioned in
opposition to the Arabo-Islamic heritage as it did in the 1930s, or in opposition to Arabism as it did
in the 1970s. Instead, the Egyptocentric discourse of June 30 was characterized by an unequivocal
anti-Americanism, and a  lack of  a  superior  attitude towards Arabs,  These two characteristics  of
discourse, the chapter argued, cannot be separated from the changing roles of the GCC countries and
the US as economic players in Egypt.
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Part II




The economic determinants of nationalist discourse and the role of mass media
(1919-1970)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is the first of the two chapters which historicizes the nationalist discourse presented in
Part I of this study. I explore the economic origins of the Egyptian national identity, and the changes
it has undergone since the beginning of the 20th century and up until the death of Nasser and the Arab
nationalist  project,  while  highlighting  how  mass  media  was  indispensable  to  the  subsequent
nationalist  undertakings.  Chapter  5  and  6  provide  the  pretextual  dimension  for  the  discourse
discussed in Part I of this dissertation in order to avoid the treatment of discourse as single incidents
isolated in time. It also aims to test the stability of nationalist discourse as a way to examine the
extent to which it is sensitive to changes in the economic and technological contexts. 
In a sense, the overarching objective of this study is to assess the extent to which economic
agents are capable of modifying nationalist discourse to serve their interests. This could not be done
without examining the history of nationalist thought and its links to the workings and movement of
capital and technological development.  The objective of this chapter is, therefore, twofold: first, it
aims to demonstrate the foundational principles of Egyptian nationalism by analyzing the writings of
foundational nationalist thinkers and historians. Second, it aims to show whether these foundational
principles were determined—even if not simply determined—by the interests of the business elite in
different historical periods. 
I did so by exploring the early Egyptian nationalist project and its intimate links with a modernist
capitalist (including state capitalist) project. I examined its role as a method for trying to have better
control and a bigger share of the means of production by a nationalist bourgeoisie that were alienated
by a foreign feudal and bankers’ class in the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century.
The chapter will also look at how major shifts in the nationalist discourse in Egypt since the 1919
revolution have had major economic aspects to them, and how technological advancements in mass
media were mobilised to achieve such nationalist objectives. It will also explore how for the first
time such nationalist discourse switched from being an anti-establishment discourse of resistance
prior to the 1919 revolution, to being institutionalized in the inter-war period after the emergence of
al-Wafd party as a representative of a nationalist bourgeoisie, and Egypt’s partial independence from
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the British empire.
This chapter will also analyse the writings of the two main nationalist thinkers representing the
two major camps from the period leading up to the "constitutional era" in Egypt which spans from
the Urabi revolution until the revolution of 1919, which scholars mostly agree were the years a
modern nationalist discourse was founded by leading nationalist intellectuals. This era leading up to
the 1919 revolution is the era in which calls for independence and a constitution became more vocal,
especially with the outbreak of World War I.
After the 1952 coup, the Free Officers Movement (FOM) took the independence project to the
next level when they embarked on a land reform programme in order to dismantle the power of the
overthrown regime and its allies. The land reform set a ceiling of 200 feddans of land ownership to
dismantle the power of the feudal elite. Other than social justice, redistribution of wealth had two
benefits for the new regime; gaining popular support as a new regime and breaking the power of a
former elite. With an expected backlash from other regional and international powers, Nasser and
the FOM felt the need for “exporting the revolution” and creating allies both in the Arab region, in
Africa and around the world.
Therefore, a discourse of social justice, Arab-nationalism, third-worldism and non-alliance was
well-suited for the new regime’s ambitions. This was further exacerbated by the refusal of the US
and the UK to fund the building of a new dam south of the Aswan Dam to provide the needed
energy  for  Nasser’s  industrialization  and  modernization  dreams,  which  was  also  a  way  of
distinguishing himself from the old feudal regime. This has driven Nasser to nationalize the Suez
Canal,  turn  to  the  Eastern  Bloc  for  political  and  militaristic  support,  which  added  a  new
characteristic to the Nasserist regime, that is, anti-imperialism. This was also heavily used by his
propaganda tools to discredit his opponents in the region who were constantly described as “lackeys
of colonialism”.
The chapter  will  discuss another  important  and relevant event  where economic aid played a
major role in changing/shaping a nationalist discourse. Saudi Arabia's aid to Egypt after the 1967
defeat in the six-day war to help with the economic challenges caused by the humiliating defeat was
implicitly conditioned to the toning down of the Arab nationalist discourse (Dawisha, 2003, p. 255-
6). This was followed in the 1970s by a Saudi Arabian campaign and a continuation of politically-
motivated aid to Egypt, and Saudi efforts in brokering the expulsion of Soviet experts in 1972 by the
Sadat administration.  The toning down of Arab nationalism due to this Saudi Arabian influence,
followed by the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League due to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
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made it urgent for Egypt to develop a new nationalist discourse that would distance it from the pan-
Arabist discourse of the foregone era.
5.2 “The birth of Egyptian nationalism”
Many scholars regard the Urabi revolution as signaling the birth of Egyptian nationalism (Cole
1993; Farah 2009; Reid & Mayer 1988). Juan Cole argues that the first signs of modern Egyptian
nationalism were a direct result of the mismanagement of the economy by Khedive Ismail, and the
debt crisis that was caused by an over-borrowing spree that banked on a boom in cotton production,
which did not last for as long as was hoped for in the middle of the 19th century. The debt crisis led to
large  budget  cuts,  and  an  increase  in  taxation  imposed  by  the  European  cabinet  which  almost
exclusively  affected  small  Egyptian  landowners  and  low-rank  Egyptian  military  officers  and
soldiers, leaving the Turko-Circassian military elite and feudal aristocracy almost unharmed. The
introduction  of  mixed  courts  meant  that  European  creditors  managed  to  seize  land  from small
Egyptian landowners who were slightly in arrears due to the cotton bust and high taxation.  The
interest of both the peasantry and the military in abolishing foreign influence has led to the initial
success  of  the  Urabi  movement  due  to  the  broad-based  support  it  received  with  its  assertive
nationalist discourse, which emphasized that Egypt should only be for the Egyptians. The success of
the Urabi movement ended with further and more aggressive foreign intervention in the form of a
British military conquest of Egypt.
Cole goes back 31 years before the start of the Urabi movement, and starts with explaining in
detail the privileges, namely estates, granted to the Ottoman-Egyptian service class forming it into a
new nobility, and how they paid no taxes on the land granted to them before Khedive Said imposed a
‘ushr (one-tenth land tax) on this newly-formed nobility. However, even after a further increase
under Ismail's rule, the tax remained remarkably lower than what the peasants paid as kharaj (tax on
agricultural land) (Cole, 1993, p. 56).
Cole explains how the Egyptian cotton industry was the region's first large-scale experience with
boom-and-bust  cycles  which are typical  to  primary  commodity  trading in  “the periphery  of  the
industrial market”. The boom in Egypt's cotton production and export was a result of the North's
blockade of the South during the American Civil War, for the American South was the main supplier
of cotton to Britain; the South’s overall cotton exports fell by 95 percent as a result of the seige
(Cole, 2013, p. 58).
Cole continues to explain in many pages the effect of the cotton boom and bust on the peasants,
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and how the boom benefited the Ottoman-Egyptian elite much more than it did the local peasants,
and how it significantly increased the value of agricultural land, especially land that belongs to the
nobility because the light taxation it received. Due to the boom and expected increased prosperity,
the state raised land taxes in the late 1860s, and once again during the debt crisis in the early 1870s
which led most small peasant to default and give up their land to large landowners. Cole explains
how during Khedive Ismail’s era, this process led to the transfer of 300,000 feddans from medium-
and smallholders to largeholders. Starting 1876, mixed tribunals, which became widely despised by
local  peasants,  were introduced to apply European laws that would allow European creditors  to
capture land belonging to peasants in arrears, replacing Islamic laws that did not allow the seizure of
land for debt default. It is estimated that between 1878 and 1883, mixed court transferred ownership
of about 50,000 feddans from defaulted peasants to money-lenders in the province of Minuffiyah
alone (Cole, 2013, p. 59).
In  his  book,  Cole  also  attributes  the  participation  of  the  propertied  peasants  in  the  Urabi
movement to more economic issues such as the recognition of small peasant land as private property
in 1858. The legal claims of peasants to their land, and a stronger sense of private property gave the
peasants a greater political interest in its disposition, and left peasant seeking ways of regaining
their lost lands (p. 64). Cole also argues that Ismail's abolishment of forced labour, a step that led to
the end of their statuses as near-serfs and instead into a rural proletariat, led to the abrogation of
noble privileges and an increased income for peasants, which in turn, led to a greater ability for
peasants to mobilize resources.
In short, peasants started to have a greater stake in the system due to economic changes in the
second half of the 19th century, namely the increased per capita earnings due to the cotton boom,
greater profitability, and the recognition of their land as private property. Around the same time,
propertied peasants saw their land taken by the Khedive and his Ottoman-Egyptian nobility. As part
of the mixed tribunals system, peasants also started seeing their land being foreclosed by European
and Levantine creditors. Due to all this, there started to be a real and burning interest in abolishing
privileges of the Turco-Circassian nobles and foreign creditors, “an interest sharpened by high rates
of population growth that increased competition for land”. Cole then continues to demonstrate how
such economic factors would build up over a number of decades until it culminates with the Urabi
revolt.
Although the nationalist movement led by Urabi was suppressed and Urabi himself was sent to
exile, the direct military occupation would only firmly establish his movement’s nationalist ideals
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which culminated decades later with the 1919 revolution. Nadia Ramsis Farah (2009, p. 64) argues
that the Urabi revolt signaled the birth of Egyptian nationalism because the Egyptian landed elite,
who was subordinate to the ruling Turkish-Circassian elite, sought an ideology that would deprive
the foreign elite of political legitimacy, and they found this ideology in Egyptian nationalism.
The nationalism of the Urabi revolution was mostly an ideology of resistance; it was grassroots,
and although Urabi at some point was the effective ruler of the army—and even the country as a
whole after Khedive Tawfik’s authority dwindled—this was very short-lived, and the movement was
not able in the end to fully institutionalize after being crushed by a British invasion which managed
to forcefully restore Khedive Tawfik to the palace. However, a few decades later, the nationalist
movement  did  have  some success  in  institutionalizing  Egyptian  nationalism,  and the  nationalist
discourse ceased to be one of grassroots and organic resistance,  and became a discourse with a
degree of institutional backing as will be discussed later in the chapter.
5.3 A false dichotomy between Kamil and al-Sayyid? Determinism in the writings of the
two pioneer national thinkers
Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid are considered by scholars of Egyptian nationalism the
architects  of  early  modern  Egyptian  nationalism  (Gershoni  &  Jankowski,  1987,  p.  6).  They
dedicated most of their writings to theorizing and structuring an identity for Egyptians amidst a
myriad  of  influences  including  the  Ottoman  Islamic  influence  on  the  one  hand  and  European
modernist influence on the other. They were also prominent political figures leading the two main
political parties of the time established to fight for Egypt's independence: Kamil being the historical
leader of al-Hizb al-Watany (the nationalist party) and al-Sayyid being the historical leader of Hizb
al-Umma (the nation’s party). They both were also the chief editors  of two of the most important
nationalist publications of the time.
By  1900,  the  nationalist  leader  Mustafa  Kamil,  published  al-Liwa newspaper,  probably  the
nationalist  platform that was the most aggressive in its attack against the British occupation.  Its
uncompromising tone won it great popularity among student and young intellectuals making it the
most widely circulated newspaper in Egypt by 1908, reaching a circulation of 15,000 (Goldschmidt
&  Johnston,  2003,  p.  242).  Being  the  official  newspaper  of  the  al-Hizb  al-Watany (Kamil's
nationalist party), it propagated the party’s anti-British and pro-Ottoman stances.
Al-Liwa's main nationalist rival newspaper was therefore quite naturally the newspaper of the
Umma party led by Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid. Al-Jarida newspaper, established in 1907, focused on
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issues of literary criticism, feminism and social reform and saw itself as independent of British,
Ottoman and Khedival influences, and was home for the writings of liberal nationalist thinkers of
the time such as Taha Hussein and feminist pioneer Malak Hifny Nasif (Goldschmidt & Johnston,
2003, p. 214).  Al-Jarida was also co-founded by nationalist leader, economist and the founder of
Banque Misr, Talaat Harb, in which he wrote articles calling for the creation of an economic bases
of political independence, through the establishment of national economic institutions. This burning
nationalist desire has been a common theme in all the post-1919 newspapers namely the nationalist
Wafdist ones such as al-Akhbar (Tignor, 1976).
During the period of British occupation, a formulation of an Egyptian identity was advanced by
the leaders of the two political parties established in the decade preceding World War I (Gershoni &
Jankowski, 1987). According to Israel and Gershoni, the views of these two parties articulated by its
two  thinkers  "were  the  culmination,  the  most  elaborate  and  cogent  expression,  of  Egyptian
nationalist attitudes as they had evolved over the preceding decades." (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987,
p. 6).
The slogan of the Urabi movement "Egypt for the Egyptians" is thought to be interpreted by
Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid as a secular statement that contradicts what he defines as Ottomanism based
on religious loyalty, and that this loyalty is incompatible with the slogan. As I will discuss later in
this chapter, Kamil had a different interpretation of the Urabi motto. Israel and Gershoni argued that
al-Sayyid,  with  his  liberal  tendencies,  believed  that  such  religion-oriented  nationalism  has  a
destructive potential of dividing the nation’s Muslims and Copts and instigating a hostile reaction in
Europe against Egypt (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 8).
One  important  and  exemplary  event  that  perfectly  captures  the  ideological  division  in  the
foundation years of modern Egyptian nationalism was the tension caused by the Turco-Italian war
between  Italy  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  which  represents  a  more  traditional  and  older  form of
political association. This was an important war on many levels. It is popularly known for the use of
the first aerial reconnaissance mission in the history of wars—as well as the first aerial bomb ever;
two technological advances which have become key characteristics of all subsequent modern wars.
This war was also one of the last nails in the coffin of the Ottoman Empire, or rather the Sick Man of
Europe.
Other than being a defeat in its own right, it had presented a pretext for a Balkan states to think
they might be able to defeat the Sick Man of Europe, leading to further suffering for the Ottoman
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empire. As one of the world’s last surviving pre-modern empire, its fall had ushered in the formation
of many new nation-states across its former territory.
The Turco-Italian war forced the Egyptian nationalist thinkers to start making difficult choices
about which side to support as Egypt was still then officially a nominal vassal state of the Ottoman
Empire. In his book Story of my Life (2012a, p. 79), al-Sayyid explains how the disparity between
Europe's supportive reaction towards the independence of the Balkan state on the one hand, and its
reaction  towards  the  independence  of  Egypt  on  the  other  hand  makes  Egyptians  conclude  that
Egypt's only fault is that it is an Islamic nation. This, in his view, led to the unfavorable outcome of
Egyptians siding with the Ottomans as defenders of the majority's faith against the Italians who
represented in the minds of many Egyptians the attackers on the faith. Al-Sayyid wrote:
What they [Egyptians] conclude is that Egypt's only fault is being an Islamic nation, and that
Europe does not help in the East except Christian nations. Therefore, some of them wish if
Muslims had a unity like that they imagine exists in Europe, which was the reason for
Europe to interfere in the affairs of the Balkan States and Armenia. We say this while we
do not know of a collective word for Christianity (Pan-Christianism) the same way a
collective word for Islam was created (Pan-Islamism) (Al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 40).
Al-Sayyid continues to describe this war as a chance to revisit what he had been advocating,
which is that “Egypt should be for Egyptians”. Al-Sayyid writes that he kept reminding Egyptians
that Egypt's duty in this war is to be neutral, that Turkey's dominion does not bring good to Egypt,
does not prevent it  from harm, and that it  could not save her from the British Occupation— an
occupation that Egypt cannot get rid of except with its unity and relying on itself (Al-Sayyid, 2012a,
p. 79).
Al-Sayyid's neutral position on the Turco-Italian war in 1911-12, developed with time to become
more anti-Ottomanist. During World War I, he privately advocated for entering the war on the side of
Britain, and get in return recognition of independence from the British Empire. However, the plan
did not proceed because the British were not very receptive to such offer (Gershoni & Jankowski,
1987, p. 26).
Evident of such anti-Ottomanism, in December 1914, al-Sayyid's newspaper  al-Jarida went as
far as hailing the declaration of Egypt as British Protectorate as a “great revolution”, and that it
would portend a glowing future for the country. It also took the chance to state that the resulting
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termination of Ottoman sovereignty as advantageous to Egypt's true interest in attaining self-rule
(Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 27).
Kamil, on the other hand, had already died at the time of the breakout of the Turco-Italian war,
but  his  views  and legacy  which  became the  official  position  of  his  party  were  extremely  pro-
Ottoman. In 1898, Kamil dedicated an entire book titled The Eastern Question for the defense of the
Ottoman Empire, which he refers to as al-dawla al-'olya (Sublime State). In the introduction of the
book, Kamil congratulates the Sublime State for its great victory over Greece in the Greco-Turkish
war of 1887. 
Kamil wrote in the introduction of his book: “People—both friends and foes of the [Ottoman]
state, have seen substantiation of its well being, and evidence of its youthfulness, and therefore the
souls of its sons and friends have been refreshed, and the hearts of its enemies and adversaries were
blurred by God.” (Kamil, 2014, p. 7). He ended the introduction of the book with a prayer in which
he writes:
God, the creator of heavens and earth, with a faithful and sincere heart to bestow
eternal strength and everlasting victory upon the sublime state, and for the Ottomans
and Muslims to live for eternity in mastership and sublimity; to save for the Ottoman
empire its protector, and for Islam its imam and champion: his majesty the Greatest
Sultan and Caliph Abdel Hamid II the Conqueror (Kamil, 2014, p. 7-8).
This obvious political allegiance to the Ottoman empire as the guardian and protector of Islam
against the non-Muslim world namely “Christian Europe” continues throughout the book. In his
criticism of  how the  Greeks  were  seeking  independence  from the  Ottoman  empire,  he  harshly
attacked them based on the pretext that the “Islamic treatment” was unique in dealing with them, and
that  even  Catholics  treated  the  Greeks  with  contempt  and  disdain.  Kamil  also  writes  that  it  is
impossible for historians to deny the high qualities and moral rectitude of Mehmed the Conqueror
and Muslims, which appeared in Constantinople after the conquest like a “rising sun dissipating
darkness, and as a sign of how outstanding the Islamic faith is.” (Kamil, 2014, p. 39).
Kamil also saw Egypt as a mere component of a wider Islamic world united under the rule of
the Ottoman empire, and represented in the person of its Sultan. In his book, Kamil claims that the
wellbeing of Egypt and the sublime state cannot be achieved without harmony and unity, and that
Egyptians  have unanimously realised such fact  following the example  of  their  beloved prince
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Abbas [II Hilmi Bey].
Egyptians, according to Kamil, have come closer to the Sublime State, and voiced their love to
it through thick and thin, and the whole world admitted that the people of Egypt are the most
faithful loyalists to the Sublime State and the shahist throne. According to Kamil, this was proven
during the Greco-Turkish war, and he expressed that he has no doubt that the proud Egyptian
nation is solid in its position and will never give up its loyalty to the Sublime State. 
He goes on to call on every honest Egyptian and Ottoman to thwart the workings of those who
try to sow division between Egypt and the Sublime State. He described those who “sow the seeds
of discord between His Majesty the Great Caliph and His Highness the Great Khedive [of Egypt],
and those who work on creating hatred and resentment between the leader and the follower” as the
most serious opponents of the state, and its biggest enemies (Kamil, 2014, p. 72).
But  was  al-Sayyid  really  the  ideological  arch  rival  of  Kamil?  Despite  al-Sayyid's  apparent
adoption of secular and liberal ideas and his outright anti-Ottomanism, al-Sayyid's views were not
void of primordialist and perennialist sentiments, which according to Smith, the key to its nature and
power lies in the rootedness of the nation in kinship,  ethnicity, and the genetic bases of human
existence (Smith, 1999).
No one has any doubt that  we are a nation distinct  from any other by virtue of qualities
peculiar to us, and which possibly no other nation shares with us. We have our own peculiar
color, our own peculiar tastes, and a single, universal language. And we possess a religion
which most of us share, ways of performing our activities, and a blood which is virtually one
flowing  in  our  veins,  while  our  fatherland  has  clearly  defined  natural  boundaries  which
separate us from everyone else (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 14).
Al-Sayyid in this passage echoes a sentiment that is extremely primordialist and puts a lot of
focus  on  nature,  whether  it  is  geographical  nature  such  as  “defined  natural  boundaries”  or
physiological nature such as “our own peculiar color” and “blood which is virtually one flowing in
our  veins”.  According to  al-Sayyid,  such forces  of  nature  led  to  developing a  “single  universal
language”, “a religion that most of us share”, “peculiar taste” and even “ways of performing our
activities”.
This statement defines how nature gave Egyptians immutable characteristics such as a universal
religion and language, and that even cultural  phenomena, or social constructs in the language of
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social sciences, is still a product of the natural order. Al-Sayyid proceeds to more explicitly refer to
“civic  association”  as  a  “product  of  nature  and  one  of  its  creations”.  "The  umma  is  that  civic
association [al-ijtima' al-madani] which is a product of nature and one of its creations”. Al-Sayyid
also personifies  what  he describes  as the “civic  association”—which according to  typologists  of
nationalism stands in great contrast with nationalism based on organic elements such as ethnicity,
language, etc.—as having the right to life and freedom in the same manner individuals possess those
natural rights (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 13).
Al-Sayyid believed in the rootedness of the Egyptian nation in a past that is intimately linked to
the present as a continuous whole that defies time.
Our nation in this present does not have an independent presence from our previous nation.
But a nation is a whole undivided and indivisible one. It is a nation where its social body was
created from the day it became independent in this bounded homeland. It had a known social
system, so it started moving in its life from health to disease, and from disease to health, until
it became what it is today (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 55).
In this passage, al-Sayyid once again puts a very clear emphasis on “nature” and comparing a
nation to a living creature in expressions such as “moving in its life from health to disease, and from
disease to health.” For someone who was celebrated as a liberal nationalist thinker, Al-Sayyid was
intolerant towards citizens hosting various national identities, and was asking for those who hail from
other nations to pay allegiance to Egypt only, or else their Egyptianism should be doubted.
If many of us reflected on themselves, looked into the depths of their consciences, reviewed
what they say in their gatherings, and examine their actions, they will see that some of us still
like  belonging  to  the  countries  of  the  Arabs,  or  to  Syria  or  Turkey and not  Egypt.  This
tendency is shown in speech and embodied in action. Who can describe this tendency and its
results as loyalty to Egypt? Who can […] call those who love [countries] other than Egypt,
Egyptian? (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 55).
Here also Al-Sayyid expressed antagonism towards Egyptians who identified in anyway with
other nations like the Turkish, Arab, Syrian, Circassian or European. For al-Sayyid, an Egyptian
identity was exclusive and could not be shared in anyway with any other national identity.
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If the Greeks when occupied by Turkey abandoned their nationalism, renounced their national
traits and despised belonging to their country and forgot that they are Greek, their personality
would have perished, the ambition for independence would have died for them, and it would
have been impossible for them to restore its honours. However, despite their weakness, they
retained their nationalism and solidarity. They did not shame their homelands by belonging to
another, and so they ultimately achieved what they demanded (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 61).
Despite al-Sayyid's effort to gain independence from the British empire, he was very influenced
by European models  of  political  organization.  A recurrent  theme in al-Sayyid's  writings  is  “the
Egyptianization of European modernity”. In an article written on the March 4, 1913 titled Imitation,
al-Sayyid  encourages  the  copying  of  other  peoples'  experiences,  and  argues  that  this  does  not
necessarily  lead to the distortion of the national identity of the receiving end. He gives  ancient
Greece’s influence by ancient Egypt as an example of imitating another civilization, but still being
able  to  brand it  as  yours.  Furthermore,  when the  Arabs  took a  lot  from the  Persian and Greek
civilizations, they Arabized it and made it their own.
Al-Sayyid believes that Egyptians'  “linguistic,  religious and moral standards” will  shape and
overtake any modern cultural or scientific imports from Europe. For al-Sayyid, full imitation does
not exist; the imports from Europe once reaches Egypt will acquire our character and adjust to our
linguistic, religious and moral standards until it becomes completely our own (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p.
55).
Al-Sayyid's nationalist reference points and examples were all European, and the same way he
mentions “old” nations such as Greece, he also makes a reference to a new 19th century nation state:
Italy. He explains in a column written in January 1913—just half a century after Italian unification
and the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy—that Italians became weak and divided and fell
under the rule of Austria and France, and have only regained their independence and restored their
glory by means of their attachment to their nation, and love to their country. He wonders why we
have not heard anyone in Italy claiming that they were French even if they were from French origins,
or Austrian even if they were from Austrian origins.
This  solidarity,  in  al-Sayyid's  view,  led  them  to  have  the  honour  of  independence,  and
subsequently upgrade to the “ranks of great colonial powers”. It is also worth noting that this was
written only three months after the end of the Italo-Turkish war, in which Italy defeated the Ottoman
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empire  in  its  first  major  successful  colonial  expedition.  Al-Sayyid's  admiration  for  the  Italian
struggle from unification to its rise as a colonial power could also partly explain his position against
the popular support in Egypt for the Ottomans against Italy.
His admiration of colonialism as the end result for successful struggles of independence and
attachment  to  the  homeland,  is  also  reminiscent  of  Kamil's  writings  where  he  uses  terms  like
“conqueror” in a favourable sense. In a way, the two nationalist leaders also have in common a view
of  Egypt  as  an  imperialist  power  waiting  to  be  realised.  Their  anti-colonialist  activism  was,
therefore, perhaps not a principled position against imperialism in general, but based on a belief that
Egypt is  too great  to be colonized by European nations,  and that Egypt  could be as “great”  as
European powers if it could achieve independence and was left to realize its imperialist potential.
Another example of al-Sayyid drawing inspiration from Europe's modernism is apparent in his
column published in April 1913 titled The secret of the development of nations in which he praises
his friend Ahmed Fathy Zaghloul for Arabizing a book by his contemporary French philosopher
Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. In the same article he also refers to what
Zaghloul told him about how al-Tarbiya (upbringing) was the reason behind the development of the
Anglo-Saxons, and that he asked Egyptians to imitate them. He praised Zaghloul's translations of
Western thinkers and philosophers as a way of disseminating to the public the “scientific rules for
advancement”,  in  order  for his  people to  apply them and make use of the experiences of other
nations (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 94).
He argued that it is very useful for Egypt as an emerging nation to know the findings of
social scientists on the rules regarding the rise and fall of nations and the reasons behind their
strength and weaknesses. He thought it was indispensable for Egypt to be guided by this social
research in her efforts for progress and development. He simply believed that these findings or
social rules will be applicable to Egypt, and its favourable results will be what Egyptians wish for
their nation (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 76).
Even Kamil–despite his outright Ottomanism and pan-Islamism–would still look northward for
inspiration. Defending his argument that religion is not in conflict with nationalism, he wrote that he
believes nationalism and religion are inseparable, and that the man whom his heart is captured by
religion, will love his nation sincerely and sacrifice his soul for it. Kamil explains that he does not
rely on the sayings of his Muslim forefathers in order not to be accused of intolerance and ignorance
by the children of the modern age; instead he cites the words of Bismarck, whom he describes as the
most important politician of his era, and as a great man who had served his country and raised its
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status. In defending his argument, he attributes to Bismarck the saying: “if you take away religion
from my heart, you would take with it my love for the homeland” (Hussein 1984, p. 83). 
Despite being presented in Western and Egyptian historiography as an advocate of a secular,
territorial  and  inclusive  brand  of  nationalism  compared  to  Mustafa  Kamil,  al-Sayyid  still  paid
allegiance to the role of religion, language and nature in the process of nation building in Egypt. He
also fiercely rejected liberal cosmopolitanism and the possibility of having multiple identities for the
Egyptian citizenry, and argued that any other sort of national identification would disqualify any
individual from being Egyptian.
This laid the foundation for strict conditioning of who could qualify as an Egyptian in terms of
religiosity, language, etc. The writings discussed throughout the chapter set these conditions quite
bluntly. Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid's writings also praise colonialism as the ultimate objective of the
struggle of independence. His overall fascination with the colonialist powers of Europe mixed with
his nationalist tendencies demonstrates that his views are not against anti-imperialism in principle
but  rather  that  colonialism  is  something  the  could  be  learned  and  acquired  given  the  right
“nationalist upbringing”.
Al-Sayyid  is  highly  influenced  by  Europe's  19th century  nationalism  and  technological
advancement, which in his view culminates with European-style imperialism as being the highest
form of nationalism. Kamil, on the other hand, was more oriented towards a traditional form of state,
where the monarch and Islam play a key role in defining the nation. He was, nevertheless, still fond
of Europe’s 19th century experiment with modern nationalism making the ideological gap between
both  thinkers  and their  followers  narrower  than  what  is  generally  believed,  and mainly  centres
around their position towards the Ottoman empire and Egypt’s relation to it.
This  section  aimed  to  give  an  overview of  some of  the  principles  of  Egyptian  nationalism
through analyzing the writings of Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid and situating them in
their wider political, social and economic contexts of the time. It was a glimpse into the debates that
were taking place among Egyptian nationalists in the build up to World War I and then the 1919
revolution. The conclusion of this section is that despite political differences between Kamil and al-
Sayyid over the Ottoman Empire, they were both organicist in their nationalist approach putting a
significant deal of emphasis on issue of ethnicity, blood, geography and nature as a basis of what
constitutes the Egyptian nation.
It might be argued that nationalism is by definition an ideology of perennialist and primordialist
beliefs, especially in relation to nations that are perceived as ancient compared to nations that are
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perceived as more recent (e.g. settler nations). Hobsbawm argues for the existence of two distinct
forms of political entities containing nations: the nationalist and the revolutionary-democratic. The
nationalist  assumes the existence of some prior community distinguishing itself  from foreigners,
while  the  revolutionary  democratic  regarded  the  sovereign  citizen-people  as  what  constitutes  a
nation-state, and distinguishes its people from the remainder of the human race (Hobsbawm, 1990, p.
22).
Hobsbawm  argues  that  French  nationality,  despite  being  an  “old”  nation,  was  of  the
revolutionary-democratic type; issue of ethnicity, history, the language or patois spoken at home,
were irrelevant to the definition of 'the nation'. Kamil and al-Sayyid, despite their difference, both
advocate for a nationalist political entity to contain the Egyptian nation in this Hobsbawmian sense.
This  might  have  been  necessary,  since  Egyptian  nationalism,  arguably  born  with  the  Urabi
revolution, was set in motion to challenge the privileges of both the Turkish-speaking ruling and
land-owning elite and the European financial elites. This will be discussed in more detail in the
remainder of the chapter on the economic origins of Egyptian nationalism.
5.4 A bourgeois  revolution,  and the creation of  an institutional  and constitutional  national
order
The 1919 revolution paved the way for the creation of a sovereign, modern, constitutional nation-
state in Egypt that does not orbit in a sphere of a larger empire. By then, the Ottoman Empire was
already in its death throes, and Britain granted Egypt formal recognition as an independent state.
Surely, this was not the end of the British presence in Egypt, but the formal independence was not
entirely  cosmetic  and  did  have  some  impact  in  creating  some  constitutional  order,  and  more
importantly  in  creating  a  national  economy and media  led  by  national  businessmen to  work in
parallel with foreign-controlled media and capital. This nationalist bourgeoisie managed to produce
itself  as  an  integral  part  of  the  nationalist  struggle  against  British  occupation  in  particular  and
European influence in general (Abdel-malek, 2013). 
In order for the Egyptian business class to increase its stake in the economy, a strong nationalist
discourse was needed to gain them legitimacy over their foreign rivals. Al-Sayyid’s discourse for
“Egyptianizing European modernity”  and his strict criteria for what constitutes an Egyptian suit well
a national bourgeoisie that was committed to sharing in the fruits of a modern European-dominated
processes of capital accumulation in finance and industry by calling for its Egyptianization. The
revolution of 1919 and its aftermath led, unlike the previous nationalist movements and struggles, to
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the institutionalization of these nationalist ideas. The nationalist struggle no longer became only an
informal struggle against formal institutions that work in favour of Ottoman and European centres of
power, but it had some success in creating institutions to rival those of the colonial administration.
Albert Hourani (2013, p. 180-1) argues that when industry began to appear in the 1920s and the
1930s, it was the circle of Lutfi al-Sayyid that was responsible for it. Talaat Harb, who established
Banque Misr  and the  lot  of  companies  that  was  associated  with  it,  was  a  school  fellow and a
collaborator  of  al-Sayyid.  The  role  of  Talaat  Harb  and  Banque  Misr  in  building  the  economic
foundation for the national independence movement was one of the clearest manifestations of the
role of economic men in the shaping of nationalist discourse as will be discussed later in the chapter.
Robert Vitalis (1995) argues that minor investors coalitions such as that of the Greek and the
Jewish minorities may have imagined a continued expansion of their holdings under the protection
of a colonial administration, but after 1919, argues Vitalis, an Egyptian political elite gradually took
control of the administration of the state, which led Egyptian nationals to rapidly monopolize access
to resources.
Vitalis, who studies business nationalism in inter-war Egypt, points out that World War I brought
immense benefits to Egyptian capitalists, and that the war started to gradually bring down the entry
barriers,  namely  the  capitulations  or  mixed  courts  system,  erected  in  the  mid-1800s.  For  such
business elite, industry and manufacturing—as well as finance, cotton export, transport, construction
—were all areas where they could now pursue both profit and power (Vitalis, 1995, p. 30).
Other than establishing political institutions such as a modern parliament and the constitution,
the Egyptian business class had some success in increasing its share in the economy of Egypt. From
the time of Urabi’s defeat in 1882 until Egypt was declared a British protectorate at the start of
World War I  in  1914, the share of  foreign capital,  especially  British and French,  had increased
significantly. Foreign capital invested in Egypt had increased from EGP 21 million in 1902 to over
EGP 100 million in 1914 without taking into account the Suez Canal (Abdel-malek, 2013, p. 43).
Between 1900 and 1907, 160 new companies were incorporated with a capital of EGP 43 million.
Abdel-malek  argues  that  the  principal  allies  of  this  new influx  of  foreign  capital  were  the  big
landowners because the occupying force has become a perpetual customer for their products, as
Egypt was turning into a gigantic cotton farm for the textile mills of Lancashire (Abdel-malek 2013,
p. 42). Furthermore, some merchants were main allies of the British colonizers because they could
profit from supplying the British army with the merchandise they needed.
This trend, however, started to slowly reverse after the end of World War I. In 1917, two years
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before the 1919 revolution, a commission for industry and commerce was established and included
in its membership nationalist leader and businessman Talaat Harb and others with a mission to
establish  a  national  industry.  Abdel-malek  (2013)  argues  that  the  national  bourgeoisie  was
supportive of the violent revolution of 1919 with the hope that they become the sole owners of the
country’s wealth and resources, and this strategy was successful to a certain extent. Although its
success was limited and the majority of capital was still controlled by foreign powers, the share of
Egyptian capital did increase quite significantly in the aftermath of the 1919 revolution.
On the eve of the declaration of Egypt as a British protectorate on December 18, 1914, foreign
capital in Egypt amounted for EGP 92 million, of which EGP 67 million were invested in land as
opposed to only EGP 8 million of Egyptian capital invested in land, in addition to EGP 94 million
of Egyptian debt owed to foreign creditors which makes the percentage of foreign capital in Egypt
at that time about 92 percent of all invested capital in the country (Abdel-malek, 2013, p. 46). By
1948, the amount of capital invested by the total amount of companies operating in Egypt was
around EGP 118 million of which 61 percent was foreign and 39 percent was Egyptian (Abdel-
malek, p. 47).
However, Vitalis argues that there was no direct antagonistic confrontation between foreign and
national  capital.  On the  contrary, in  many cases  the  two “forms” of  capital  served each others
interests  and  worked  together  harmoniously.  This,  in  Vitalis’s  view,  was  probably  the  national
capitalists’ biggest  chance to  slowly but  increasingly infiltrate  the  European-dominated business
world, and join ranks with the country’s top capitalists. New rising figures such as Talaat Harb and
his new national bank project Banque Misr, and the construction and sugar empire run by Ahmed
Abbud, who had reportedly become one of the world’s richest persons, marked a new shift in the
weight and the power of national economic forces (Vitalis, 1995, p. 30).
The  role  of  the  printing  press  in  supporting  the  efforts  of  the  nationalist  bourgeoisie  was
immense. It was quite natural for an event as significant as the 1919 revolution, and the emergence
of political heavyweights such as al-Wafd party to alter the media landscape of the time. Talaat Harb
already started a decade before the outbreak of World War I to focus on the nationalist economic
problems using nationalist media platforms to promote his ideas. However, it was not until after the
partial independence gains resulting from the 1919 revolution that his plan had been realised, and the
mass print media had played a crucial role in the realization of his plans.
Banque  Misr,  which  was  founded  in  1920  to  mobilize  Egyptian  capital  to  compete  with
European capital, started as a relatively small operation, but its symbolic value attracted the attention
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of both the nationalist and the European press. One of the most devoted supporters of the project was
al-Akhbar newspaper with its nationalist Wafdist tendencies calling on Egyptians to support the new
enterprise by buying shares in it.  Al-Ahram and  al-Muqattam also participated in the new bank’s
publicity campaign (Tignor, 1976).
The  European  press  was  more  skeptical  though  about  Egypt’s readiness  for  such step.  The
Bulletin Commercial,  despite  its  professed  support,  did  not  think  the  project  was  feasible.  The
journal wrote in reaction to the project: “A long education is necessary in order to adapt to the
principles and prescriptions of modern finance—in a word European assimilation.  In everything
there must be an apprenticeship. One does not become a master at a stroke. Without wishing to
diminish whatsoever the merit of this new activity, we can say that limited strictly to the indigenous
element in capital, administration, and direction its hour has not yet come.” (Tignor, 1976).
Despite  its  modest  start  with  a  capital  of  less  than  EGP  80,000,  the  campaigns  of  the
nationalist newspapers started to pay off after a slow take-off and the capital of the bank rose from
EGP 474,924 in 1924 to EGP 720,000 in 1925 to EGP 1,000,000 in 1927, or more than 12 times
the initial capital of the bank that was raised seven years earlier (Tignor, 1976). It is very unlikely
that without the control of mass media platforms in the form of newspapers and the kind of mass
mobilization it  allows, that  these efforts  would have ever  seen the light,  let  alone succeed in
establishing  a  national  bank that  will  prove  instrumental,  and will  play  a  key  economic  and
symbolic role in the struggle for independence. 
In order to increase the share of the national bourgeoisie in the country’s capital, some degree
of protectionism and import substitution policies were adopted in the early 1930s when the tariff
system was amended to increase the taxes to as high as 50 percent on luxury products that have an
equivalent produced nationally. This has resulted in an 11-fold increase in the size of local textile
market in the 1930s, taking from the market share of the British textiles (Tarouty, 2015). British
factories were affected by the decline of their exports to Egypt and considered establishing plants
in Egypt to exempt its products from the high tariff, but any presence in Egypt had to happen
through a joint venture with an Egyptian company.
The result of this was that Calico Printers entered the Egyptian market in 1933 as a joint venture
with the national firm  Filature National D’Egypte,  and five years later in 1938, Bradford Dyers
entered into a joint venture with the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company established by Talaat
Harb. Harb found pride in the fact that the Misr firms blocked Bradford’s original intention to enter
the  country  as  an  independent  producer  and  that  it  had  managed  to  capture  its  technical  and
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managerial skills for itself (Tarouty, 2015).
It  is  therefore  clear  that  a  certain  form  of  economic  nationalism  during  this  period  had
strengthened the position of national capital vis-à-vis foreign capital, and guaranteed national capital
more political support from an increasingly nationalized set of institutions; the domination of foreign
elements in the political and economic sphere made more viable the argument that all Egyptians
shared the same interests regardless of their class position. This allowed the national bourgeois elite,
represented  by  al-Wafd  party,  to  avoid  class-based  confrontation  and  mobilize  the  support  of
disenfranchised  groups  and  secure  the  hegemony  of  bourgeois  influence  within  the  national
movement (Hussein, 1973, p. 69).
This  highly  shifting  and  volatile  tides  of  capitalism  and  business  required  a  nationalist
discourse that is relatively flexible, broad, abstract and could be adjusted depending on private
investment interests and strategies (Hussein 1973, p. 45).
Local businessmen understood this, and the versions of nationalism that different Egyptian
investors  championed  proved  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  shifting  and  pragmatic
assessments of interest.  The public expressions of economic nationalism associated so
prominently with the Misr group’s chairman, Harb, proved equally useful to Harb’s local
Egyptian  rivals,  especially  in  trying  to  obtain  political  support  for  their  various
enterprises. There were no obvious penalties involved in doing so as long as economic
nationalism  was  the  discursive  monopoly  of  capitalists  or  intellectuals  who  did  not
challenge  the legitimacy of  the  prevailing  private  enterprise–oriented  economic order.
Harb, along with Yahya, ‘Abbud and others, remained free to pursue strategies of selective
cooperation  with  foreign  capital.  Business  nationalism  strengthened  the  competitive
positions of local capital—Egyptian and non-Egyptian both—vis-à-vis potential foreign
partners, even while Egyptian nationals could use it to advantage in neutralizing some of
the  well-known competitive  advantages  that  had  accrued to  local  foreigners.  In  sum,
Harb’s  public-relations  campaigns  benefited,  if  unequally,  a  diverse  range  of  local
investors (Vitalis, 1995, p. 45).
As explained above, an expanding mass print media after almost a century of maturation was an
important tool in the hands of the nationalist movement, and just like with capital, the nationalist
movement was keen on having their own share of an otherwise dominated European media scene.
The history of a vibrant and old press scene in Egypt cannot be separated from the national struggle
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for independence. Modern press in Egypt had started with the French Campaign which introduced
mass  printing  in  1798  by  publishing  two  journals  Le  Courrier  de  l'Egypte and  La  Decade
Egyptienne to act as propaganda tools for the Napoleon-led French campaign in Egypt (Goldschmidt
& Johnston, 2003, p. 320).
Two decades later, Bulaq Press was established by Muhammed Ali in 1822 as the first Arabic
printing press owned by the government as part of his modernization plan, and seven years later the
first  Arabic-language newspaper,  al-Waqai'  al-Misriya was  founded as  the  government's  official
journal, and still acts as such until this day (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 90).
Established as a mouthpiece for the pro-French Levantines in Egypt, al-Ahram was established
in 1876 in Alexandria by the Christian Levantine Tiqla brothers. One year after the establishment of
al-Ahram, the humorist and nationalist writer, playwright and journalist Yaqub Sanu' established,
with the encouragement of Islamic reformists Muhammad Abduh and Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, the
satirical comic magazine Abu Naddara Zarqa, which was critical of both the Khedive in Egypt and
the Sultan in Istanbul. This first experiment to print cartoons in Egypt was short-lived because the
Khedive, growing impatient with the satire of Sanu', expelled him from Egypt in 1878. However,
Sanu’ continued to mock the Khedive from his new home in Paris (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003,
p. 352).
The growing nationalist movement culminating with the Urabi revolution and the subsequent
British  occupation  filled  the  scene  with  more  publications  representing  different—and  often
competing—interests. Al-Muqattam, established in 1988, was representing the point of view of the
British occupation. Al-Muayyad, founded in 1889 by Mustafa Riyad, was the mouthpiece of Khedive
Abbas, and was published to counter the pro-French  al-Ahram and pro-British  al-Muqattam.  Al-
Hilal  monthly magazine was established in 1892 by Jurji  Zaydan, an early theoretician of Arab
nationalism, with the aim of popularizing science in the Arabic language.
5.5 Paving the way for Arab nationalism by means of redistributing land
The important transformation towards a bigger role for national capital in the interwar period vis-à-
vis foreign capital  would continue  as  a  trend even after  World  War  II  and the collapse  of  the
monarchical order in 1952 during the years of the Nasserist republic. Three major milestone, which
signaled further nationalization of capital during the Nasser eras, were the land reform project put in
place right after the Free Officers Movement took power in 1952, the nationalization of Suez Canal
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and the resulting tamseer28 programme in 1956 and the nationalization programme of 1961.
Many  regard  the  1952  Free  Officers  Movement  (FOM)  as  a  rupture  with  the  country’s
monarchical  history.  However,  the  1952  overthrow  of  the  monarch,  and  the  subsequent
establishment of a republic along the Nile, was probably somehow a culmination of movements and
sentiments that have existed long before 1952, such as the type of economic nationalism discussed in
the previous  section.  The land reform measures,  and many of the subsequent economic policies
implemented by the Free Officers Movement cannot be separated from the national demands that
preceded 1952 of more equal access to capital to end foreign privileges and usher into a new era of
true national independence.
Almost immediately after the 1952 coup d’etat, the FOM embarked on a land reform project as
a way to gain popular support and derive legitimacy for a new regime who reached power through
extra-constitutional  channels  and wanted  to  present  itself  as  a  vanguardist  force  addressing  the
grievances of the nation. However, land reform most importantly aimed at breaking the political
power of the landed aristocrats (Abdel-Malek 2013; Al-qazzaz 1971; Hussein 1973; Margold 1957
Parsons 1959; Tingay 2005; Warriner 1953; Younis 2012). At this point, out of the 550,000 feddans
of agricultural land that was confiscated as a result, 175,000 or about a third, were confiscated from
members of the royal family. The biggest landowners (the top 0.5 percent) owned 36 percent of all
land under cultivation in Egypt then (Margold, 1957).
Table  5  shows that  the  number  of  landowners  who owned more  than  20 feddan  increased
meagerly between 1916 to 1956 from 32,000 (2 percent of total landowners at the time) to 35,000
(1.19 percent of total landowners at the time) while owners of less than 1 feddan increased quite
dramatically from 100,600 (47.4 percent of total landowners at the time) to 212,3000 (72 percent of
total land owners at the time). This indicates that even if the number of larger landowners were
stable, their relative weight had gone down dramatically.
28literally “Egyptianization”, and it refers to the process of managing assets that belonged to the European and Jewish 
communities after their outmigration as a result of the Suez Crisis.
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Prior to 1952, control over arable land had undoubtedly been translated to political power and
influence. Out of the 319 members of parliament elected in the early 1950s, more than half were big
landlords (Al-qazzaz, 1971). Kenneth H. Parsons (1959) also argues that the land reform programme
in Egypt is relatively conservative in terms of ownership and that it was based on the preservation of
private property, as the very high 200 feddan cap on ownership has only led to the redistribution of
land owned by the biggest of landlords. 
Parsons believes that the land reform law, therefore, was designed mainly to limit the economic
and political  power of individual landholders,  especially at  a period when the new regime was
trying to  consolidate  its  power. Some scholars  also  argue that  Nasser’s reforms,  in  addition  to
reducing the  political  influence  of  the  landed elite,  was  simultaneously  designed to  promote  a
politically passive peasantry. In other words, the state would provide basic services and privileges to
the  peasants  in  exchange  for  their  political  acquiescence  during  a  time  of  serious  transition
(Hussein, 1973; Tingay, 2005).
It was only natural also for the Free Officers to position themselves against what the monarchy
stood for. They tried to promote a discourse of modernization, industrialization and progressive
ideals as opposed to the monarchy’s “rural, backward and reactionary” character that was also
supported by foreign powers. The new regime was therefore hoping that by putting into effect a
cap on land ownership, excess capital will divert to industrial activity (Beinin & Lockman 1998;
Hussein 1973). Historically, capital accumulated before the time of the Free Officers was used
almost exclusively to purchase more land. After land reform was implemented figures show that
capital  was most used for the construction and purchase of property in urban centres (Abdel-
Malek, 2013).
Between 1954-1956, capital invested in industrial activities was a modest 12 million Egyptian
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pounds. In contrast, around 100 million Egyptian pounds were invested in urban property. The
regime then responded to this failure by limiting rents on new buildings, but the landowners once
again did not  invest  in  industrial  production and have either  hoarded their  money in gold or
smuggled it abroad. This is what prompted the regime to start taking a more active role in the
process  of  industrialization  and modernization,  which  eventually  led  to  the  emergence  of  the
Nasserist model of state capitalism in 1961 (Al-qazzaz, 1971).
There might be no one better to describe the political intentions behind land reform than
Nasser himself. In a 1957 speech before the parliament, Nasser said:
The overthrow of the king was a precursor for declaring the republic, a precursor for the
abolition  of  titles,  and  a  precursor  for  the  abolition  of  feudalism.  Land  reform  was  the
precursor  for  the  abolition  of  political  parties  […]  The  land  reform  law  aimed  at
comprehensive  change  in  the  prevailing  political  and  social  systems  in  the  country;  it
abolishes feudalism; it abolishes the vast estates that gave their owners social and economic
powers and privileges, which turned them into an upper class that  managed the country’s
affairs  as  they wish through control  of  the  legislature  represented by the parliament,  and
control of the executive represented by the ministries (Younis 2012: 113).
This  attack on feudal  monarchical  regimes meant  that  in  a  region mostly  ruled  by absolute
monarchies, there was a need to spread a republican anti-imperialist nationalist ideology to support
the new movement against the expected backlash from foreign superpowers, Israel that was widely
seen as the West’s planted ally in the region, and from the West’s monarchical allies in the region. In
addition to promoting an anti-colonialist and nationalist discourse, this new ideology had to also
promote unity among regimes who held these views to be able to counter this expected backlash.
This  is  why the  Arab  nationalism and  Third-Worldism championed  by Nasser  would  make the
perfect  ideology  that  encompasses  all  the  requirements  and  characteristics  needed  by  the  free
officers’ regime, and act as a safeguard against a return to a previous model of ruling and governance
in a region ruled mostly by conservative pro-Western regimes.
After Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact with Turkey, Iran and the United Kingdom with the blessing
of the United States  in 1955, Nasser was quick to react  in less than two weeks and formed an
alliance with Syria that was presented as a first step in a wider integration of the Arab world. Nasser
even dispatched forces to be situated at Iraq’s border with Syria and Turkey. He signed a mutual
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defense pact later the same year with Syria which was later joined by Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Nasser’s mutual defense pact was an attempt to isolate Iraq politically as a punishment for signing
the Baghdad Pact—which helped with establishing Western influence while trying to limit Soviet
influence in the region—without consulting Egypt’s leadership beforehand (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).
Nasser’s idea was that the Arab world should take a neutral stance in the cold war between Western
powers and the Soviet Union.
Nasser’s mouthpiece and one of his principal propaganda tools, the  Voice of the Arabs radio
station waged a media war against the Iraqi Prime Minister of the time Nuri al-Said, and repeatedly
accused him of being anti-Arab because of his “Turkish descent”. The radio station accused al-Said
of dispersing Arab officers in the Iraqi army and replacing them with Turkish officers to ensure the
subjugation of the Iraqi army and its loyalty to its “imperialist obligations” (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).
Nasser’s nationalism was not only about Arab nationalism, but also Third-Worldism. He did not
want  to  waste  an  opportunity  of  finding  allies  anywhere  to  help  with  his  struggle  against  the
expected backlash from the region’s monarchies and the international powers. Nasser, along with
Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia, was a founding member of the Non-
Aligned  Movement  established  in  Bandung,  Indonesia  in  the  spring  of  1955.  The  Bandung
Conference confirmed Nasser’s position of resistance in the minds of people,  and that  Egypt  is
seeking real sovereignty from the West, and will  seek to establish a new “progressive” order of
republics both in the region but also around the “developing” world to counter the power of the West
and its regional allies. Another milestone of this rebellion was in the autumn of the same year, when
Nasser signed the arms deal with Czechoslovakia. This arms deal was particularly important because
it  was  one  of  the  first,  and  probably  the  biggest,  arms  deal  that  did  not  come  from the  West
(Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).
Before the conclusion of the Czech arms deal, the Americans turned down an arms deal with
Nasser worth $27 million, and the excuse was that he will not be able to pay for it in hard currency.
As a reaction, Nasser asked the Chinese prime minister in the Bandung Conference to sell Egypt
arms. Since China was mostly relying on Soviet arms, the Chinese prime minister could not promise
more than passing Nasser’s request on to the Soviets. The Czech arms deal was the result of this
process, and it is widely believed that the Czechs only performed the role of the middle man between
the  Soviets  and  Egypt.  This  deal  was  hailed  in  the  Arab  world  as  a  sign  of  the  region’s
“independence” from the Western imperialist powers and one of the important signs that the region
is taking strides in its post-colonial experiment, and Nasser was no doubt the hero of this moment.
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Also, Nasser’s propaganda hailed the deal as a “momentous juncture in the historical march of Arab
nationalism.” (Dawisha, 2013, p. 168).
This arms deal and rising popularity of Nasser both among his people and in the Eastern bloc
was  quite  naturally  very  central  to  the  question  of  Israel’s  security.  The  rising  tide  of  Arab
nationalism under  the  leadership  of  Nasser  had  already  been  worrying the  then  newly-founded
Israeli  state.  According to Dawisha,  Ben Gurion was especially  worried and was looking at  the
possibility of toppling him and believed that it was a sacred obligation to do so. One of the goals of
the  offense  on  the  Egyptian-controlled  Gaza  strip  in  1955  led  by  Israel’s  Ariel  Sharon  was  to
demonstrate the incapability of Nasser’s military and to undermine his rising popularity in the Arab
world.  The  Egyptian  military  headquarters  was  destroyed  and  38  soldiers  were  killed  and  31
wounded (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).
It is important to note that Nasser did not start his political career ruling out the possibility of
cooperating with the West, and it is believed that the US was even sympathetic with the FOM ouster
of the king in 1952 (Hussein, 1973, p. 95). This will be described in the following section on his
clash with the US over its withdrawal from funding a new dam south of Aswan which led him to
nationalize the Suez Canal, and how this specific move irreversibly contaminated his relations with
the West. The souring of the relationship with the West was also due to the hesitant attitude of the
British and the American in supplying him with adequate weapons.
5.6 Suez Canal crisis and funding for the dam as a pretext for a wide nationalization movement
The last section explained the several reasons why it was logical for Arab nationalism to adopt a
model of state-led development and centralized power: the first was to break the power of the feudal
lords by means of excessive government intervention to manage, regulate and redistribute wealth.
The second reason is adopting a model that would contrast with the market economies of the West,
and the feudal and rentier economies of the region’s monarchies. The third reason is adopting a
model closer to the model developed by the country’s new allies in the Eastern bloc, and lastly is the
belief that a central strong government would be more capable of consolidating its power against the
potential backlash of Israel, the regions’ monarchies, and the Western superpowers.
As  a  result,  the  Nasserist  nationalist  ideals  of  state-led  development  (or  state  capitalism),
redistribution  of  wealth,  anti-Westernism,  and  Third-Worldism,  can  all  be  at  least  partially
attributed to many economic conditions around issues of funding for mega projects, redistribution
of wealth, and arms deals.
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What further aggravated Nasser’s relations  with the Western superpowers,  was his  dream to
build a high dam south of Aswan and south of the existing Aswan dam that would supply the needed
energy for his modernization and industrialization plan. Nasser approached the World Bank, the US
and  the  UK  to  raise  the  large  funds  needed  to  erect  the  dam,  and  they  all  expressed  initial
willingness to provide financial and even technical assistance to support the project; the World Bank
in late 1955 announced that it  agreed to lend Egypt $200 million for the project, in addition to
another $200 million mostly funded by the US government. However, Nasser’s actions against the
Baghdad Pact and the arms deal signed with Czechoslovakia naturally alarmed the West; the US and
the UK have grown increasingly impatient with him due to his warming relations with the Eastern
powers (Joesten, 1960).
After a draft agreement was signed in February 1956, the US State Department announced in
July of the same year that the US was no longer financing the dam project, and Britain and the World
Bank followed suit.  These developments were the prelude to the Suez Crisis. A week after such
announcement, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal to fund the high dam project,
which prompted the first direct widescale military confrontation between the Nasser regime and
Western powers (Britain and France) and their ally in the region, Israel (Joesten, 1960).
The Suez Canal was nationalized in 1956, but it was not until 1961’s “socialist” transformation
that the regime started its large-scale nationalization project. Nasser moved forward with this project
as he was encouraged by his rising popularity after his regime survived the nationalization of the
Suez Canal and the subsequent Suez War (Hussein, 1973: 100).
Additionally, the outmigration of some European and Jewish communities as a result of the Suez
Crisis had transferred a lot of private economic enterprise into government hands alluring it to play a
larger and more direct role in the economic sphere; this made the regime realize that it could speed
economic development and industrial transformation if it takes matters into its own hands rather than
relying on the whims and unreliability of private capital (Hussein 1973; Shechter 2008).
It was also what Nasser perceived as an economic necessity and prerequisite to modernization
that  drove  him  to  embark  on  a  massive  nationalization  programme.  Nasser’s  dream  was  to
industrialize the economy, and his aim at start was to incentivize private capital to invest more in
industry (Warriner, 1953). As discussed above, one of the main goals of land reform was to divert
capital that became available by placing a ceiling on land ownership to industrial activity. This,
however, did not yield the expected results, and the private sector had failed the regime’s hopes for
industrialization, and pushed it to pass the nationalization law in 1961 and control major industries
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in 1963 (Al-qazzaz 1971, Tarouty 2015, p. 40).
Nasser realised the importance of mass media to support all these fundamental transformations,
and once  he  began  to  establish  his  power  as  the  undoubted  ruler  of  the  country, he  started  to
propagate  his  new  doctrines  of  social  transformation  through  the  radio  to  get  across  the
government’s new  plans  and  policies  to  the  masses  (Shalabieh,  1985,  p.  2).  The  use  of  latest
technology by the Nasser regime to inform and influence larger communities was marked by the
establishment of the  Voice of the Arabs radio station, Nasser’s most significant media project that
could summarize his media policy (Shalabieh, 1985, p. 3).
The dramatic conversion to the cause of Arab nationalism, in which Nasir [sic] was to use Egypt's
extensive capabilities, particularly its unquestionable cultural dominance, was to be transmitted to
the rest of the Arab world through the medium of radio. Like no other Egyptian or Arab leader
before him, or among his contemporaries, Nasir recognized the immense power of radio, a power
which, as a dazzling orator, he had used vigorously and effectively (Dawisha, 2003, p. 147).
Although television was introduced in the 1960, its  growth was relatively slow in the early
years. It was confined to the rich urban population and was hence an ineffective tool of persuasion
compared to radio, which had already reached Egypt’s remote areas and was heard across the Arab
world (Dawisha, 2003, p. 6-7). Wilton Wynn (1959) writes in the Nasser of Egypt:
Nasser's most famous propaganda weapon was his powerful ―Voice of the Arabs radio. As
Nasser's  fame grew, this  radio  became daily  more  popular  in  the  Arab  world.  A Saudi
Arabian merchant buying a radio stipulated that he wanted a set ―that picks up the 'Voice of
the Arabs'. The Palestinian refugees in camps in Gaza and Jericho gathered in vast throngs at
public places daily to hear the fiery broadcasts of the ―Voice (Wynn, 1955, p. 133-144).
The Voice of the Arabs motto was that “the voice of the Arabs speaks for the Arabs, struggles for
them and expresses their unity”, and it defined Egypt as being in the service of the Arab nation and
its struggle against Western imperialism and its lackeys in the Arab world (Dawisha, 2003, p. 147).
Nasser‘s radio broadcasting expanded rapidly in a media scene which he made almost void of any
competing views (Khamis, 2011, p. 1160). Unlike most of his predecessors, Nasser was a charismatic
leader with massive popular support due to being perceived as a culmination of Egypt's nationalist
struggle for  independence  and a  symbol  of  a  country  falling  back into the  hands of  its  rightful
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owners. He realised the importance of the media and banked well on anti-imperialist sentiments and
a strong desire for national sovereignty that has been brewing over the preceding seven decades
(Wynn, 1959).
The 1967 humiliating defeat marked the beginning of the end of Nasser’s pan-Arabist project
and with it the Arab nationalist discourse. It was not just a defeat against Israel, but also the entire
Western powers and their allies in the region that he for a period of time managed to defy. After the
defeat, Egypt was in dire need to compensate the loss of land and revenue. Nasser's defeat and need
for money after 1967 made him give up his ideals on pan-Arabism. Adeed Dawisha argues that it
was Arab statism and not nationalism that defined the post-1967 era, and that despite the fact that
people in Arabic-speaking countries still defined themselves as Arabs, hardly any of them believed
that there could be any political unity between them, and that this change began with Nasser himself
(Dawisha, 2003, p. 254).
Dawisha continues to argue that Egypt’s acceptance of this principle was facilitated by grants
given  to  Egypt  by  its  former  oil-rich  and  conservative  adversaries.  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and
monarchical Libya paid Egypt a much-needed annual grant of $280 million to compensate for the
loss of its land and revenues making Nasser dependent on assistance from these oil-rich pro-Western
kingdoms,  whose  goals  from  the  start  was  to  fight  Nasser’s  pan-Arabist  project,  which  they
perceived as an imminent existential threat to their monarchical regimes (Dawisha, 2003, p. 255).
Haikal,  Nasser’s confidant  and the most influential  journalist  of the era,  wrote in his  book  The
Sphinx and the Commissar, that the revolutionary struggle of the pre-1967 era was now a thing of
the past due to the political power of money, in reference to the rising power of the reactionary oil-
rich countries. The Khartoum Summit, in which the terms of the grant were finalized, marked the
institutionalization of the petro-dollars power in fighting pan-Arabism (qawmiya) and promoting
instead territorial nationalism (wataniya), according to Haikal (Haikal, 1979).
I have read all of Haikal’s articles in al-Ahram from the time of the Khartoum Summit until the
death of Nasser, and none of them included criticism (not even in a mild form) of Saudi Arabia and
its  ruling elite.  We will  see in the following chapters,  how a change in the discourse about the
Palestinian question has been very central to the switch from Arab to Egypt-centered nationalism.
The Palestinians  ceased to  perceive  the  post-1967 Nasser  as  an  Arab nationalist  leader, but  the
president of a defeated state, articulating and warning against concerns on a par with concerns given
by the reactionary King of Jordan (Dawisha, 2003, p. 256).
This trend continued and was further entrenched during the Sadat era. Sadat inherited a country
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that was already too dependent on grants from the oil-rich monarchies after the losses resulting from
the war, the closure of the Suez Canal (one of Egypt’s most important sources of foreign currency),
and the decline in tourism. In 1964 tourism had brought in $86 million in foreign exchange; in 1966
it brought in $100 million; and the projections were $138 for 1967 had an armed conflict not taken
place. The minister of planning estimated that there would be a decline of $84 million in tourism
revenues  for  the 1967/1968 financial  year. Other than tourism,  it  was  estimated that  Egypt  was
losing $56 million annually in oil production due to the loss of the Sinai oil fields as a result of its
occupation (Kanovsky, 1968).
This  has  clearly made Egypt  all  the more  reliant  on aid especially  from the rising regional
powers in the Gulf, whose agenda was clearly antagonistic to the ideals of pan-Arabism. The simple
idea  was  for  each  Arab  state,  especially  Egypt,  to  stay  away  from meddling  into  their  affairs,
especially  if  this  meddling posed an  existential  threat  to  their  fragile  monarchical  orders  in  the
region. Therefore, from now on, Egypt will refrain from adopting any form of pan-nationalism and
instead develop a territorial imagination and a brand of nationalism that confines itself to Egypt’s
borders. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
5.7 Conclusion
It is impossible to determine whether national capital—whether private capital before 1956 or state
capital after 1956—in its struggle for economic gain employed nationalistic sentiments, or whether
the nationalist  movement in  its  struggle for independence sought  economic gains.  A traditional
Marxist  view  would  arguably  support  the  former  and  regard  the  nationalistic  sentiments  as  a
superstructural  phenomenon  based  on  the  substructural  mode  of  production  of  the  era.  It  is
sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  assume  an  intertwined  and  mutually  reinforcing
relationship between the nationalist  struggle for independence and the quest for economic gain
without having to determine the primacy of one over the other. 
As  we  have  seen  throughout  the  chapter,  in  the  pre-1952  era,  the  national  business  elite
associated itself with the national struggle for independence; it shaped a nationalist discourse that
had  at  its  heart  the  issue  of  economic  independence  and  mobilizing  national  capital  so  that
Egyptians can start sharing in the wealth and resources of their country. This, for a period of time,
succeeded in delaying class-based questions about the distribution of wealth and resources among
Egyptians. The nationalist struggle was seen mostly through the lens of “Egyptian against foreign”
which allowed a class of national business elite to accumulate capital and control parts of industry
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and finance in the name of the country’s quest for independence.
In the post 1952 era, issues such as breaking up the political power of the feudal elite by the new
military elite required some serious economic measures by atomizing land ownership through the so-
called land reform. These measures  were shortly  followed by a  clash with  the  US,  Britain  and
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) over the funding of the new dam, which was seen by the
emergent Nasser regime in the mid-1950s as a prerequisite to the industrial  development of the
country and its hopes for modernization. The failure to secure such funding was the first incident in a
series of events—including the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the 1956 crisis—that led to an
irreversible harm to the Egyptian-Western relationships that was only mended two decades later.
This  drove  Egypt  to  search  for  new allies  in  the  non-Western  world  which  contributed  to  the
refinement  of  a  nationalist  discourse  that  is  based  on—besides  pan-Arabism—Third-Worldism,
socialism, and anti-imperialism. 
This  project  had  ended  with  the  1967  defeat  of  the  Nasser  regime  against  Israel  and  its
subsequent  reliance  on  aid  from  its  previous  foes  in  the  Gulf  region,  which  was  implicitly
conditioned to giving up on the pan-Arabist project and abandon attempts to “export the revolution”
to Egypt’s neighbours. As we will discuss in the following chapter, from then on, Egypt will give up
on the promotion of any pan-nationalist ideology, and will (re)institute an Egyptocentric brand of
nationalism with very little interest in influencing any developments beyond its territorial borders.
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Chapter 6
Bringing Egypt back to the Western orbit (1970-2011)
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 5, the 1967 defeat was a major disruption in the post-colonial nation-
building project, and started placing Egypt and its national identity on a radically new track with
the  forging  of  new  regional  and  global  alliances.  The  massive  socio-political  and  economic
changes of the 1970s created a class of pro-state group of businessmen which are referred to in this
study as the infitah (open-door policy) businessmen or business elite.
The infitah policies caused this class of businessmen to accumulate colossal amounts of wealth
with the assistance of the state, and, therefore, became the mouthpieces for the new policies whether
it is economic liberalization or the peace treaty. In many cases, they became responsible for forging a
new national  identity  that  is  now based  on  alliance  with  the  West  (or  imperialism in  Nasser’s
discourse),  peace  with Israel  and the  consequent  tension  with most  of  the Arab world,  with  an
outbreak of a soft-Islamic revolution that was crafted by Sadat to counter both Nasserism and the
“threat of world communism”. In the spirits of the 1970s and the Cold War politics, socialism was
still seen by Sadat and his Western allies as more disruptive than Islamism. This view was short-
lived  and Sadat  had  quickly  started  clashing  with  the  Islamist  groups,  of  which  one  ended  up
assassinating him on the 8th anniversary of the 1973 war.
This chapter will present the business landscape and economic trends of this era including the
return of some business families to Egypt after their businesses had been nationalized during the
Nasser era, the beginning of the private advertising industry in Egypt to serve the emerging “private”
sector, and the rise of the state-sponsored private sector’s role in influencing nationalist discourse.
This  economic liberalization  and change in  political  orientation based on peace with Israel  and
joining the US camp in a Cold War context needed a carefully crafted official nationalist discourse to
face the inevitable opposition to such policies. This official discourse was more often than not laden
with contradictions and ended up giving Sadat more foes than friends.
These  transformations  quite  naturally  required  the  adoption  of  a  new  official  nationalist
discourse; first, the discourse undermined Egypt’s Arab character after a unanimous decision was
made  by  the  Arab  league  to  expel  Egypt  and  move  its  headquarter  to  the  Tunisian  capital.
Additionally, the undermining of Egypt’s Arab character would free it from its previously claimed
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responsibility of supporting different groups in the region with their battle against colonialism and
conservative monarchies, such as in Algeria, Palestine and Yemen; this would, therefore, facilitate
such a transition to a liberal economy and a close alliance with the US; secondly, the new official
nationalism needed then to define itself less as a champion of Third-Worldism, anti-imperialism and
less as an opponent of Western imperialism, Israel and conservative Arab monarchical rule. Lastly,
this new discourse was antagonistic to all forms and shades of socialism especially Nasserism and
communism in order to swiftly implement the liberalization process and peace with Israel and curb
any potential opposition to them.
 Sadat himself over a period of two decades switched from a defender and promoter of Arab
nationalism into its most fierce critic. In an article titled “What do the Arabs want?” written in 1957,
Sadat wrote:
There was nothing behind our coup [1952] other than Arab nationalism . . . which awakened a
new historical  development.  .  .  .  We must nurture  this  link between the people of  the Arab
nation . . .for when the revolution occurred in Egypt, it rendered the Arab nation one nation,
sharing one history and claiming one destiny (Dawisha, 2003, p. 184).
A couple of decades later after signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat—in a speech before
the parliament in the late days before his assassination—sent a clear message to the Arabs who
made the decision to boycott Egypt.
[The Arabs] push us with their escalation and attitude to estrangement . . . We are the origin of
the Arabs. Hagar, the wife of Abram, is the mother of Ishmael, the ancestor of Arabs. Hager is
Egyptian. So if there is someone out there who wants to belong, they should belong to Egypt,
not Egypt to them. There is no point in these debates about whether we belong to the Pharaohs
or not. Our blood is Arab and we are the origin of the Arabs and they belong to us (Sadat: We
are the origin of Arabs, 2009).
This chapter will discuss in detail this shift in official nationalist discourse by analyzing Sadat’s
speeches and media interviews especially after the signing the peace treaty with Israel in March
1979. This will be supplemented with analyzing other texts—literary and otherwise—from the era. 
As for the Mubarak years, the focus was still largely on Egyptian nationalism despite a relative
ease in tension with Egypt's Arab neighbours. With the emergence of a neoliberal state in Egypt in
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the  decade  preceding the  2011 revolution,  the  official  national  discourse  had  become mild  and
mundane and less populist while the few expressions of mass nationalism in this period were limited
to sports events and rivalries.
6.2 Anti-Arabism
The Nasser leadership was undoubtedly pan-Arabist, but it also saw Egypt as having a central and leading
role in an aspired Arab unity rather than merely being an equal part of it. Under Nasser, the Egyptian and
Arab brands of nationalism have conflated rather than conflicted until at least 1967 (Smith, 1997, p.
512). The relative harmony of official nationalist discourse between Egyptian territorial sentiments
and Arab regional sentiments  started fading gradually after 1967 and culminated when the Arab
world decided in 1979 to isolate Egypt following Sadat’s visit to Israel and the signing of the peace
treaty. Sadat’s mood shifted inward and decided to prioritize the interests of Egypt as opposed to
Nasser’s assertion that Egypt’s responsibility and focus is the Arab world (Shalabieh, 1985, p.193).
Sadat was very vocal in his criticism of the Arab states especially during his last years. Unlike
the following sections on Pharaonism and Islam which mostly focus on other literary texts condoned
by the state, but not directly uttered by it, this section will mostly focus on Sadat’s own discourse.
Just one year before Sadat’s visit  to Jerusalem, he was still  paying lip service to some form of
Arabism. Sadat in a speech in 1976 said:
It is crucial that the people feel through their representatives that they are an actual partner in
drawing policy and not just an audience. At the Arab level, you might remember what I have
always repeated in my talks about principles that guide our Arab policy; my belief that Arab
solidarity is a strong foundation capable of overcoming any disagreements was not just mere
optimism but  a belief  with its  deep reasoning supported by our  approach that  rejects the
policy of axes in the Arab world, and cancels theoretical categorization of Arab states […] We
are not a small nation that could be ravaged or shaken by any storm that blows. Our Arab
nation is  a  great  nation.  Great  in  all  sense;  great  for its  past;  great  for its  vast  area  and
potential; great for the justice of its causes. Such a nation deserves to achieve justice for itself
and security for others, and deserves the opening of a new world based on justice and equality
(Sadat, 1976).
Three years later after  the peace treaty, Sadat’s discourse had changed drastically, and the
Arabs have become “midgets who only appear like giants when they stand on their money”. In an
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interview with October magazine he said:
I am sorry to say that the Arabs did not change, but they have lagged behind and it is Egypt
that has changed. We were and still are more civilized and developed, and they have all been
belittled in our eyes because we are the ones who grew, and therefore we look at them from
above. I remember a joke I heard from a great political leader about a rich ugly dwarf who
married a beauty queen and she was asked: “how do you marry such man? Did you not find a
more youthful and handsome man?” to which she responded: “but you did not see how he
seemed like a giant when he stood on his money?”
They seem like giants when they stand on their money but in reality they are dwarfs. This is a
problem to which Egypt did not contribute. It is not our fault that Egypt was and will remain
a giant with all its long history, bitter struggles and international achievements, while others
seem like short people who buy golden artificial limbs to seem more youthful,  taller and
greater; they are nations without causes, and if they had a cause, it is about where, how and
when to spend their billions, but Egypt has urgent and severe causes and what the people here
suffer  is  not  today’s product  or  something  that  started during my period but  before  that
(Sadat, 1979).
Unlike Nasser who adopted an interventionist policy and actively supported regime change in
several Arab countries, Sadat advocated a more non-interventionist and isolationist approach.
Arabs used to fear that Egypt will export troubles and coups to them, and this horrendous
image Arabs have of Egypt did not change until the Khartoum summit when King Faisal has
shown generosity and provided financial support and pushed Kuwait to provide even more.
Only then Gamal Abdel Nasser felt ashamed of King Faisal and ordered an immediate halt of
hostile  action inside Saudi  Arabia.  If  there  were any reckless  actions  after  that  in  Saudi
Arabia, I am certain that Gamal Abdel Nasser was not aware of them. What’s funny now is
that Saudi Arabia has increased the level of readiness of its armed forces to combat secret
attempts by the Egyptians against the Saudi rulers, and what is bizarre is that Saudi received
this information from Syria. This happened despite my assertion from the first moment I took
office that what happens in any Arab country is none of my business, the same way that what
happens in Egypt is not the business of any other Arab country, and this is driven by respect
of the sovereignty of each state over its people and resources (Sadat, 1979).
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In this paragraph, Sadat is clear in his condemnation of Nasser’s interventionism under the pan-
Arabism banner,  and is  implying  as  discussed  in  chapter  5,  that  the  Khartoum Summit  in  the
immediate aftermath of the Six Day War and the aid given by the Gulf states to Egypt has changed
Nasser’s approach dramatically, and made him give up on his pan-Arabist progressive project and
switch his focus to affairs that take place within Egypt’s borders. Sadat goes on in this interview to
attack  the  Nasserist  categorization  of  Arab  states  into  reactionary  monarchies  and  progressive
republics, and the belief that there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except on the rubbles of
the royal palaces. “If we return back in time a little, we find that the reactionary states are the ones
who supported the progressive states. Saudi Arabia, which is the most reactionary according to that
classification, is the one who assisted Egypt, Syria and Jordan. King [Idris] Senussi is the one who
paid for the Egyptian tanks,” said Sadat in the same interview in 1979.
Sadat’s early days before the peace treaty were less antagonistic towards the region especially the
conservative monarchies in which the seeds of a reconciliation were sown in the aftermath of 1967,
and it also marked the beginning of an era in which Egypt was more in a subordinate position as an
aid recipient in relation to the rich oil-producing conservative Arab states. This new reality required
a toning down of Arab socialist discourse which Sadat has been very effective in implementing, but
the fully-fledged all-encompassing anti-Arabist discourse, only emerged in his last days as a reaction
to the immense pressure he faced as a result of his solo quest for peace with Israel.
The same way Nasser had Haikal as his confidant and ideologue, Sadat’s advocator was Moussa
Sabry. Sabry was a journalist who was appointed the Chief Editor of Akhbar al-Youm in 1975. Sabry
was in Sadat’s immediate circle of friends and advisers and accompanied him in most of his crucial
visits,  especially  those related to  the peace talks with Israel.  Most notably, Sabry wrote Sadat’s
historical speech that he gave before the Knesset in 1977, according to a testimony by Sadat’s wife
(Dream TV Egypt, 2014). Sabry in his weekly columns in Akhbar al-Youm propagated Sadat’s anti-
Arab, anti-Nasserist and anti-communist discourse, and promoted fiercely the peace decision with
Israel. Sabry was also a major promoter of the May 15 “corrective revolution” and he is the one who
reportedly coined it a “revolution”. In his column titled “This is the Arab solidarity!” published on
June 9, 1979, Sabry wrote:
The alliances of evil and greed cannot continue for long, because its nature is temporary and
it is set to achieve narrow and personal goals. Therefore, it must vanish. We have examples
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of that from our reality. The expressions of praise exchanged between the Baathist rule in
Iraq and the communist rule in South Yemen went beyond the permissible limits of praise,
when the two agreed on attacking Egypt. Back then, statements were issued to express Arab
solidarity, and discontent over Egypt’s abandonment of this solidarity because it sold itself
to imperialism, and all these clichés which have become tacky. Nevertheless, let’s see what
these combatants against imperialism have done? (Sabry, 1979a).
Sabry then  spends the  rest  of  his  column providing incidents  of  disagreements  and battles
among  those  regimes  while  continuing  to  sarcastically  calling  them  “combatants  against
imperialism”. In the same week, he wrote a column titled The myth of Arab chivalry criticizing the
position of the so-called “progressive” camp in trying to overthrow the regimes of the “regressive”
camp.
Gaddafi—while  we were trying to  tame his  excesses—wanted to  impose on us  dropping
Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf from our calculations, because from his point of
view they are regressive, and that we have to work together to overthrow their rulers! We told
Gaddafi very clearly that we gave up on intervening in the internal affairs of any other Arab
country, and that we no longer adopt this progressive-regressive division (Sabry, 1979b).
This echoes Sadat’s previous assertion about Egypt’s non-interventionist policy which clearly
refers to the era and policies of Nasser and his allies in the region. After attacking most of the Arab
regimes and highlighting their ungratefulness and hypocrisy, Sabry concludes the column by stating
that he everyday finds new evidence that Arab chivalry and morality is nothing but a myth. Sabry's
sharp pen was also used to attack Moscow and communism. In an article written by Sabry in May
21, 1978 he was mocking the Soviet Union for criticizing Egypt after  a wave of arrests against
communist Egyptians. “Moscow does not like Egypt's democracy because it is a democracy that
wants to protect itself  from Moscow's mouthpieces and from those who kneel in its sanctuary.”
(Sabry, 1978).
In a series of articles commenting on the January 1977 bread riots, Sabry described the riots as a
Moscow-instigated conspiracy.  In an article titled “Egypt is above the conspiracy”, Sabry explains
how the youth of the leftist party of the time came to his office with their resignations from the party
after they had discovered the conspiracy behind the bread riots to destroy Egypt. He quotes one of
the leftist youth as saying:
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I do not accept that the Soviet Union attacks the people of Egypt. I do not accept that Radio
Moscow assaults the dignity of Egypt. I used to believe the leaders of this party when they
used to say that the termination of the treaty with the Soviet Union is against the interests of
Egypt, and that we must maintain the friendship with the Soviet Union. But today I see the
Soviet Union as instigating the destruction and the burning of Egypt, and I have not heard a
single  voice  from  the  leftist  party  leaders.  I  have  not  read  a  single  statement  [of
condemnation], like the tens of statements that are sent to us from the part at each occasion—
not  a  single  statement  that  defends  the  sovereignty  of  Egypt,  that  attacks  Moscow  for
instigating sabotage and destruction. Yes, I discovered that I was deceived (Sabry, 1977).
6.3 Pharaonism and Westernism
It is not completely coincidental that whenever liberalism is on the rise in Egypt, Pharaonism is as
well.  The  pharaonization  of  Egypt  was  a  quasi-colonial  European  project  started  by  Napoleon
Bonaparte’s  French  campaign  on  Egypt,  and  the  subsequent  discovery  and  deciphering  of  the
Rosetta stone in 1822. This preoccupation with ancient Egypt reached its peak a century later by the
discovery of the Tutankhamun tomb in 1922 (Wood, 1998). The interest in Egyptology was more
prevalent outside than inside of Egypt. 
Egyptology  started  as  an  academic  discipline  in  Europe  in  the  late  19 th century,  and  later
proliferated into hundreds of Egyptology degrees offered by universities around Europe and the
world.  It  is  therefore  unsurprising  that  whenever  a  political  elite  wanted  to  forge  a  unique
personality from its surrounding or as part of their soft-independence project, which would not put
Egypt at  an ideological conflict  with any so-called European values of civilization,  Pharaonism
came as a very strong candidate. It was also often utilized by its liberal protagonists to criticize both
Arab and Islamic pan-nationalist projects at different periods of time (Wood, 1998).
For  example,  Taha  Hussein,  the  great  Egyptian  thinker  and  a  symbol  of  the  Egyptian
Renaissance, supported in 1937 in his influential book  The Future of Culture in Egypt (Hussein,
1996) the idea that Egypt should adopt the European ways of organizing their military and their
economy  if  it  was  serious  about  modernizing  and  developing.  This  was  Hussein's  recipe  for
independence: if we want to be independent like the Europeans, we must copy them in their ways.
If we want this mental and psychological independence which cannot happen without
scientific, literary, and artistic independence, then we would want the means for that.
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Those means are to learn the same way the European learns, to feel the same way the
European feels,  judge  the  same way  the  European judges,  act  the  same way the
European acts, and go about our lives the same way he does (Hussein, 1996, p. 45).
Taha Hussein is considered a symbol of Egyptian enlightenment and one of the most important
intellectual architects of the so-called “liberal age”. He is normally credited with establishing free
basic education in Egypt, first as a fierce advocate of establishing education as a universal right, and
then as  a  minister  of  education  who made education  more  available  and accessible  to  a  wider
population.  Hussein  became the  second  person to  earn  a  PhD from the  then  newly-established
Egyptian University (now Cairo University), and went on to study European history and philosophy
at the University of Montpellier and the Sorbonne to complete his master’s and doctoral degrees
respectively.
Hussein was not only fond of European civilizational achievements, but also a staunch supporter
of  Pharaonism  and  sees  the  Mediterranean  as  Egypt’s  natural  cultural  and  historical  habitat
(Hussein, 1996). He fiercely rejected Arab nationalism and unity which was starting to gain some
ground in the 1930s at the hand of one of its first promoters Sati’ al-Husri (Gershoni & Jankowski,
1995). Hussein wrote an article published in the 1930s that Pharaonism is deeply rooted in the
hearts of Egyptians, and that it will remain so. He asserts that the Egyptian is more Pharaonic than
he is an Arab, and that Egypt should not be asked to give up her Pharaonic character, otherwise, this
would be at par with asking Egypt to destroy the Sphinx and the pyramids, according to Hussein.
“Do not ask from Egypt more than it can give. Egypt will not join an Arab union whether the capital
is in Cairo, Damascus, or Baghdad.” (Hamed, 2017, p. 76).
Hussein  in  his  book  also  stresses  the  link  between  the  ancient  Egyptian  and  Hellenistic
civilizations, and argues that the only link Egypt has to the East is to the near Mediterranean East in
the Levant and Turkey. He finds it absurd that people in Egypt might feel a stronger connection with
people from China, Japan and India than with people from Greece, Italy and France.
One of the earliest and foundational thinkers of pan-Arabism Sati’ al-Husri wrote a long response
to Taha Hussein's article criticizing his take on the nationalist question and defending his pan-Arabist
view. Al-Husri reassured Hussein that Arab political unity does not mean bringing down the Sphinx
or  the  pyramids  as  he  had  claimed.  He  accused  Hussein  of  unnecessarily  imposing  mutual
exclusiveness between Arab and Pharaonic culture by arguing that over millennia Egypt has spoke
many languages and practiced many religions which has weakened its links to the Pharaonic past but
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without destroying its heritage. According to al-Husri, all the Pharaonic heritage that is filling up
Egypt’s museums did not produce a movement to embrace the ancient Egyptian religions or revive
its  ancient  language,  so  why  then  would  an  Arab  unity  require  the  demolition  of  Pharaonic
monuments.  “Egypt  has  distanced  itself  from  the  Pharaonic  religions  without  demolishing  the
Sphinx, and it gave up its ancient language without bringing down the pyramids,” writes al-Husri
(1938).
The 1970s saw the revival of pharaonism and rejection of all sorts of pan-nationalisms when it
comes to official nationalist discourse (Selim, 2000; Dawisha, 2003; Shalabieh 1985). Samah Selim
shows the difference between the two editions of Ne’mat Foaud’s Shaksiyat Masr (The Character of
Egypt)—the first published just right after the 1967 defeat and the second edition in the second half
of the 1970s— and detects a stress on pharaonism and territorialism in the second edition compared
to the first. Selim noticed how passages extolling Egypt’s Arabism was deleted in the later edition.
Furthermore,  Fouad’s 1974 polemic  A’idu Kitabat al-Tarikh (Rewrite History) was an attack on
Nasser’s Arab nationalist legacy and called for the rewriting of Egyptian history along Pharaonist
lines (Selim, 2000). In her call to rewrite history, Fouad suggested that Egyptians should start from
the  Egyptian  Museum  as  a  starting  point  for  creating  a  new  national  consciousness.  “In  the
Museum, the Egyptian can see the history of Egypt being weaved one thread at a time,” writes
Fouad (1974, p. 52).
Fouad then goes to explain that in the Museum where Egyptian civilization starts at the stone
age  chamber  and  ends  in  one  of  its  peaks  where  the  statue  of  Amenhotep  III,  the  father  of
Akhenaten, stands with his wife Tiye and their children in the age of the empire (Fouad, 1974, p.
52). According to Selim, this was not the only literary attack on Arab nationalism in defense of
adopting a more particularistic brand of nationalism; Husayn Mu’nis’s Misr wa Risalatuha (Egypt
and its mission) also deleted earlier sections extolling Egypt’s Arabism (Selim, 2000).
Selim argues  that  when Pharaonism started  in  the  early  20th century  as  part  of  the  broader
independence movement, it was politically more anti-Ottoman than anti-British, and culturally its
was  a  modernist  movement  that  implicitly  eschewed  what  it  saw  as  a  decadent  Arabo-Islamic
heritage.  Michael  Wood  (1998)  also  asserts  that  Pharaonism  “identified  Egypt  as  a  distinctive
territorial entity with its own history and character separate from that of the rest of the Arab and
Islamic world”.
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6.4 Islam as a cultural and legal, but not political, project
The Pharaonism of the liberal age championed by figures like Taha Hussein was not identical to that
of  the  1970s.  While  Pharaonism in  the  1930 was  mostly  used  to  escape  Egypt’s Arabo-Islamic
heritage as argued by Selim and Wood, in the 1970s it was mostly employed to undermine pan-
Arabism and was not intended to challenge the nation’s Islamic heritage in any fundamental manner.
It was in fact designed to co-exist with it. Even in the 1930s, the far-right ultra-nationalist group
Young  Egypt  managed  to  pay  allegiance  to  both  Pharaonist  and  Islamic  heritage  through  the
argument that Egyptians have always been respectful to their religions, and that modern Egyptians
can learn from their ancient ancestor the respect of the dominant religion which in this day and time
is Islam (Gershoni & Jankowski 2010, p. 235). Ni’mat Fouad herself is an example of the conflation
of  Muslim  and  Pharaonist  sentiments.  “The  Egyptian  civilization,  which  is  said  to  be  pagan,
preached Christianity and Islam because the revealed details of its art and thought, acknowledges the
unity of creation in life and a comprehensive sense of the universe. This is the basis of Islam, which
continues to promote reflection and thinking” (Fouad, 1989, p. 88).
Islam was heavily employed by Sadat and his administration to justify reversing some of the
social  and  economic  reforms  that  was  made  under  Nasser  to  fit  the  new  liberalization  of  the
economy; the Sadat regime bet that an increased religious awareness would push down the popularity
of  secular  socialist  and  Nasserist  ideals,  and  would  facilitate  both  the  political  and  economic
transformation  from a  secular, state  socialist,  Eastern-  and Southern-oriented  regime,  to  a  more
capitalist Western-oriented regime (De Smet & Bogaert, 2017, p. 216).
In the words of Nadia Ramsis Farah: “the last thirty-five years have been marked by a strident
religious ideology designed to justify the abolition of the Nasserist system and the reintegration of
Egypt into the international economic system.” (Farah, 2009).
Nasr  Hamid  Abu  Zaid  (2015)  discusses  how  shari’a was  used  to  reverse  land  reform  and
inheritance  tax,  and “all  that  had been accomplished since  the  Free Officers  Revolution  for  the
benefit of the poor”. The land reform law passed in 1954 was decided by Sadat’s government to be
against Islamic law. Accordingly, the government captured the land from families who have worked
it for more than two decades to return it to its former owners (Abu Zaid, 2015, p. 121-122).
According to Abu Zaid, the 1967 and 1973 wars ended the era of pan-Arabism and socialism in
Egypt, and people have decided to move gradually towards a fundamental view of Islamic thinking
(Abu Zaid, 2015, p. 121-122). In addition to introducing shari’a as the main source of legislation,
Sadat envisioned Egypt as “the country of science and religion” (Guindi, 1981). He wore a gilbab
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every Friday on his way to the mosque escorted by cameras to film him as he prays; a prayer sign has
started to appear on his forehead and he insisted on appearing publicly with his prayer beads, and
describing himself as “the believing president” (Guindi, 1981). Sadat was also the first president to
start broadcasting the call for prayers five times a day on national television (Abu Zaid, 2015, p.
123), while claiming to be a “Muslim president of an Islamic state” (Connect TV, 2015).
Islam at the time was promoted as a religious and cultural project but less as a political project.
Fadwa al-Guindi (1981) describes this  as allowing “alternative Islam a relatively high degree of
laissez-faire for nonmilitant activities. These nonmilitant Islamic groups enjoyed a relative freedom
of  expression  and  consequently  embarked  on  establishing  numerous  publications  with  wide
circulations including the monthly  al-Da’wa, the weekly  al-’Itisam and the bi-monthly digest  al-
Mukhtar al-Islami. These periodicals acted as the ideological organs of “alternative Islam”.
It is true that many of the Islamic groups were critical of the infitah policy, but it was mostly mild
criticism and focused on the moral implications of consuming cultural Western products, and the
impact  this  might  have  on  society.  However,  most  Islamic  groups  were  never  critical  of  the
fundamental Laissez-Faire philosophy of liberalism as long as it did not bring with it a threat to the
perceived cultural foundation of society. This is probably inspired in part by the career of the prophet
as  a  merchant,  and  his  hadith that  “Nine-tenths of  the  sustenance  (rizq)  is  derived  from  trade
(business ventures)” (Kayed & Hassan, 2013: 76). The antagonism of the loyal Nasserists and leftists
towards the infitah policy, on the other hand, was significantly more fundamental and was calling for
its full abolishment as a state policy and not only a slight modification to suit the cultural needs of a
Muslim population.
6.5 The infitah and the rise of a new elite
The open-door policy did not just coincide with the rise of Pharaonism, an Islamic revival and anti-
Arabism, but they were mobilised to facilitate such radical transformation and set the stage for it. As
discussed above, a religious (re)awakening would serve as a tool to delegitimize and dismiss any
policy  that  would  contradict  with  the  new  liberal  order  as  socialist/communist/soviet  and
consequently atheistic and therefore undesirable.
Egyptocentric  territorial  nationalism combined  with  Western  orientation  was  an  ideology  of
choice of the secular liberal business elite. They thought that pan-nationalist commitments would
hurdle the  transition to  a  liberal  economy, especially  that  for  them pan-nationalism was always
associated with a highly despised socialist doctrine and with central planning. This sentiment linking
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socialism and Arab nationalism to obstacles in the way of private enterprise was best expressed by
David Rockefeller, the head of the Chase Manhattan Bank which is one of the first foreign banks to
operate in Egypt after the open-door policy in the 1970s, after his visit to the Middle East in 1974.
I think that Egypt has come to realize that socialism and extreme Arab nationalism ... have
not helped the lot of the 37 million people they have in Egypt, and if President Sadat wants
to help them, he has got to look to private enterprise and to assistance (Mullaney, 1974).
In this view, a narrow territorial national imagination would therefore create a desired fast-track
towards a re-liberalization of the economy by freeing Egypt from its costly commitments towards its
neighbours especially with regards to the Palestinian cause. Moreover, with a Western orientation
and massive reliance on the tourism industry, a stress on that  Pharaonist  brand of Egypt would
certainly appeal to Egypt’s new allies in its new political orbit.
A quick comparison between the names of the companies from the pre-infitah era and the post-
infitah era is quite indicative of that shift. Companies established under the Nasser regime would
typically include the words “Arab” or Nasr (victory) such as the Arab Contractors (est. 1955), Arab
Company for Foreign Trade, Nasr Export and Import Company (est.  1958), and the state-owned
automobile company Nasr (est. 1960). In the post-infitah era, many of the large companies’ names
reflected the spirit of the time, such as Ceramica Cleopatra (est. 1983), Americana (est. 1979) and
Orascom Construction (est. 1976) whose logo is a pharaoh holding a hammer. In the late 1970s and
the 1980s there was also a proliferation of Islamic businesses carrying Islamic names.
Gouda Abdel-Khalek (1981), argues that the infitah (opening up) is an inaccurate description of
the shift in the 1970s because it implies that what preceded it was inqhilaq (closing down). Instead,
Egypt did not leave a state of autarky in favor of more exchange with the outside world because
Egypt  was already open to the outside world.  What  happened,  according to  Abdel-Khalek,  was
having less exchange with the Eastern Bloc countries and more with the so-called Developed Market
Economies  (DMEs).  He  argues  that  the  infitah  did  not  simply  mean  looking  outside,  but  it
specifically meant “turning northwest” and was a process of realigning and restructuring Egypt’s
economic alliances.
Under the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), bilateral trade agreements
were scrapped by the government. This step favoured trade with developed economies at the expense
of trading with the Eastern Bloc and so-called Third-World countries. It also meant that the state has
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less say in planning priorities for foreign trade. Infitah then, according to Abdel-Khalek, was more a
process of opening the Egyptian economy wide open for Western goods at the expense of national
industry, and that the policy of “open-door” merely means opening the door to consumer goods from
capitalist industrialized countries. According to this view, consumer goods are easier to handle than
intermediate and capital goods. Therefore, deregulating the import industry encourages the import of
consumer goods giving it an immediate boost, but also a future boost for the negative impact this
policy would have on national production and products. It is true that the 1970s was also notorious
for directing available capital for investments in importing and then trading the imported products
rather than in manufacturing for the quick and easy profit it provides.
Abdel-Khalek proves this argument using foreign trade statistics. He noticed that DME’s share in
imports to Egypt fell until 1967, stabilizes through 1971 and rises afterwards whereas the Eastern
Bloc’s share behaves in the exact opposition fashion. A noteworthy remark is that the combined total
of both blocs remained stable, which means that for the two blocs, trade with Egypt is more akin to a
zero-sum game, where the gains of one bloc has to be at the expense of the other. From Table 6, it is
obvious that when the imports of one bloc increases, the other almost always decreases. 
Marvin G. Weinbaum (1985) shares Abdel-Khalek’s assertion that Egypt did not go from a state
of isolation during the Nasser years to a state of opening up during Sadat. He mentions that between
1957 and 1964 trade as a share of national income ranged between 36 and 43 per cent with an
external debt bill reaching more than $2 billion. He argues that the major changes during the Nasser
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period is not the volume of trade but the decrease in Egypt’s trade with its traditional partners in the
West in favour of Eastern planned economies.
Weinbaum also goes on to explain Sadat’s economic and political dependence on direct financial
assistance from the increasingly affluent conservative Arab states, at least until the boycott of the
late 1970s when Egypt mostly relied on US aid for that matter. To prepare the stage for this new
shift, the government had jailed Egyptian communists in 1971 and expelled 25,000 Soviet military
advisers in July 1972. Egypt tried to make up for its lack of  exportable oil by sharing in the region’s
oil-driven growth by exporting skilled labour to its oil-rich neighbours (Weinbaum, 1985).
The  new  ideological  change  was  therefore  intimately  intertwined  with  the  socioeconomic
changes of the era. This chapter does not argue that one lead to the other and one was the cause and
the other the effect, but rather that the economic forces and the ideological forces of the time were
mutually reinforcing. It is important to note that when the rise of Egyptocentric nationalism at the
expense  of  Arab nationalism is  discussed,  it  is  not  meant  that  no  residues  of  Arab  nationalism
remained in  official discourse or that under Nasser there was no elements of Egyptocentrism or even
Islamism. Since the Urabi revolution, Egyptianism, Arabism and Islamism have been all present at all
times but with different intensity, and this study is only trying to measure the relative rise or fall of
the different Egyptian nationalisms. In many cases also these brands were more harmonious than at
other times, as was a dominant Arab nationalism harmonious with Egyptocentrism in the 1960s, but
then both became in conflict and almost mutually exclusive in the 1970s which was also the case in
the 1930s. Similarly, Islam and Pharaonism seems to have coexisted to a certain degree in the 1970s,
but might have been more conflictual in the 1930s.
This  consequential  reordering  of  Egypt’s political  and  economic  orientation  resulted  in  the
restoration of Egypt’s business elite which was active before the 1961 nationalization programme. In
the 1960s, the regime used to appoint the previous owner of the nationalized companies as their
chairmen in their public sector form. Some of these companies returned to their owners in the mid-
1970s,  or at  least  the previous owners were allowed to establish similar companies in the same
industry. Some of the business leaders of the time agreed to continue leading their enterprises as
chairmen even if they lost ownership of the company such as Osman Ahmed Osman; others such as
Onsi Sawiris and Ahmed Abbud chose to leave the country. However, in many cases ownerships
were  restored  as  a  result  of  the  infitah  policy,  and  even  when  it  was  not,  many  of  such
businesspersons and families chose to return and start a new enterprise. The different ways in which
private  business  activity  was  restored  in  the  1970s  could  be  summed  up  as  follows:  the
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businessperson had never left and remained at the top of the company even after it was nationalized,
and then ownership was restored under Sadat and they returned to their  previous status as both
chairmen and owners (e.g. Osman Ahmed Osman).
the businessperson had left the country after their company was nationalized and therefore had no
control over the nationalized business. The person/their family would return to Egypt after the
infitah policy gaining control and ownership of their previous company or establishing a new one
(e.g. Onsi Sawiris and Lotfi Mansour).
Most  of  the  current  giant  business  conglomerates  and billionaire  tycoons have  founded (or
refounded) their business in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 open-door policy. Although, the
state  did  denationalize  the  previously  nationalized  businesses,  it  allowed the  former  owners  to
establish new private companies (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, p. 111). Most of these new private
businesses worked as local agents for international and especially American multinationals, which
was the area with the most potential for growth after decades of attempts at Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) and heavy restrictions on importing consumer products. While the bitter taste
of nationalization was still fresh in the memory of these businessmen, this model of acting as local
agents was suitable for a business community that wanted to take limited risk. Acting as agents
meant  that  there  was  no  investment  in  heavy machinery  or  a  large  labour  force  that  could  be
expropriated by the government (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, p. 111).
One of the most important names in that regard is Onsi Sawiris, the patriarch of Egypt’s richest
family which consists of himself and his three sons, of which each is a dollar billionaire in their own
right (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015, p. 141). Onsi Sawiris established a construction company in 1950,
which was nationalized by the Nasser government in 1961 (Orascom official website, n.d.). Five
years after the nationalization of the company in 1966, Sawiris left to Libya to pursue construction
business elsewhere. He only returned 12 years later after Qaddafi and Sadat had a tense relationship
leading many Egyptian including Onsi to return to Egypt now that the atmosphere was becoming
more  favourable  for  business  in  Egypt.  Onsi  returned  to  Egypt  and  established  (or  rather  re-
established) a construction company calling it Orascom which would grow to become a giant multi-
national  business  group  that  has  international  investments  in  different  industries  including
construction, telecommunication, and tourism. In the spirit of the time, Orascom’s first logo was that
of a Pharaoh’s face (Tarouty, 2015: 94). The Sawiris family in the early days after their return to
Egypt  acted  as  an  agent  for  a  number  of  multinational  companies  including  German  Siemens,
American AT&T, Swedish Volvo and French Alcatel (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015: 112).
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The Mansour family has a very similar story. Also consisting of a patriarch Lotfy Mansour and
three sons Mohamed, Yasin and Youssef. Just like the Sawiris family, the three sons of the Mansour
family are each responsible for a business line constituting different parts of a giant conglomerate.
Lotfy Mansour started a cotton business in 1952 which was later nationalized by Nasser. Mansour
then left to Sudan to work in the cotton industry there, until the company he was working for was
also  nationalized.  He  then  worked as  a  cotton  broker  in  Switzerland  before  returning  to  Egypt
following the infitah to start a new business (Hazlehurst, 2016). The company established in 1975
became the agents for General Motors, Ford,  Chevrolet  and Caterpillar, and then later American
brands such as Marlboro, Merit, L&M and McDonald’s (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015, p. 141; Zayed &
Hussein 2011). According to Forbes rich list, the Mansour family, along with the Sawiris family, are
the two richest business families in Egypt and among the richest in Africa (Forbes, 2017).
Not all businessmen of the pre-nationalization era were sidelined and some were co-opted and
became important figures of the Nasserist order. Unlike the Sawiris and the Mansour families, many
businessmen have chosen to stay and work with the new regime as corporate bureaucrats or a state
bourgeoisie.  One of  the  most  prominent  of  these  examples  was Osman Ahmed Osman.  Osman
established  a  small  engineering  company  in  the  late  1940s,  which  grew  to  become  the  Arab
Contractors company which won a $48 million contract to construct part of Nasser’s own dream
project,  the Aswan High Dam. Like most major companies,  Osman’s Arab Contractors was also
nationalized.
However, Osman did not leave the country and still led the company as its chairman even if he
ceased being its owner. However, Osman was allowed by the Nasser regime to run branches of his
business abroad as a private enterprise. Despite his close relationship with Nasser, Osman had an
even closer  relationship with Sadat  and brokered deals between the new Sadat  regime and the
Muslim Brotherhood for them to counter the power of Nasserist and leftist groups. He then served
as the Minister of Housing under Sadat, and his son wedded Sadat’s daughter (Tarouty, 2015: 42).
Although,  Arab  Contractors  was  never  denationalized,  Osman  was  allowed  to  establish  a  new
construction  company  in  1974—one  year  after  taking  over  the  Ministry  of  Housing—taking
advantage of the new investment law which signaled the start of Sadat’s open-door policy (Osman
Group Website).
Hassan Allam, a construction tycoon, shares a story similar to that of Osman Ahmed Osman.
Allam established his construction company in 1936 to become one of the biggest  construction
companies  in  Egypt  owned by an Egyptian.  The company continued to  be a  giant  until  it  was
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partially nationalized in 1961 and then it was fully nationalized by 1964. A year after the enactment
of the open-door policy in 1975, Hassan Allam was allowed to establish a private construction firm
called  Hassan  Allam  Holding,  which  is  still  operational  until  today  and  is  among  the  largest
construction companies in Egypt.
6.6 The Afghan War and the Mubarak years
The Soviet-Afghan war was an important milestone that further established Islamism as a forceful
power in the political, culture and economic spheres. The  Mujahideen fighting the Soviets in the
Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 received large support from the US but also from regimes allied with the
US such as Sadat’s Egypt and Israel. Sadat already allowing Islamists to operate to counter Nasserist
and Leftist influence, went a bit further by agreeing with the American administration to train and
equip the Mujahideen for the war (Cooley, 2000, p. 32).
Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national adviser at the time, who is also widely considered to be the
architect of Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan, visited Sadat in early 1980 to discuss delivering arms and
training the Mujahideen in Pakistan to fight the Soviets. Egypt under Sadat, and as part of the US
cold war efforts, engaged for the first time in a war by the side of the US and against the Soviet
Union.  According to John K.  Cooley, Sadat  had completely focused his  attention on the Soviet
Union and described it as more dangerous to the world than Adolf Hitler had ever been (Cooley,
2000, p. 32).
The Soviets undoubtedly thought of Sadat as ungrateful and considered his actions a slap on the
face,  especially  when  he  allegedly  handed  Soviet  SAM  missiles  to  military  researchers  at  the
Pentagon and of course after the prominent expelling of the Soviet advisers in 1972. “Neither were
Soviet observers astonished to see President Sadat, in 1980, building popular backing for his still
unpublicized, if not truly secret, military support to the Soviet Union’s adversaries in Afghanistan.
He began trying to create committees to raise money and volunteers for Afghanistan, and against the
“threat of world communism.” (Cooley, 2000, p. 32).
Rather than to only appease the US and Israel, Sadat might have thought that supporting jihad in
Afghanistan will also appease Islamist groups angry at the peace treaty with Israel and at  Sadat’s
reception of the deposed Shah of Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Cooley,
2000, p. 32). However, Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Islamist groups demonstrate that this
might have been a gross miscalculation.
Conventional wisdom seems to suggest that Hosni Mubarak’s rule was a mere continuation of
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Sadat’s  policies.  Although  the  transition  from  Sadat  to  Mubarak  can  hardly  be  considered  a
substantial rupture as in the case of the transition from Nasser to Sadat, Mubarak was generally more
prudent than Sadat and this had its own policy implications.
First, Mubarak worked on mending relations with his Arab neighbours, especially the Gulf states
but also Gaddafi’s Libya, and have succeeded considerably. After ten years of being expelled from
the Arab League, Egypt managed to re-enter and restore the Arab League to its original headquarters
in Cairo after being hosted by Tunis for 10 years. One year after, Egypt joined a US-led coalition to
liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion in the Gulf War of 1990. This intervention established Mubarak
as a hero in the Gulf countries especially in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Just before the Gulf war, Egypt’s economy was seriously struggling. In 1990-91 Egypt's budget
deficit was 20 percent of GDP, inflation was soaring, foreign-debt service was consuming half of
Egypt’s inflows of  foreign currency, and foreign reserves  covered barely two months'  worth of
imports, which imposed a serious food security issue given that Egypt then imported half of its
wheat  needs.  Mubarak  was  quick  to  join  the  US-led  alliance  to  liberate  Kuwait  from Saddam
Hussein's invasion, and he was rewarded by the forgiving of $20 billion-worth of debt owned by
America,  the  Gulf  states  and  Europe,  and  about  another  $20  billion  were  rescheduled  (The
Economist, 1999). One year after the forgiving of the debt, Egypt embarked on an IMF-sponsored
structural adjustment programme aimed at liberalizing the economy and privatizing the public sector
of the country.
These developments signaled the start of the second neoliberal wave that culminated with the
rise of Gamal Mubarak and his clique challenging the power of the old guard bureaucrats and
military generals. Due to the absence of wars and military conflicts, and the neoliberal promise of
global borderless prosperity, the nationalist discourse of the Gamal Mubarak clique, which was
effectively  ruling  the  country  the  decade  before  the  2011  revolution  erupted,  was  mild  and
mundane,  especially  in  contrast  with  the  populist  developmental  struggle-based  nationalist
discourse of earlier periods.
David Harvey (2005) explains the tension in which the neoliberal state deals with the question of
nationalism. Harvey argues that the neoliberal state is expected to set the stage for market functions
and only intervening enough to ensure that. On the other hand, the neoliberal state needs to behave
as a competitive entity in global politics under a neoliberal world order that discourages protectionist
policies. “In its latter role it has to work as a collective corporations, and this poses the problem of
how to ensure citizen loyalty. Nationalism is an obvious answer, but this is profoundly antagonistic
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to the neoliberal agenda” (Harvey, 2005, p. 79). Neil Davidson also argues that neoliberalism needs
nationalism to recreate a cohesion at the political level which was lost at the social level by the
implementation of neoliberal policies (Davidson, 2008).
Blommaert (2005, p. 234) argues that what we may identify as ‘nationalism’ in recent decades
(the decades of neoliberalism) is a new form of ‘statism’, where the state is searching for reinforced
authority in symbolic fields such as culture and language because of the gradual erosion of its role
and authority in ‘hard’ domains such as the economy, monetary affairs, social policies, international
relations  or  defence.  Nationalism  under  Gamal  Mubarak’s  neoliberal  condition  has  therefore
belonged more to the symbolic than to any of the “hard” domain.
Since the neoliberal state needs to mobilize nationalism in order for a nation-state to succeed at
the level of a world market and to ensure citizens’ loyalty amidst an austerity state that does not
provide as much in terms of social services, this nationalism cannot go too far as to threaten global
market forces which it is supposed to advocate. Developmental nationalism is therefore excluded as
a model,  especially in developing countries,  because it  encourages protectionist  policies and the
closing down of  borders  through erecting tariff  barriers  for Import  Substitution Industrialization
(ISI). In the case of Gamal Mubarak, the political elite was mostly formed of a Western-educated
civilian business  class  of  which many are dual-citizens trying by means of a  neoliberal  passive
revolution (De Smet & Bogaert, 2017, p. 222) to take over power from an old military/bureaucratic
elite  that  has  no  deep  connection  to  the  outside  world,  and who would  often  adopt  a  populist
nationalist discourse.
Therefore, one of the main avenue left for expressions of mass nationalism was during football
tournaments, especially between 2006 and 2010 when Egypt won three African cup of nations in a
row and came close to qualifying to the World Cup for the first time in 20 years in an event that
provoked a violent face-off with regional rivals Algeria. Gamal Mubarak used to attend the key
games in person, and would spend time with the national team players in the dressing room and
made sure the media would capture these moments.
His brother Alaa Mubarak made a phone-in in one of the sports  shows after Egypt’s defeat
against Algeria and some allegedly violent episodes around the game in Sudan where Alaa and
Gamal Mubarak were attending themselves. In the phone call he said: “Egypt is worthy of respect.
No one can humiliate us. Those who humiliate us will have to pay the price for it […] They envy us.
I can understand [their aggression] because they have a complex about Egypt.” (GigaManMedia,
2009). Hosni Mubarak himself addressed the parliament a few days after the disqualification from
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the World Cup using a highly nationalistic speech assuring listeners that the protection of Egyptians
abroad is the responsibility of the state (BBC, 2009). This happened after news reports that Egyptian
interests in Algeria have been attacked by angry football fans.
Media under Sadat and Mubarak was still tightly controlled by the state despite the introduction
of some cosmetic changes. Radio was utilized by Sadat the same way it was by Nasser to publicize
and  persuade  the  nation  with  his  peace  plan,  but  Sadat  in  his  era  had  a  new media  weapon:
television.  Shalabieh  (1985:  210)  argues  that  television  influenced  the  way  Sadat  and  Begin
behaved during the peace talks. By knowing that the whole world was watching, they seem to have
been self-conscious about the long-lasting effect they were creating by engaging in these peace
talks.
However, television,  even more so than the press,  was under Sadat's  total  control.  Although
Sadat permitted the formation of political parties and a few independent media outlets especially in
press, his rule and control of media production was almost absolutist and did not differ much from
Nasser except only cosmetically. Therefore, he utilized different forms of media to propagate the
country's new political line and towards the end of his rule have had many writers, politicians and
journalists who opposed him put in jail and then introduced even more restrictive measures on the
press (Khamis, 2011).
Mubarak, at least in the early years of his rule was an extension of Sadat's policy when it came
to media control. Same restrictions were applied during the era of Mubarak on journalists and the
media until the introduction of satellite television which offered an uncensored alternative to state-
owned media. This was also accompanied with the introduction of independent and private press
and the emergence of the Internet (Khamis, 2011, p. 1161). The Mubarak regime still carried out its
occasional crack down on media and journalists when they took a clear opposing stance against any
official  narrative  (Kenner,  2010).  Despite  the  continuous  attempts  to  control  new  media
technologies,  these new and diverse media outlets  meant that for the first time since the 1952
revolution Egypt managed to shift  from a highly monolithic media scene to a somewhat more
dynamic one which played a significant role in the build up to the 2011 revolution (Khamis, 2011).
6.7 Conclusion
In 1974, Sadat embarked on an economic liberalization programme aimed at reversing most of the
economic measures taken during the 1950 and 1960s, namely land reform and nationalization. In
order to do so, Sadat needed to craft a new national identity that would suit the requirements of the
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new era. A religious awakening, a rejection of pan-Arabism and Third-Worldism seemed to have
been the new regime’s strategy to face resistance to the new unpopular policies.  
In the Cold War politics of the time, the US embraced these changes and brokered a peace treaty
with Israel in Washington, D.C..  This led to denunciation from almost  all  Arab countries.  They
accused Sadat of betraying the Palestinian cause by not linking an Israeli evacuation of the West
Bank, Gaza and Arab East Jerusalem to the Israeli commitment to evacuate Sinai. Sadat reacted by
drawing  closer  to  the  US.  In  public  speeches,  he  termed  the  Arab  leaders  “dwarves  and
ignoramuses” with “putrid and corrupt” minds (Cooley, 2000). This led Sadat’s regime to not just
reject  political  pan-Arabism,  but  also  any  form of  Arabism  including  cultural,  and  resort  to  a
nationalist discourse that positions itself against and claims superiority over Arabs . In order to do so,
an identity that stresses the uniqueness of Egypt even compared to their  closest  neighbours was
crafted. This identity drew heavily on Egypt’s Pharaonic history. The re-emergent business elite of
Egypt  embraced  this  Pharaonism and Americanism as  was  clear  from the  symbols,  names  and
economic activities of their companies. However, as we have discussed earlier  in the study, this
Americanism did not survive well. Recent political and economic developments has led those who
rose to power and accumulated wealth as the result  of an alliance with the US in the 1970s to
sponsor some of the most anti-American sentiments in 2013.
Mubarak’s policies is usually perceived as an extension of Sadat’s, but there was still significant
differences characterized by Mubarak’s non-confrontational character who managed, for example, to
mend relations with the Arab states—especially the oil-rich Gulf states—and restore the headquarters
of the Arab League to its former city, Cairo. During the first two decades of the Mubarak rule—
before the neoliberal turn took full effect with the rise of Gamal Mubarak—stresses on territorial
Egyptian nationalism and Egypt’s Pharaonic identity, and the increased Islamization of the cultural
sphere continued. 
However, these brands of nationalism were more reconciled with a better relationship with Arab
countries due to the structural economic crises that culminated in Egypt in the late 1980s, and that led
to reliance of all sorts of economic support and lifelines from the oil-rich Gulf states. Although, there
was plenty of emphasis on “Arab Brotherhood” in the official discourse, this was in no way the kind
of  Arabism  propagated  by  Nasser,  but  was  more  of  a  conservative,  US-led  alliance  as  was
demonstrated in both the Soviet-Afghan war and the first Gulf (Kuwait liberation) war.
The  project  of  a  young  mostly  Western-educated  neoliberal  elite  in  the  first  decade  of  the
millennium was to finish whatever little remained of the developmental postcolonial militaristic state
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that  was established in the 1950s and the 1960s in Egypt,  and inspired much of the nationalist
discourse  adopted  since  at  least  the  establishment  of  the  republic  in  the  1950s.  Giving  up  on
nationalism altogether in favour of cosmopolitanism and globalization was not an option due to the
nature of the neoliberal state as being in competition with other states in a globalized world with no
trade or capital barriers. This kind of tension characterized the attempts of a shock transformation
from a developmental militaristic state to a neoliberal civilian one, and gave way to an incoherent




Throughout this study, I tried to explore how did the ultra-nationalist and nationalist discourse of the
June 30 period serve a group of businessmen who helped with the dissemination of such discourse. I
analyzed the propagated discourse critically by going beyond the text to examine why and how it
was produced. In order to do so, this exploration needed to be historicized especially in a field like
nationalism which heavily draws on imaginings of the past, but also to demonstrate how the past is
continuously reconstructed and re-imagined based on present conditions. Therefore, I also explored
the historical pedigree of the June 30 discourse to serve two functions: first it worked to show the
history of how economic interests played a prominent role in shaping the nationalist discourse of
economic elites; second, it worked to demonstrate the nationalist resources that the June 30 business
elite and media drew from, and where it corresponds to previous forms of nationalism and how it
differs. 
In order to achieve this goal, I have tried to answer a research question through answering a list
of sub-questions. The first sub-question was about identifying the key messages of such discourse,
and the discursive techniques to  be used as a starting point for exploring the functions  of such
messages and techniques. The second sub-question was on whether nationalist hysteria is a one-
dimensional phenomenon or does it have a rational dimension to it. One of the studies starting points
was challenging the idea that the discourse of rational agents could be reduced to “hysteria” even if
this is how it appeared at face value.
The third sub-questions was about the possible economic interests that led the producers of such
discourse to take this position. It was demonstrated throughout the text that the discourse at hand
was heavily influenced by the movement of capital. For example, the economic role of the US was
becoming more and more irrelevant due to the rise of oil-rich Gulf countries, and this was reflected
in an Egyptocentric discourse that was highly anti-American but at the same time toned down on the
anti-Arab component of previous Egyptocentric discourses.  
The fourth sub-question was trying to examine whether these media outlets were a profitable
enterprise in and of themselves. Of course these media outlets could have been established and this
discourse employed to generate traffic and therefore profits. Although it is extremely difficult to find
financial  data  for  media outlets,  the  study made it  clear  that  direct  profits  was not  the goal  of
establishing these media outlets and that most of them were non-profitable. Having proved that these
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media outlets were not self-contained and self-sufficient systems, it was left to be explored the "real"
functions and purpose of these outlets.
This study has made and covered some general and specific pronouncements about the field of
nationalism. The general ones regard the study of non-European nationalisms, or nationalisms in
countries that are perceived as not having reached a stage of advanced capitalism, or the so-called
“periphery”. It argued, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, that since at least the emergence
of the modern nation-state, Egypt has been part of the global and historical developments and its
brands  of  nationalism  have  echoed  that  of  German  romantic  nationalism  at  times,  populist
nationalism when it was the global trend, and non-populist neoliberal nationalism also when it was
the historical mode and global trend. The findings of the study show that the link nationalism has
with the organization of economic life, whether capitalist or not, was just as strong as in “advanced”
European capitalisms.
For example, this research was initiated before Brexit took place, and before the rise of Donald
Trump in the US, Victor Orbán in Hungary, Matteo Salvini in Italy and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.
However, by the time of its finishing it became clear that this nationalist rise was not peculiar to
Egypt and is a global trend as a reaction to a global economy in deep crisis; it becomes clearer by the
day that  the  globalization  order  is  under  serious  threat,  and that  faith  in  issues  like  free  trade,
multiculturalism, and liberal democracy constituted around a centrist consensus is dwindling as a
result of an economic crises that was brought about by the forces of globalization and neoliberal
consensus.  As discussed in the introduction,  for the  New York Times’  former Cairo bureau chief
David Kirkpatrick, the June 30 was reminiscent of the rise of ultra-nationalism in Europe in the
1930s, but it is also perhaps reminiscent of the rise of ultra-nationalism in Europe in this day and
age; it could even be argued that the rise of nationalism in Europe is reminiscent of its equivalent in
Egypt. 
The study argued that the national ideology of Egypt as an “Eastern” nation has seldom, if at all,
been motivated and driven by pure mysticism, irrational dogmatic faith and passion (characteristics
that  have  typically  been  attributed  to  the  East),  and  has  mostly  been  driven  by  rational
considerations.  Even  when  it  is  related  to  seemingly  faith-based  systems  such  as  religion,  it
remained largely fluid and always ready to metamorphose depending on rational considerations. 
The use of  “rationalism” throughout the study was not meant to act a positive attribute, and was
far from being a word of praise.  In this study, it  was used to denote that careful strategies and
planning have always been employed by promulgators of official and bourgeois nationalism to serve
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their economic interests and maximize their economic gains. In many cases, this strategizing and
planning was carried out by the so-called economic man, the heroic figure of modern capitalism
whom John Stuart Mill defines as “a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of
judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (Sedlacek, 2013: 22). The study
demonstrated how this was the case temporally across all eras and thematically across all brands of
nationalism in Egypt, including in its anti-imperialist forms.
This  should not  be misinterpreted as an echoing of classical  economic theory that  all men
always seek to maximize utility as consumers and profits as producers. Instead, economic men
should be understood as some men (the economic elites) who seem to prioritize the maximization
of their wealth and power without denying the existence of other drives and motives and without an
attempt to universalize the claim and extend it to all mankind as is the case with classical economic
theory.  The  study  was  focused  on  the  nationalism  of  economic  elites,  who  are  by  definition
primarily preoccupied and driven by economic interest.
There  is  good reason to  believe  that  the  ideological  standpoints  of  such economic  men are
largely influenced by their economic interests. This conclusion would help us answer at least the
first  part  of  our  research  question  regarding  “the  function  of  the  articulation  of  a  nationalist
discourse by the media owned by Egypt's infitah businessmen in their opposition against the rule of
the Muslim Brotherhood in the period leading up to the ouster of Mohamed Morsy in 2013?”.
A major function served, as argued throughout the study, is of economic nature. When I made the
decision to study the media, it was not to argue that this was a dominant nationalist discourse, or if
the watching “masses” adopted such discourse; it was stressed that this is not a reception study, and
media was only a tool to study the discourse of a business elite that chooses to “speak” and influence
discourse through investing in media outlets. Whether the receivers are influenced or not was not
within the scope of this study. However, I would be more inclined to give a negative answer because
if this was the case, than the structure/superstructure configuration could then be universalized to
include the whole society whose ideology, culture and beliefs would be a mere consequence of the
economic interests of its business elites.
For this reason, I consider this to be a study of power rather than hegemony in the Gramscian
sense  because  it  distinguishes  power  from  mere  force  or  violence  in  that  power  addresses
individuals without annulling their capacity as agents. On the contrary, it presupposes their capacity
as agents, and power in that sense only exists in relation to individuals who are free to act in one
way or another (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 5). The June 30 persuasive discourse of the
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anti-Brotherhood  media  is  evident  that  the  agency  of  the  addressees  and  consumers  of  this
discourse was presupposed by the infitah businessmen media. The study also argued that since the
economic  terrain  which  the  business  elite  operated  in  was  characterized  by  “primitive”
accumulation, the business elite is unlikely to have been functioning as a hegemonic class in the
Gramscian sense of the term.
Gramsci  himself  divided the  superstructure  into  two levels:  one  is  civil  society  that  is  the
totality of the organisms that are called private and the other level is the State (or the political
society).  For  Gramsci,  the levels  of  the civil  society corresponds to  the function of hegemony
which the dominant group exercise throughout society, whereas the level of political society (or the
State) corresponds to “direct domination”. For Gramsci, the two functions are connected where the
hegemonic  function  is  driven by the  prestige  and confidence  enjoyed by the  dominant  groups
because of their function in the world of production. On the other hand, the complementary role of
coercive  power  exercised  by  the  state  targets  those  who  do  not  consent  in  order  to  enforce
discipline on them (Gramsci,  1971, p.  12).  The issue of “consent” is  therefore very central  to
Gramsci’s hegemony. As discussed in Chapter 1, for Gramsci, the ability or the motivation of the
“dominant” groups to drive consent from the masses using cultural hegemony at the level of civil
society is questioned in settings that are rent-based and where capitalism is not advanced. 
The other general thread that weaved throughout the study was the fluid nature of nationalism
that perhaps answers the second part of the research questions about the historical pedigree behind
the discourse uttered around the events  of  June 30.  We have seen that  nationalism could be a
progressive or regressive force; an inclusive or an exclusive mechanism or a blend of both; anti-
imperialist,  or  a  proponent  of  imperialism.  It  could  be  secular  or  religious.  It  could  comprise
democracy or authoritarianism. It could be nationalism from below, or nationalism from above.
This fluid nature was manifested throughout the study, but in this closing chapter, I would like to
remind of the changing position of the infitah businessmen from the official nationalism under which
they started their process of wealth accumulation. Tarek Nour went from being a businessman who
had  close  links  with  America  to  the  extent  that  he  would  name  his  first  advertising  agency
Americana, to a businessman who would hire a TV host who is a fierce critic of the US, and would
give a powerful platform for anti-American sentiments. As a quick reminder, I will bring out this
quote by Ibrahim Eissa uttered on Tarek Nour’s channel once again for further reflection.
Today is the day of independence. We didn’t just triumph over extremism and bigotry. We
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didn’t just triumph over snobbery, exclusion, arrogance, stubbornness, blindness, dullness and
tediousness.  No,  we triumphed over America.  Today is  a victory over America (Huna al-
Qahira 27-7-2013).
It is true that later Ibrahim Eissa’s show was suspended, but it is almost certain that this was
because of his anti-Saudi pronouncements and not the anti-American. Eissa’s suspension due to his
anti-Saudi sentiments is a further proof of the second most important diversion from the baseline
infitah discourse, that is, the strong views regarding the inferiority of Arabs to Egyptians. It is also
worth noting that Eissa ended up—despite his highly anti-American discourse presented in Chapter 2
—hosting a show in al-Hurra television, which is an American channel funded by the US government
to promote the image of the United States in the Arab world (McCarthy, 2004)
The historical pedigree of such nationalist discourse is therefore minimal without so much in
common with past discourses. It is more characterized by violent ruptures with the past than with
continuity; therefore, instead of Anthony Smith’s argument that “perhaps the central question in our
understanding of nationalism is the role of the past in the creation of the present” (Smith, 1999: 180;
my  italics),  the  study  would  conclude  by  asserting  that  “perhaps  the  central  question  in  our
understanding of nationalism is the role of the present in the creation of the past”.
The study adopted  a  modernist  view to  study a  recent  nationalist  phenomenon in  Egypt  by
examining the role of capital in influencing nationalist discourse. Despite its name, the modernist
view  was  not  adopted  in  this  study  to  argue  that  nationalism  is  a  modern  phenomenon;  this
theoretical debate was beyond the scope of this study; it was employed because it is the paradigm
that gives the most attention to the role of capitalism, economic factors and mass media technology
in the forging of nationalism as a discursive formation. The sensitivity of Egyptian nationalism to the
movement of capital and modes of accumulation—as it has been demonstrated throughout the study
—challenges  the dominant  modernist  view that  mostly limits  the impact  of  capital  to  European
nationalism.  Even  in  the  post-colonial  tradition,  nationalism in  the  so-called  periphery  is  often
regarded as merely a reaction to European colonialism (Tom Nairn, 2015: 331; Michael Hechter,
2017; Hobsbawm, 1990). 
The regional influence and developments stemming from over-accumulation occurring in the oil-
rich Gulf states described throughout the study challenges this view, even if it was true to a certain
extent in the 19th century colonial and in the 20th century post-colonial era. Moreover, the emergence
of  early  experiences  of  pre-modern  forms  of  nationalism  outside  of  Europe  before  the  age  of
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European colonialism and before a European-led world economic system also poses questions about
the validity of this post-colonial assumption. With excessive capital accumulation occurring in non-
European settings and regions, the study of nationalism needs more than ever to break away from
this Eurocentric tradition.
The last point to be made shall be about the potential of this research to be extended beyond the
pages of this dissertation. The reason why I did not give this last chapter the typical “conclusion” title
is my belief that this research still does not—and might never—have a conclusive end. I believe that
what  is  needed  is  the  revival  of  further  examinations  of  links  between  more  “structural”  and
“superstructural” elements, that is between the fields of ideology, religion, culture and language on
the  one  hand,  and  the  economy  and  relations  of  production  on  the  other  hand  in  studying  the
contemporary and recent history of Egypt, but also the Middle East. 
This bringing down of disciplinary barriers is a way to confront Middle Eastern exceptionalism
especially after it has seen a revival due to the “failure” of the Arab revolutions to transition into
democracies.  One year  before  the  breakout  of  the  Arab  revolutions  in  2010,  Larry  Diamond,  a
scholar of democratic transitions, described the Middle East as “a striking anomaly – the principal
exception to the globalization of democracy” (my italics) (quoted in Heydemann, 2015). This view of
the Middle East as an anomaly was seriously challenged after the Arab revolutions of 2010/11 when
the respective authoritarian orders started crumbling one after the other and analogies were drawn
with the “Spring of Nations” of 1848 (hence the coinage of the “Arab Spring” as the most common
description of the revolutionary events) and the 1989 revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe.
However,  it  is  arguable  that  the  persistence  of  authoritarianism—with  the  possible  exception  of
Tunisia—gives  a  new  life  to  arguments  about  Arab—or  Middle  Eastern—exceptionalism
(Heydemann, 2016).
An appreciation of how symbolic and discursive fields are overdetermined could prevent the
analysis from stopping at the cultural level. It is a way to challenge the view that this “something” in
the composite culture of the Middle East—“which has frozen its history and has made it impossible
to ‘move forward’”— is not intrinsic and does not develop in a vacuum. 
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